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During the war against revolutionary France, in order to carry
out the ambitious policy of Henry Dund.as, Secretary of State for War,
the King's forces were conveyed to the far distant East and. West Indies,
to the Continent, the Mediterranean and. Erpt and. to the Cape of Good. Hope.
For the first eighteen months the war was conducted in a sluggish
and haphazard manner resulting in failure on the Continent and in an
inefficient transport service. The disorganization of the Navy Office
and abuses in the Royal dockyard.s, defects in the transport system which
had. been revealed by a commission of naval enquiry appointed. in 1785,
still existed. It became increasingly difficult to hire, inspect and
fit out enough ships to be used as transports. By July 1794 the lack of
success of the Continental campaigns and. the realization that war would
continue caused. the ministry to make important changes in the government
and in the transport system. The business of hiring vessels to be used
as troopships, victuallers, and. ordnance vessels was now centered. in a
Transport Board. and the competition in the engagement of shipping that
before existed. between the Navy, Victualling and. Ordnance offices was
eliminated.. A board. set up to deal specifically with transport affairs
was able to give undivided. attention to them. Thus a more organized
and efficiently run transport service was inaugurated..
Since the war against France was conducted. through a series of
campaigns and. expeditions the Transport Board did. not have to maintain a
large army overseas for an extended. period. of time. However, it carried
out some of the greatest troop movements of the eighteenth century,
particularly the Abercromby-Christian expedition of November 1795 which
3involved the conveyance of 27,000 men, their equipment, provisions and
ordnance to the West Indies, and the expedition to North Holland. in 1799
which involved the transportation of 46,000 men from England and the Baltic.
The progress of the transport BerviCe in getting the expeditions out to sea,
especially those going to the West Indies, was often impeded by the slowness
of other departments, particularly the Ordnance, in preparing for the
military enterprise and by the natural foibles of storms and. contrary winds.
Throughout the war the Transport Board also had to cope with a
dangerous shipping shortage, due to a vast increase in every branch of
trade. This was a time of unprecedented commercial prosperity when it
became more advantageous for the merchant to put his ship to a trade than
to let it to the government. Hiring space on merchant vessels that
traded reg.ilarly between Britain and the areas where the army was being
sent was one method the Transport Board employed in an attempt to meet
its tonnage requirements. Many troops and almost all officers were sent
to the West Indies in this manner and a great part of the provisions sent
to the British army overseas were conveyed in victuallers hired on freight.
The Transport Board chartered. eighty ships at Hamburg in order to satisfy
its shipping needs in 1795. However, this venture proved a great and
costly disappointment. More beneficial was the Board's practice of
keeping the freight rate offered. by the government to the owners of
merchant vessels consistent with the high cost of provisions and stores
and increased wages. The freight rate was increased by over seven
shillings per ton or by two thirds over an eight-year period. Previously,
it had remained almost static throughout the eighteenth century. By these
wise and practical methods the Transport Board was able to meet the logis-
tical requirements of Dundas' ambitious policy throughout the war.
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The logistical problems confronting a government in. sending
and. maintaining a sizeable army overseas is a neglected study in the
field of military history. The swiftness and efficiency with which
troops, their equipment and ordnance are transported to the field of
battle is a very essential factor in the outcome of any military
campaign and. should not be ignored. Because of the inability of the
government to adequately supply and. provision forces during combat
the objectives of many a military operation were never achieved. It
is the purpose of this enquiry to see how efficiently and effectively
the transport service was conducted during an eighteenth century world
war. The choice of the war against revolutionary France as a setting
for this administrative study proved specially interesting. During
that war the transport system for the first time in one hundred years
was radically changed by the creation of a Transport Board.
The need to undertake a study of the logistical problems con-
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scripts in their collections. The personnel of the Public Record
Office and the Manuscript Department of the British Museum have also
constantly and. patiently assisted me.
Finally, I could never have undertaken this work but for the
generosity and interest of my parents.
London, 1968	 M. E. Condon
CHAPTER I
THE CHAIN OF COMMAND IN THE TRANSPORT SYSTEM
9I
William Pitt never wanted war; and so he never prepared
for it. For ten years Pitt had been improving the general adminis-
trative machinery of the country but neglecting the army; when the
war began the ministers had to improvise an army as soon as possible.
The navy, though not as neglected as the army, was far from being in
perfect condition. There was mismnagemeni in the Admiralty and.
waste and. fraud in the Royal docicyards. Abuses in the Royal dock-
yards and. consequently in the transport system had. been revealed by
a commission of naval enquiry appointed. in 1785; but no action had
been taken to eliminate them. Action would not be taken until the
cabinet realised. war would continue and. that was a year and. a half
after it had begun.
The Prime Minister was not alone in his desire to steer
England. clear of war; his most prominent supporters were the King
and Lord Grenville at the Foreign Office. Once England. was at war,
however, they all hoped. and. counted on ii being a short one. For a
period of eighteen months after the French declaration of 3 February
1793 an indeterminate, Blow and. cumbersome war machine was employed
in preventing the establishment of a new order in France. The War
Office was under a nonentityGeorge Tongs, and. did. not even have
cabinet rank. The Master of the Orfinazice was the Duke of Richmond
10
who after a time ceased to attend cabinet meetings. Pitt's brother
Lord Chatham was at the head of the Admiralty and. would later be re-
placed by the more vigorous and efficient Lord Spencer. Pitt, whose
forte was not foreign or military affairs relied to a great extent
on his overworked Secretary of State for Home Affairs, Henry Dundas,
to formulate military policy. With these haphazard and odd arrange-
ments it is not difficult to see the reasons for failure and die-
-
couragemerit in the early part of the war. Another very important
reason for failure was the adoption by Pitt and. Dundas of military
plans on a scale far in excess of what the resources of the army
could maintain. Pitt and Dundas' military policy had several objects.
They hoped to arrest the growth of revolutionary France in Europe by
campaigning in the Netherlands and by aiding the French Royalists;
they also wished to increase the wealth and security of Britain and
at the same time weaken France by picking up French colonial terri-
tories. These multiple objects required a military strength beyond
the capacity of Britain at the time. The ministry not only failed
to estimate correctly the military strength of the country but failed
to decide where it could best be applied. The major and best part
of the .ing's army was consigned to the West Indies since that object
was given priority over the others, leaving a limited number for the
campaigns on the Continent and still fewer to aid the rising French
Royalists. This diffusion of efforts by the ministry without suffi-
cient military resources led to blunders and. mistakes - the campaigns
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on the Continent were a disaster and. Pitt's efforts to aid. the
French Royalists were a total failure - giving the Whig opposition
plenty of material for criticism.
Whigs under the leadership of Edmund Burke and the Duke of
Portland criticised severely the ministry's multiplicity of objects
and thought the government should concentrate on the one objective
of ridding the Continent of Europe of the revolutionary menace,
particularly by giving substantial aid. to the French Royalists.
Another faction of the Whig opposition wider the leadership of
Charles James Fox greatly impeded the efforts of Pitt and Dundas
by adamantly upholding the ideas of the Jacobin radicals and by
urging the withdrawal of Britain from the war altogether.
Since there was so much opposition to the war and since the
campaigns on the Continent had been going so badly, Pitt decided in
July 1794 to introduce important changes in the government and in
the administrative machinery. These changes he hoped would secure
a united front as well as an efficiently run war machine. The
broader aspect of these changes is seen in the fruition of Pitt's
negotiation with the Portland Whigs. Portland himself accepted
Pitt's invitation to be Second Secretary of State with control of the
Home Department and the Colonies. His supporter William Windhui
was given the post of Secretary at War; ' that office was reorganised
1. Lord Grenville remained at the Foreign Office;
AGeorge Yonge was transferred to the Mint.
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and given cabinet rank. Pitt, however, still was determined to
keep the course of the war under the direction of Dundas. He
therefore created a new office that of Secretary of State for War
with a Beat fl the cabinet. Thus from July 1794 both the Secretary
of State for War and. the Secretary at War were in the cabinet,
giving military affairs a better chance to receive adequate treatment.
In another effort to appease the Portland Whigs Windham was given
supervision of the Royalist expeditions. At the end of the year
Lord Chatham at the Admiralty was replaced by Lord. Spencer who was
far more efficient; at about the same time the Duke of Richmond was
retired from the Ordnance in favour of Lord Cornwallis. Pitt also
recalled the King's son, the Duke of York, from command in Holland;
after returning to England he served with great benefit to the army
and. the nation in the capacity of Commander-in-chief.
Secondly, in an attempt to make the war machine work more
efficiently, Pitt made changes in the administrative machinery of
the transport service. In July 1794 he followed up some of the
findings of the commission of naval enquiry by creating a Transport
Board, altering radically the chain of command in the transport
system. In order to appreciate the efficiency of the transport
system after these innovations it is necessary to see how the
administrative machinery of the transport system worked before the
changes in the cabinet and before the establishment of the Transport
Board.
13
II
The transportation of troops, their provisions and. supplies
involved. a series of operations and. a relegation of conanda oarried.
out by a number of persons, ranging downwards from the ministers in
cabinet, through the secretary of state, the secretary at war, the
secretary of the Admiralty, the master of the ordnance, comptroller
of the navy, the commissioner of the victualling, down to the transport
agent. To equip and. transport one regiment of troops the War depart-
ment, the Ordnance Board, the department of State, the Treasury
department, and. the Admiralty and its subdivisions the Navy Board
and the Victualling Board were all oonoerned.. Each one of these
departments and. boards was still involved. in the transportation of
troops after the establishment of the Transport Board on 4 July 1794;
but the chain of command. was altered considerably. In what follows
the organisation as it existed. at the beginning of the war will be
discussed.; the changes arising from the creation of the Transport
Board will be examined. in chapter II.
The secretary of state was in the pivotal position in the
chain of oommnd; it was he who kept the war machine in motion.
The Admiralty (and later the Transport Board as a branch of the
department of the Admiralty) received. a letter from the secretary
of state before any important undertaking. 1 That letter usually
announced. a cabinet decision and signified the ling's pleasure upon
1. E. ., PRO, ADX/1/4159, 26 Nov. 1793; ADM/3/11O, 2 March 1793;
ADM12/600, 15 July 1793, f.539; LDM/1/3730, 26 Aug. 1794.
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which the Admiralty was to act. "If an integrated expedition was
successfully assembled with its proper equipment, provisions, and
transport, and at the place and time which the cabinet had decreed,
this was the achievement of the responsible secretary of state."1
This was true of the war against revolutionary France as it was of
the American war,
All letters flowed through the department of State. A
decision to send troops to a particular theatre once agreed by the
cabinet would be set in motion by the secretary of state who forwarded
the cabinet's resolutions to the King for his approval and transmitted
them to the various department heads. He signified the cabinet
decision to the Admiralty by requesting vessels for the troops which
were to embark. Here is a typical instruction from the secretary
of state to the Admiralty at the beginning of the war. Henry Dundas
wrote on 21 February 1793.
It being the King's intention that three of the
battalions of His Guards should be sent as soon
as possible to Holland to assist in the defence
of that Republic; I am commanded to signify to
Your Lordahips His lajeaty's Pleasure that you
are to give orders that a proper quantity of
shipping may be provided for the reception of the
said troops, with the number of women and servants
mentioned in the inclosed. Return together with
their Camp Equ.ipage and. Baggage, and to convey them
wither to the Brill, Williaznetadt, or such other
place in Holland as the Officer commanding the
said troops shall think most convenient for landing.
1. Piers Mackesy. The War for America 1775-1783 (London, 1964), 17.
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The troops will be ready to embark from Greenwich
Hospital Stairs on Monday next, previous to which
time it is hoped that the transports will be
prepared, and will proceed down the river as near
the Hospital as conveniently may be, and that
proper craft will be ready to assist in the
embarkation of the said troops the sooner the
Camp Eqiiipage and Baggage can be put on board
the better.
In addition to the transports which may be requisite
for the troops baggage, it will be necessary that
a proper vessel should be appointed for the reception
of the battalion horses. If she cannot be fitted
in time to accompany the other transports it will
be expedient that she should follow them as soon
as possible.
The mention of convoy came next.
Your Lordahips will take care that a proper
convoy be appointed. to accompany the said
transports to the place of their destination
and to remain there till further orders, with
a view of affording the troops any assistance
or protection which they may stand in need of;
the transports to be taken up for the conveyance
of the troops, excepting about 300 or 400 tons,
may be discharged as son as the troops' stores
shall have been landed.
On 24 February the secretary of state's office informed
the Admiralty that the Guards were to go to Helvoetsluys.2
In informing the Admiralty of the cabinet decision concern-
ing the movement of troops the secretary of state told the Admiralty
where and when the troops would be ready to be embarked, their place
1. PRO, LDM/1/4157, 21 Feb. 1793.
2. Id, 24 Feb. 1793.
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of destination, the different kinds of transports that would be
needed (for troops, for baggage, and for horses) and. the destination
of the transports after the troops had been landed; a recruest for
a convoy was also made. (Except in regard to victualling ships in
almost all cases where overseas convoy was needed, the secretary of
state made that request of the Admiralty. This could take place at
any time from the initial request for conveyance up till the vessels
were reported readr for service. ) Three days later the Admiralty
was informed, of the exact place of destination.
Thus, the administrative machinery was set in motion.
Then the Admiralty department with its subdivisions the Navy Board
and Victualling Board, the Treasury department, and the Ordnance
Board were put to work.
Once the Admiralty had received an instruction from the
secretary of state requiring the use of transports, in turn it
passed orders to the Navy Board to provide the vessels and get
2them ready.	 The Navy Board was wider the direction of the
commissioners of the Admiralty but unlike other subdivisions of
government departments it had a high degree of autonomy especially
in the transport and. supply area. The commission of naval enquiry
1. E. ., PRO, ADM/1/4162, 16 Sept. 1794; LDM/1/4290, 24 May 1793;
LDM/3/11O, 28 June 1793. When the East India Company Directors
were apprehensive about their ships sailing in enemy infested
waters they wrote to Secretary Dundas and asked if it might not
be advisable to have a convoy.
2. E. ., PRO, ADM/1/4159, 2 Dec. 1793; ADM/106/2651, 24 July 1794;
.A])M/3/11O, 24 June 1793; .ADM/2/600, 23 May 1793.
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appointed in 1785 had called for a new constitution of the Navy
Board in order that it might form a system better adapted to the
conduct of busine8s. By 1793 the reconstitution had not taken
place and the admirable and efficient comptroller Charles Middleton
was no longer at the Board, his place having been taken by Henry
Martin. In 1793 the Navy Board consisted of eight commissioners.
It was the duty of that Board to consult and advise with the
Admiralty how to transact to the best advantage all affairs tending
to the well-being and. regulation of the civil establishment of the
navy. With the agreement of most members and by common council
it proceeded to make contracts for naval stores of every kind, and
supervised their issue; it prepared all estimates for the expense
of the navy; directed all monies for naval services into the
treasurer' s hands; and examined and certified his accounts for
naval expenses. Added to these naval responsibilities was the duty
of hiring and preparing all army troop transports and navy victuallers
as well as preparing army victuallers and. ordnance vessels. It was
not the Navy Board's duty to hire army victuallere; that was the
responsibility of the Treasury. 1 Nor did. it have the duty of hiring
ordnance vessels. The Ordnance Board hired its own vessels; but
it was the Navy Board's duty to inspect and if need be equip all
1 • This was different from the practice adopted during the American
war of independence, when, at first, the Treasury hired its own
ships to carry food but latterly the Navy Board took over res-
ponsibility. See below p.1S.
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vessels, whether troop transports, victualling transports or ordnance
transports, for their particular service.
In the period before the establishment of the Transport Board
the Treasury department was the only department which performed its
duty regarding transports without working directly through the
secretary of state. The Admiralty, as we have seen, corresponded
extensively with Dundas. As we shall see, the War Offioe and
Ordnance Board did. also. But the Treasury usually received its
information from the Admiralty; and the Victualling Board which
worked closely with the Treasury and. was a subdivision of the
Admiralty corresponded very little with the secretary of state.
Since the Treasury was responsible for provisioning the
army, that department was informed by the Admiralty (more often
than not through the Navy Board) of the need for provisions, of
the length of time the troops were to be victualled with provisions
and. at what rate. And the Victualling Board working closely with
the Treasury was directed by the Treasury to provide the provisions
and. often to provide the vessels for army provisions. 1 The business
of the Victualling Office as described by the commission of naval
enquiry appointed in 1785 was concerned with victualling the navy.
1. E. ., PRO, ADM/1/4290, 26 Sept. 1794; .ADM/109/102 , 8 Nov. 1793;
.ADJ(/111/129, 16 Nov. 1793. The duty of purchasing provisions
for the sing's forces and settlements abroad was given to the
Victualling Board in October 1793. Before that the Treasury
alone handled the purchasing. ADM/109/1 02 , 24 Oct. 1793.
19
It provided,
either by contract or otherwise all provisions,
and also certain stores required for His Majesty's
Navy; arranging and distributing the whole to the
several ports and. places at home and abroad, as the
service may require; to take care that the different
provisions and stores, when issued be properly
charged to the Agents, Storekeepers, Pursers, Masters
of transports, or others, to whom they were issued;
and. to compel the respective parties to pass timely
and regular accounts; also to take care that all
offal arising from articles manufactured be properly
disposed. of, all old stores sold to the best advan-
tage, and the proceeds duly accounted for; to attend
the various checks, etc. which have been instituted
for the security of the Public, with other numerous
and important objects, which were constantly and
necessarily attached to this office.1
The business of victualling the army was conducted by the
Victualling Office in a similar way. At the outbreak of the war,
however, the Victualling Board did not have the duty of victualling
the army; it was the sole responsibility of the Treasury. Nine
months after the war began the Victualling Board was given the
responsibility of victualling the army under the general direction
of the Treasury. The commissioners of the Treasury were of the
opinion that this service might"be performed with greater advantage
to the public by ghe Victallinil Board than in any other way," as
the commissioners were satisfied by two members of the Victualling
Board that the Board could. "discharge that duty without prejudice
1. Parliamentary Papers, 1806. Eighth Report of the Commissioneri
appointed by Parliament to enquire into the Fees, Gratuities,
Perquisites, and noluments, which are, or have been lately
received in the several Public Offices therein mentioned,
vol. VII, 554.
20
in the smallest degree to the service with which Ehey were theg
entrusted for the navy." 1 In addition the Victualling Board was
often directed by the Treasury to hire the vessels to carry these
provisions. The latter responsibility was transferred to the
Transport Board in 1794; but the Treasury continued throughout
the war to hold. the responsibility of providing the army with its
provisions.
Here follows an example of Treasury arrangements concern-
ing transports. In October 1793 provisions were needed to victual
334 men in the Bahama Islands. The troops consisted of seven oom-
panies of the 47th regiment amounting to 314 men and. a subaltern's
command. of artillery consisting of twenty men. The Victualling
Office at the direction of the Treasury calculated the amount of
provisions needed for the troops after the rate of one pound of
flour and. twelve ounces of pork per man per day and transmitted
its report -to the Treasury on 15 October. On 8 November the
Treasury after studying the report directed the Victualling to
provide the amount of provisions specified in the report for six
months and. send. the same to the Bahamas at the first opportunity.
By 14 December the provisions had been shipped on the Mary Ann
victualler.
1. PRO, .ADM/109/102, 24 Oct. 1793. Because of the added. duties
imposed on the commissioners they were given the following sums
in addition to their salaries. To the Chairman of the Board
£500 a year. Each of the other commissioners £250 a year.
Clerks and. officers under them were given allowances that commenced
from 24 June 1793; on 26 Oct. 1793, G. Rose was appointed store-
keeper of army provisions. PRO, ADN/109/102, 26 Oct. 1793.
2. Ibid., 15 Oct.; 8 Nov. 1793.
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Since, before the Transport Board was established, it was
the responsibility of the Treasury to hire its own vessels the
commissioners of the Treasury usually directed the Victualling
Board to provide the vessels; 1 and on occasion it requested the
Navy Board to do so;2 there is evidence that the commissioners
of the Victualling made the same request to the Navy Board..3
The Navy Board acquainted the Treasury when the victuallers
were laden and. rea&y to sail; then the Treasury requested convoy
for the victualling ships. 4 The Treasury with the assistance of
the Admiralty or the Navy Board directed them to their place of
destination. For example, on 21 January 1794 George Rose, secretary
to the commissioners of the Treasury, wrote to the commissioners of
the Victualling:
I have laid before the Lord Commissioners of His
Majesty's Treasury your letter of the 20th instant,
acquainting their Lordehips that the supply of
provisions for three months for 10,000 men in the
West Indies have been shipped on board the transports
named. in the rnarin anger, Welcome Messenger,
Freedom, CamillW, which have been directed to pro-
ceed to Spithead; and I am commanded by their Lord-
ships to acquaint you they have given orders to the
Commissioners of the Navy to direct them to proceed
with the next convoy for the West Indies.5
1. E. g., PRO, ADM/109/102, 15 Nov. 1793; 21 Jan. 1794; 1 Jan. 1794.
2. E. g., Ibid., 27 Nov. 1793; 18 N v. 1793.
3. L g., PRO, .ADM/109/102, 3 April 1794.
4. E. g., PRO, ADM/1/4290, 24 Dec. 1793; ADM/1O9/102, 24 May 1794;
see above p.16.
5. PRO, ADM/109/102, 21 Jan. 1794.
22
On the following day the Victualling Board informed the Navy
Board of this letter.1
Money needed for the various operations of the Admiralty
department was supplied by the Treasury; the receipts for delivery
of stores and. provisions were eventually to be in the haMs of the
Treasury department. The Navy Board, the commissioners of the
Victualling, and the commissioners of Transports, when that Board
was set up, transmitted to the Treasury Board the estimates which
would be laid before the House of Commons in the ensuing session
of parliament, for the service of the navy, victualling and the
transports for the coming year.2
When the Transport Board was established the debt of that
Board was included. in the debt of the navy. 3 A letter from the
Treasury of 26 September 1794 authorized. the treasurer of the
navy to make all payments for the transport service. He was
directed to "apply to the Treasury for such monies as shall be
necessary for such service and pay the bills issued by the
Commissioners of Transport in the same manner as those which are
1. PRO, ADM/109/102, 22 Jan. 1794.
2. E. ., PRO, ADM/1/4290, 10 Oct. 1795; ADN/106/2218, 31 March 1794;
ADM/108/67, 17 June 1800.
3. PRO, LDM/1/4290, 14 Jan. 1795, G. Rose to P. Stephens.
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issued by the several Boards under the Department of the Lords of
the Admiralty." 1 Since the money expended in the transport service
was taken out of the General Fund. appropriated for naval services,
in the spring of 1796 the treasurer of the navy suggested. that a
fourth section for the transport service be added to his accounts,
to be examined and. certifiied by three commissioners of the Navy
in the same manner as had long been practiced with respect to the
expenditures in the department of the commissioners of Victualling
and of Sick and. Hurt Seamen.2
Unlike the Treasury the War department had the secretary
of state as the intermediary between itself and. the different
departments. The War Office run by the secretary at war and the
commander-in-chief3 was a subordinate administrative office. It
did not plan strategy or the strength of the army. That was con-
trolled. by the cabinet and secretaries of state. With. the changes
in the ministry and the reorganisation of the War Office in July
1794 the secretary at war had a seat in the cabinet. His presence
there enabled him to inform the ministers of the actual strength
of the army, which cannot but have been of advantage. But Henry
Dunclas as Secretary of State for War with the cabinet planned the
war. He sent operational instructions directly to the commanders
1. PRO, LDM/1/4291, Office for Auditing Public Accounts to Treasury,
29 April 1796.
2. Ibid.
3. The Commander-in-chief was Lord Amherst until the appointment
of the Duke of York to that position in 1795.
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in the different theatres of battle and issued orders to the War
Office for troop movements. The War Office carried out these orders.
It provided, the secretary of state with lists of the men and draughts
to be embarked and intimations of when they would be ready to be
embarked. If detachments of artillery were intended to be attached
to these regiments, then a further provision of tonnage would be
necessary, the estimate of which would be furnished by the Master
General of the Board of Ordnance. If transports taken up could
not remain at the place of debarkation to attend upon the motions
of the troops then more shipping would be hired for the purpose of
replacing them.
Preliminary moves regarding transports might be made at a
lower level but formal authorization was also required. Here
follows a case of the subordinate office acting informally to get
things started, pending official orders. In early June 1794 the
Secretary at War wrote directly to the Navy Board requesting traus-
ports for cavalry. The Navy Board prepared to provide the necessary
conveyance but not without taking the precaution of writing to the
Secretary at War that he should make the regular application for
transports to the Admiralty "that the Navy Board may be justified.
in what they have done to forward the service." 1 Oned&y later
Lord Amherst informed the Admiralty of an increase in the number of
cavalry to be embarked. On the same day the Admiralty informed
• 1. PRO, ADM/1/433O, War to Admiralty, 9 June 1794, enclosing a copy
of a letter from H. Martin to Lord Amherst, 8 June 1794.
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Amherst that Secretary Dundas had. not yet signified the King's
pleasure for providing 	 shipping for the number of cavalry but
as soon as it was received the service would be furthered. 1 Thus
the operation could. get started but could not proceed to an effect-
ive conclusion without the proper authorization. It was natural
during war time for convenient steps to be taken to shorten pro-
cedure and. hasten an operation; but formal authorization eventually
had. to be received. When the channels of communication between
the various departments were slow and ineffective so was the
transport system.
Only with regard to minor arrangements did the War Office
write directly to the Admiralty and. receive immediate favourable
response to its request. These requests were mostly concerned with
the transportation of individual officers and their baggage to a
specific destination (in such cases the transportation usually took
place on a warship); or with the appointment of a certain officer
to superintend a specific transportation; or to move a partioular
regiment in one transport from one British port to another; or to
make sure the troops were supplied with fresh provisions as they
2
remained in port in transports.	 However the War Office needed
to ask the Admiralty to have an army officer leave a ship in order
to join another army detachment.3
1. PRO, ADM/1/4330, War to Admiralty, 9 June 1794.
2. PRO, ADM/1/4330, 22 Feb.; 21 Xay; 9 Aug.; 2 Oct. 1793.
3. Ibid., 21 Dec. 1793.
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If artillery, engineers and. ordnance stores were to
accompany the army to its place of destination that was the res-
ponsibility of the Ordnance Board. Again the secretary of state
acted as intermediary; this time between the army commanders and
the Ordmnoe Board. The Ordnance Board received information from
the secretary of state about the movement of artillery and artillery
companies. It then acquainted the Admiralty with this information
and. requested them to order the Navy Board to make sure a ship was
equipped to receive the artillery and to make sure the necessary pro-
portion of provisions and. water casks were issued. from the Victualling
Office. 1 During the American war and during the war against revolu-
tionary France before the establishment of the Transport Board the
Ordnance Board hired its own ships to convey ordnance stores. A
request for convoy for these transports was sometimes made by the
Ordnance Board but generally the secretary of state performed this
service.
Here is an example of Ordnance Board activity involving
transports. It was assumed the Navy Board would. hire the vessels
to transport these artillery men but as a rule artillery men were
transported on armed ordnance vessels. In September 1793 Secretary
Dundas informed the Master General of the Ordnance that two companies
of the Royal regiment of Irish Artillery in Flanders should be ordered.
to accompany the expedition under the command of Sir Charles Grey to
1. E. g., PRO, ADM/1/4014, 1 Oct. 1793.
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the West Indies. He wanted the companies ready to embark from
Ostend within a fortnight, in order to join the expedition at Spithead.
On 1 October the Iaster General requested the Admiralty to order the
Victualling Office to issue the necessary proportion of provisions
and water casks for the two companies and to order the Navy Board
to hire and equip a vessel to convey them. 1 By these means the
artillery were transported overseas.
Responsibility travelled further down the chain of command
as each department carried out its special duty in regard to trans-
ports. The transport agents of the Navy Board and. later of the
Transport Board were perhaps the most important link in the chain
of command. of the transport system. Without these men a transport
service could never have existed. Transport agents were agents of
the Navy Board who were stationed in domestic or foreign ports where
transports were located or who travelled with the transports. Those
stationed in domestic ports were known as resident agents and generally
had a naval rank of Lieutenant, though some were Captains. Those
agents who travelled with the transports or were stationed in foreign
ports were known as agents of transports or agents afloat or float-
ing agents. These agents were usually Captains and therefore had. a
higher naval rank than resident agents.
Resident agents resided at their stations and corresponded
regularly with the Navy Board reporting the arrival and sailing of
1. PRO, ADN/1/4014, 1 Oct. 1793.
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transports and all occurrences relating to the service of this
department. They gave orders for the transports to be fitted and
supplied with whatever was necessary for the respective services;
they demanded provisions and. water and all such stores as were
furnished by other departments; and took care that all transports
were regilarly mustered when the weather would permit, and that
they were kept clean, and in proper condition to receive troops,
horses, baggage and stores, according to the apportionment trans-
mitted from the Board. They superintended all embarkation and
disembarkation of cavalry and infantry at their station and oommwii-
cated with the General commanding the district in all such occasions.
They purchased forage, and such other articles of immediate supply
as the Board might have directed and. hired vessels, when necessary,
for short services directed by the Board. 1 Resident. agents were
considered "the immediate organs of the Board, with whom instructions
might be committed for the conduct of the floating agents upon their
arrival from different parts of the world or by whom the particular
orders of the Board might be delivered for the speedy execution of
the service."2
Agents afloat when ordered with a number of transports upon
service, placed themselves on board whichever one was most convenient
1. Parliamentary Papers, 1809. Thirteenth Report of the Commissioners
for revising and digesting the civil affairs of His Majest y's Navy,
vol. VI, 5-8.
2. PRO, IDM/1/3741, Transport Office to E. Nepean, 19 Aug. 1801.
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for their duty; the masters were required to accommodate and
assist them. It was the duty of the floating agent to see that
the transports had their proper complement of men according to
their charter parties. They also attended the embarkation and.
disembarkation of the ring's forces and. were responsible for the
expenditure of provisions and stores in each transport. They
kept an account of such stores as were received and issued and
corresponded with the Board. On foreign stations they were at the
service of the Commanders-in-chief. 1 While under the orders of
the Commanders-in-chief the transport agents on foreign stations
sometimes hired, equipped and fitted out transports.
After the transports were equipped and the troops embarked
the convoy commander took control in accordance with his instructions
from the Admiralty. He was the senior officer onoe the transports
were in motion; and it was his task to see the transports in safety
to their destination. After that he was under the orders of the
local naval commander unless the Admiralty directed otherwise.
As a rule this was the chain of command used in operating
the transport service. However during wartime a department often
found it more expedient and convenient to deviate from the standard
practice. In most cases the departments concerned were informed and
when the deviation was completed the usual channels of command were
restored and the proper authorisation issued.
1. Parliamentary Papers, 1809, op. cit., Thirteenth Report, 5-8.
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As we have seen the transporting of men and supplies involved
much activity and. correspondence between the different branches of
government. When the Transport Board was established on 4 July 1794
a radical change took place in the administrative machinery and. inter-
departmental communication and consequently in the chain of command.
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CHAPTER II
THE NEED FOR AN]) ETABLISHMENT OF A TRANSPORT BOAR])
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The creation of a separate board in July 1794 to handle
the business of transports, and thereby relieve the Navy Board. of
this important and time-consuming task, was not a new idea. There
was a Transport Board in the first quarter of the eighteen century
which went out of existence in 1724.1 The notion of renewing the
establishment of a separate board to handle the freight and
victualling services had been discussed during the American war
of independence when Charles Midd.leton was comptroller of the Navy
Board. The American war had revealed the inadequacies of the
transport system and abuses in the Royal dockyards. Middleton
was in a position to observe these inadequacies at first hand. As
a result he became interested in navy reform and during his long
tenure as comptroller (from 1778 until 1790) he was outspoken on
the navy's defects and conscientiously active in proposing remedies.
Although Middleton was not a member of the commission of naval
enquiry appointed in 1785 to look into the abuses in the Royal dock-
yards he was definitely the source of ideas for the commissioners.
It is almost certain that Middleton's revelations about the weaknesses
1. This Transport Board was instituted in 1690 to execute the service
of providing ships and necessaries for the transportation of the
axny to Ireland. It consisted of 8 commissioners with a salary
of £400 per annum each. About the beginning of the reign of
Queen Anne, the Transport Board appears to have been reduced to
3 members. Parliamentary Papers, 1809, op. cit., Ninth Report, 4.
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of naval administration were instrumental in the calling of the
commission. Throughout his life he continued to advocate administra-.
tive reform and integrity in government. It was perhaps particularly
these efforts that brought him into line for the post of First Lord
of the Admiralty in 1805, when Pitt needed to do everything possible
to erase the image of Admiralty corruption conjured up by the im-
peachment of Dundas. That same year he received his peerage and
became known as Lord. Barham.
Midd.leton mentioned the idea of creating one particular
board to deal with the transport service when criticizing the
victualling and transporting of troops during and. after war with
America. It was his opinion that the relief of Gibraltar had.
been inefficiently and hazar1y effected due to the stores and
supplies not being ordered on time to be got ready at Spithead.
- He thought that if the preparation of the whole expedition had.
been committed to one particular board, or to one man acquainted
with sea affairs, this lack of coordination between the various
departments might have been avoided.1
Mid.dleton's notions about the creation of a separate
Transport Board probably influenced Frederick Cornwall, a member
of the Treasury Board, during the American war. Cornwall wrote
in 1778 to John Robinson, Secretary of the Treasury, "On the
Freight Service and the Supply of Provisions for the troops in
1. N1, Barh.am, vol. II, 17.
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America for 1778." In that letter he mentioned. that some time
ago he had proposed the establishment of a board for carrying on
the freight and victualling services. He did admit that at that
period there was scarcely time to execute such a measure, for the
choice of the right men to run the Board would require a proper
investigation. The same objection held true in 1778 and. Cornwall
optimistically felt that the service would be coming to a conclusion.
Therefore, he thought the freight service, though inadequate must be
continued in 1778 as it had been the past two years. 1 One change
however was made. In 1779 the army victualling ships service was
taken away from the Treasury and given to the Navy Board. At the
outbreak of the war against revolutionary France the Treasury
again had the responsibility of handling the army victualling ships
service but it relied to a great extent on the Navy Board's assistance
in hiring victualling ships. Then, as has been before stated, on
24 October 1793 the Treasury delegated to the Victualling Board. the
duty of procuring army provisions. 2 This arrangement had been dis-
cussed. during the American war when Lord North acting upon a re-
presentation made to him some time before, that it appeared. probable
that the Treasury paid a great deal more for beef and pork than the
victualling office, asked. John Robinson "to consider whether we shall
not save considerably to the public by putting the victualling of
the army under the ictuallin connnissioners."3
1. Add.. 1452., 38209, f. 330-1.
2. PRO, ADM/109/102, 24 Oct. 1793 . see above, pp. 19, 20.
3. Abergavenny 1455. 390, 30 Sept. 1781.
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With the return of peace in 1783 there was time and
opportunity for investigating the abuses of the navy and for intro-
ducing improvements. Therefore, the decade between the American
war and the war against revolutionary France was one of investiga-
tions and inquiries into naval problems and recommendations for
their solutions.
Parliament took up the question of naval reform by appoint-
ing a commission in 1785 to look into the abuses in the Royal dock-
1yards.	 Niddleton was undoubtedly instrumental in the calling of
this commission. The chief commissioners were John Dick, William
)lolleson, and Francis Baring. The latter had been in charge of
handling the victualling for the Treasury in the last year of the
American war. The investigation took three years to complete and
its results were printed in a series of reports which were dated.
from April 1786 to June 1788. Though none of the reports of the
commissioners dealt solely with the transport service, the fifth,
sixth and eighth reports yielded information about the abuses which
hampered this service and. made valuable suggestions for its improve-
ment. Some of the proposals of the commissioners appointed in 1785
were carried into effect during the war against revolutionary France
and during the Napoleonic wars. I4iddleton's influence on the
commission becomes obvious when one compares his ideas on the subject
of transport improvement with the recommendations of the commissioners.
1. Parliamentary Papers, 1806, op. cit., contain the reports of the
commissioners of enquiry appointed in 1785.
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In the fifth report which dealt with the Commissioners of
the Navy the commission of naval enquiry noted that the most damag-
ing mismanagement was the practice of several boards and officers
taking up transports for themselves in different modes, or by
single persons acting under their authority. 1 Three different
organisations had been used for hiring freight: the Navy the
transports which accommodated the troops; the Treasury the transports
which carried the provisions; and. the Ordnance the transports which
conveyed the ammunition and stores. Each department freighted and.
employed its own vessels and. sometimes at different rates, depending
on the urgency of the situation and the ships that were available;
as a result each board competed with the others for the available
shipping. It was largely to eliminate this competition that the
Navy Board in 1779 under the direction of )Iid.d.leton took over from
the Treasury the army viotuallers • The Ordnance Board however con-
tinued to hire its own shipping. In the last stages of the American
war Middleton stressed the case on grounds of rational administration
for transferring the Ordnance and Victualling Board shipping to the
Navy Board.2
 After 1780 the Navy Board. had found it extremely
difficult to charter additional tonnage "because the weakness of the
Navy's credit did. not permit it to offer oompetitive rates of freight
and it was constantly outbid for ships by the Ordnance and Victualling
1. Parliamentary Papers, 1806, op. cit., Fifth Report, 190.
2. Mackesy, op. cit., 68.
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Boards."1
After the American war Middleton forwarded his opinion on
this subject to the King in a memorial written near the end of 1783.
It was his opinion that the victualling business of the army suffered.
in the American war because the men who managed it for the Treasury
lacked knowledge of shipping and. hired without adequate inspection
or supervision at a higher rate than the Navy Board. He concluded
it would be benefioial to the service as a whole to entrust the
hiring of ships to professional men with a knowledge of shipping.
He stated.:
that should. a consideration of these reasons for
entrusting Your Majesty's Memorialists with the
transporting and. victualling business, and an
attention to the advantages arising from the
whole being uniformly conducted and from whatever
regards shipping being entrusted. only to professional
men and a desire to prevent, among the different
boards, a competition most injurious to your
Majesty's service, ever bring about a resolution to
transfer to them, with the approbation of the Lords
Commissioners of the Admiralty, the whole business
of providing hired ships or transports for every
other public board, so as to make it their duty to
supply the Victualling and. Ordnance Boards in
particular with whatever ships may be wanting in
their respective departments,— they are, with a
view to the advantage of your Majestys service,
ready to undertake it with the utmost frugality,
and., with the same attention as in the other brnches,
to make the several parts useful to each other.
1. David Syreit, The Navy Board's Administration of the Maritime
Logistics of the British Forces during the American War, 177-
1783. (unpublished University of London Ph.D. thesis, 1966),
392.
2. NRS, Barham, vol. II, 169-70.
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Middleton's memorial was written in 1783. In 1788 the
commissioners in their fifth report cited the practice of purchasing
or hiring ships and vessels, when required for the public service,
by different boards, as one found by experience to be inconvenient
and detrimental. It was their opinion, like )tiddleton's, that the
performance of this service altogether by the Navy Board would be
for the public benefit,
the professional knowledge of the members at
that Board would prevent purchase or hire of
improper vessels; and the competition being
removed, the tonnage wanted would be obtained
at a fair and reasonable rate; whereas, by
several Boards bidding against each other, the
price will be raised, and vessels unfit for
the service frequently engaged.1
The commissioners thought the Navy Board might make the agreement,
and the contract be drawn persuant thereto, between the owner and
the department for which the ship was wanted.
Middleton's influence on the commission is very apparent.
It is not surprising since he was comptroller of the Navy at the
time and since he was in the forefront of naval reform. While
the naval enquiry was in progress the Prime Minister put a set of
questions known as Mr. Pitt's Queries to Middleton in early 1786
about the. state of preparation in dockyard.s, etc. for a war
emergency as well as questions dealing with what would have been
necessary for carrying on the service to advantage in the last
1. Parliamentary Papers, 1806, op. cit., Fifth Report, 190.
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war. (These questions may have been the same as a set of questions
concerning naval reform which Mid.dleton had written and submitted
to the King in December 1785.)	 Middleton's answers reveal the
steps he thought should be taken in ensuring better naval administra-
tion. He stressed the drastic need for the reorganization of the
Navy Board. Instead of nine commissioners sitting at one table 10
obstruct business, Middleton thought they must be broken into
committees so that they could examine more correctly the contracts
and accounts, and give dispatch to the variety of matters before
the Board. He considered the method then used of conducting
business as very uneconomical and thought considerable changes were
2
needed.
The commissioners in their fifth report which was not com-
pleted until 14 February 1788, after emphasizing the need for a re-
organization of the Navy Board, proposed that there be ten commissioners
of the Navy resident in London, for conducting the business of the
Navy Board who should be divided into three committees; viz a
committee of correspondence, of accounts, and of stores. 3
 This
proposition was adopted by order in council 8 June 1796.
Since Middleton was exceedingly anxious that Pitt should
acquire an adequate notion of the Navy Board department he forwarded
1. NRS, Barham, vol. II, 207-8.
2. Ibid., see also, PRO/30/8/246.
3. Parliamentary Papers, 1806, op. cit., Fifth Report, 183.
4. Parliamentary Papers, 1809, op. cit., Fourth Report, 3.
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to the Prime Minister in September 1786 a book of Navy Board warrants
and his reasons for widertaking it. "It is a national concern of
the first magnitude" he wrote to Pitt. The book of Navy Board
warrants contained the regulations for the civil branch of the Navy
and exhibited what Middleton had done so far to put the dockyards
in order. The information it contained had. been gathered during
and after the war with America. Since the copy he gave Pitt was
the only one in his possession, Middletonrequested the Prime
Minister to return it before the commissioners entered upon their
enquiry at the Navy Office. 1
 The book must have been returned by
December for in that month Mid.dleton Bent a letter to Francis Baring,
one of the commissioners, in which he enclosed a paper on which he
set down his meditations on the abuses of the Navy Board. These
meditations were taken most likely from the book of Navy Board.
warrants. In the paper sent to Baring Middleton pointed to the
fact that in King William's time though the business was much less
than it was in the 1780's, the comptroller was allowed an assistant.
He emphasised his point by stating that the want of such help was
felt by him during the American war when he handled almost the whole
correspondence of the army victualling, transportation of troops and.
secret expedition independent of all the other business of the Board.
Though every effort was made at the time to save the public from
imposition Middleton found it was impossible. The ever-growing
1. PRO/30/8/I11, 18; 23 Sept. 1786.
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business of -the Navy Board put it out of the power of their number
to examine "with that scrupulous nicety which their importance
requires, the public accounts, belonging to their department. It
was impossible without a total change to reach that correctness
which the magnitude of the object required." 1 A reorganisation
of the Navy Board was essential.
The commissioners of naval enquiry in their fifth report
pointed out that in spite of the great increase of the navy the
constitution of the Navy Board had. undergone very little change
for upwards of a century, except that the number of commissioners
had occasionally varied from seven to ten; 2 in 1788 the duties of
the principal officers and. commissioners not only pertained to the
navy but also included -the transporting of troops and supplies for
the army. As a result of the increased naval duties and of very
little alteration in the Board for over a century
several parts of the business allotted to the
commissioners, who were supposed -to have special
superintendence over each branch of duty, were
unavoidably left to clerks, who, however honest and
diligent, were not the persons who could properly be
consiered. responsible to the Public for what was
done.
1. NRS, Barhazn, vol. II, 241-4.
2. Parliamentary Papers, 1806, op. cit., Fifth Report, 182.
3 • Ibid.	 4, /7_f, ° -	 -' A7,,%;6, .3
42
To remedy this the commissioners of enquiry called for a new con-
stitution of the Navy Board. in order that it might conduct its
business more adequately.1
In the enclosure sent to Baring in December 1786 Middleton
also gave it as his opinion, that to correct the many defects of
the Navy Board a much stronger controlling power than there was then
was absolutely necessary. Responsibility in the strictest sense
had. to be tacked on to this power, )Iid.dleton thought, or it would
be futile. 2 The commissioners incorporated this idea into their
fifth report when they criticized the lack of special superintendence
over each branch of duty of the Navy Board and recommended placing a
general superintending and directing power in the comptroller who
would do more than conduct the business and lead his fellow officers.
He would arrange the whole of the business, dividing it amongst
the several members for the purposes of accuracy and dispatch, and.
would control the expense in every branch of the office and its
dependencies. Thus he would be responsible for the whole. 3 It
is very clear that the commissioners were putting down on paper the
ideas of the comptroller.
In that same letter to Baring Middleton stated that no part
of the service stood more in need of reformation than the transport
service itself.
1. Parliamentary Papers, 1806, op. cit., Fifth Report, 182.
2. NRS, Barham, December 1786, vol. II, 243.
3. Parliamentary Papers, 1806, op. cit., Fifth Report, 182.
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The most enormous abuses are suffered to take place
in it. Transports when wanted to be taken up or
bought, are surveyed by the master attendant, master
shipwright and. clerk of the survey of Deptford. yard,
and. they are hired and freighted on their report,
and though every measure that caution can suggest is
taken to prevent imposition, yet we have the strongest
reason to believe it is still carried on, by its
pernicious and extravagant effects. The Yard officers
ought to have no part in this business, miring the
last war it employed almost the whole of their time
to the entire neglect of their own proper business.
The sixth report of the commissioners which dealt with the
dockyards and was completed 10 March 1788 called attention to this
abuse of the transport service as set down in Middleton's paper of
December 1786. In that report the commissioners again emphasized
the over-burdening duties of officers under the jurisdiction of the.
Navy Board. Only this time the examination pertained to the duties
peculiar to the officers belonging to the yard at Deptford and.
Woolwioh namely that of surveying, measuring, valuing, and report-.
ing upon all ships tendered to the Navy Board for transports or
store ships, either for hire or purchase. The commissioners came
to the conclusion that during the last war this duty occupied a
great deal of the naval officers' time and often took them away from
the yard to the detriment of the special duties of their stations
which required their presence in the yard. 2 The commissioners
recommended in their sixth report that the burden of surveying,
1. NRS, Barham, vol. II,48.
2. The number of days employed on this particular service the
commissioners of 1809 noted had even exceeded two hundred in the
course of a year; and extra wages allowed on these occasions to
the officers of the yard, occasioned a considerable additional
expense to the public. Parliamentary Papers, 1809, op. cit.,
Ninth Report, 5.
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measuring, valuing and reporting on ships tendered for transports
or store ships be taken away from the naval officers of the yard
and be performed. under the direction of the professional members
of the Navy Board by men specifically appointed for the purpose.1
The point that must be emphasised is that Midd.leton and
the commissioners of enquiry stressed the fact that the Navy Board
was overburdened; that it needed. to be constituted in a different
form in order to carry out its duties effectively. The Navy
Board was relieved of the business relating to transports when the
Transport Board was created in 1794 and the burden of carrying out
those duties pertaining to the transporting of troops and supplies
for the army and supplies for the navy was taken away.
The Victualling department also came under the scrutiny of
the commission appointed in 1785 and was the substance of its eighth
report. The commissioners found flagrant abuses respecting the
commissioners of the Victualling Board who superintended the depart-
ment of the Hoytaker. They noticed that several of the victualling
officers and clerks acted as agents for pursers, other officers of
ships, and sometimes for contractors; "a practice which, however
sanctioned by long usage or custom, we must continue to reprobate
2
upon every occasion..."
1. Parliamentary Papers, 1806, op. cit., Sixth Report, 305.
2. Parliamentary Papers, 1806, op. cit., Eighth Report, 574-5.
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They also noticed that many transports were hired by the
Board, which belonged to the Hoytaker, and. to other persons in the
King's victualling service. The commissioners voiced in the
strongest terms their disapprobation of such conduct on the part of
the persons in question, and were surprised, that such improper
proceedings escaped the censure and. correction of the Board, since
it must have been well known at the time to several members of that
Board.
By their examination into the duty of the Hoytaker the
commissioners of 1785 were led to review the whole of the transport
service during the American war. They noticed a variety of abuses
resulting from the mode of taking up transports by the Victualling
and Ordnance Boards. Unlike the Navy Board which took up transports
according to the measured tonnage of the ship, these other boards
took them up according to the quantity of stores put on board.
Under the Commissioners of the Navy measurement
is the criterion; and under the Board of
Victualling a calculation is made of the certain
quantity of ProviBions or Stores to the ton; the
contract price, according to the latter method, is
nominally lower, but by no means cheaper; that
circumstances however is trivial, if compared with
the great detriment and. loss which the public sus-
tam by exciting a competition against themselves,
whereby individuals obtain ultimately their own
terms and prices; 1 and. which they could not possibly
1 The Victualling Board became aware of the great temptations to the
persons interested with the execution of this service without suffi-
cient control. At their suggestion, in 1793, the salary of the
Hoytaker at Deptford was increased from sixty pounds a year to two
hundred pounds upon the express abolition of all future fees.
For the extravagant fees which had been paid with respect to trans-
ports employed by the Board of Ordnance, see the twelfth report of
the commissioners for stating the public accounts. Parliamentary
PanArs. 1809.. nn. nit.. - Ninth Pønnrt. '5
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accomplish, if the whole of the transports required
for Your Majesty's Service were to be hired ex-
clusively by one Board..1
This abuse was remedied. with the establishment of the Transport
Board when the hiring of victuallers and. Ordnance vessels passed.
under its jurisdiction.
During the American war Midd.leton had formed the habit of
noting down every defect as he discovered it, with the hopes of
remedying them with the return of peace. After the war, however,
he found the cooperation of Howe's Board disappointing and complained
in early 1786 that Howe ignored him; the comptroller's advise was
not sought; that he did not have much to say in important decisions,
particularly about the appointment of officers to the dockyards,
about whose characters and capabilities the Navy Board was best in-
formed. Middleton was hoping that the commission of enquiry would.
open a door for reformation and "the great lines of the Navy Board
department would once more be discussed between the Secretary of
the Admiralty and the comptroller." 2
 He also wished to see the
commissioner' s enquiry bring about a proper arrangement for the
introduction of reform in the method and economy of the Navy Board.
For these reasons Middleton stayed on in office after Howe became
First Lord.
1. Parliamentary Papers, 1806, op. cit., Eighth Report, 579.
2. NRS, Barhain, vol. II, 207-8.
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It is a comfortable reflection that much is not
needed to put a finishing hand to the business.
It will consist chiefly in completing the regula-
tions of the home—yards, and. arranging the Navy
Board for expediting business in such a manner as
may appear best to themselves for that purpose.1
But the navy enquiries of the late eighties were allowed to
die away by 1790. No examination of the reports of the commission
of enquiry took place and thus, no remedy was taken for the disorders
which the enquiry had. disclosed. The Navy department had to wait
until England was involved in the war against revolutionary France
before serious thought was again given to rectifying the disorderly
state of the office. Middleton's disappointment over the failure
of the proper authorities to follow throu.gh on the result of the
enquiry and his feeling of uselessness in the then disorderly state
of affairs resulted in his resignation from office in March 1790.
'It was not the remoter objects of the department" which worried
Micidleton,
7
l AL /444f,d4?,
the fleet and. arsenal were in the best pessible state
at tho timo of hic reoigna-bion, but the internal
arrangements of the office itself respecting persons
and their particular duties, in order to carry on
business with life and dispatch, and to correct the
various abuses which the late enquiry has exposed,
but which, from the discouragement the enquiry itself
has received, have grown stronger than ever, if not
confirmed.2
1. NRS, Barham, vol. II, 2.r3/
2. Ibid., 350; see also, PRO/30/8/111, Middleton to Pitt, 8 Feb.;
15 March 1790.
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On resigning his position at the Navy Board, Middleton was
appointed chairman of the commission to enquire into the civil
affairs of the navy, and continued to act in that capacity until
November 1795 when a quarrel with Lord. Spencer resulted in his
exclusion from all business concerning the mJnAgement of the navy.
Under the administration of Lord. Spencer and afterwards of Lord St.
Vincent, Mid.dleton could not and did not interfere.
For the first year and. a half of the war against revolution-
ary France the transport system was administered as it had been
during the American war with the exception that the Treasury was
again responsible for the hiring of victualling ships. The abuses
in the transport system, some of which were brought to the attention
of the government by Middleton's memoranda and. by the reports of the
commission appointed in 1785 were again apparent. It was also
apparent by 1794 that the war would' continue. For these reasons the
government recommended that the management of the transport service
be carried. on by one board. Middleton's insistence on the need for
the Board most likely persuaded the ministers to bring it into exist-
ence. In the Melville manuscripts there is this note. The in-
efficiency of not having a Transport Board "operated so much on the
mind L Middleto7 that it induced. him to submit to Mr. Pitt, the
absolute necessity there was for its existence;" and Pitt "was so
convinced of it as immediately to put it into execution."' The
1. NLS, Melville ES. 1044, f. 107.
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commissioners of 1785 had pointed to the Navy Board as the most
proper to conduct this service on account of there being s4 officers
in the commission. But the Navy Board's duties had multiplied with
the growth of the navy while, as we have already observed, its con-
stitution remained the same. Also there were transport duties under
the direction of the commissioners of the Treasury for which no parti-
cular arrangement had as yet been made (most prominent—the trans-
portation of army victuals). Therefore, it was decided to renew
the establishment of a distinct Board to deal specifically with
transport services. Thus the Transport Board came into existence.
The Transport Board was constituted by Order in Council on
4 July 1794:
His Majesty taking into consideration the great
extent and magnitude of the transport service of
the army, and that the same together with the
various incidental services which have arisen in
the course of the War, cannot be conducted by the
Principal Officers and Commissioners of the Navy
without great detriment and inconvenience to the
more immediate duties of their office in attend-
ing to the concerns of the Navy, and that there-.
fore great public benefit would arise if this im-
portant Branch, as well as those other services
under the general direction of the Lords
Commissioners of the Treasury for the due perform-
ance of which no particular arrangement at present
exists was to be put under the management of a
separate Board under the denomination of a Board
for Transports. His Majesty is thereupon pleased
by and with the advice of His Privy Council to
approve of the Establishment of a particular Board
for the conduct of the Transport Service and of
those other services under the general direction
of the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury, for the
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due performance of which no particular arrangement
at present exists. Such Board. to consist of
three Commissioners two of whom to be officers
belonging to His Majesty's Navy, and a third to
manage the corresponden1e and. accounts incident to
the said Establishment.
It had been the opinion of Mid.dleton and the commission
that the transport system could only be adequately run by men ex-
perienced in naval affairs. The government appointed two sea
officers of considerable experience and seniority and one civilian
as commissioners of the Transport Board.. Hugh Cloberry Christian Esq.,
Captain in the Royal Navy was appointed. Chairman. Philip Patton Esq.,
Captain in the Royal Navy and Ambrose Serle Esq., were the two
commissioners appointed. to assist him. 2 A secretary and. other
1. PRO, ADM/108/31, 20 Aug. 1794.
2. Sir Hugh Cloberry Christian (1747-1798) attained the rank of
Rear-Admiral of the Blue and Commander-in-chief at the Cape of Good.
Hope before he died. in 1798. He took part in the action off
Grenada, 6 July 1779; and was present at the actions off the
Chesapeake, 5 Sept. 1781; St. Kitts, 26 Jan. 1782; and Dominica,
12 April 1782. He left his position at the Transport Board. after
becoming Rear-Admiral of the Blue in June 1795. In November of
the same year he was appointed. Commander-in-chief in the West Indies.
Philip Patton (1739-1815) reached the rank of Admiral before he
died. in 1815. He had an active and honourable naval career, having
been present in the battle of Quiberon Bay; taken part in the re-
duction of Havana; and having had. an important share in the defeat
of Langara on January 16, 1780 before being appointed. one of the
commissioners of the Transport Board in May 1794. In 1795 he in-
sisted. on taking his flag. Lord Spencer having found him so useful
at the Transport Board tried to persuade him to stay. This failing
he did not employ him.
Ambrose Serle (1742-1812), the civilian commissioner, was a
Calvinistic writer before being appointed to the Transport Board in
1794. After serving under Lord Dartmouth for a conaid.erable period,
he was appointed Solicitor and. Clerk of the Reports for the board
of trade and. soon afterward accompanied Lord Howe to America as his
private secretary. At the invitation of Governor Tryon, Serle had
charge of the political section of the New York Gazette from September
1776 , until he departed for Philadelphia in July 1777. He left
America in 1778. He was the only one of the original three
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officers necessary for carrying on the transport service were
appointed. 1 Many of the officers were already experienced men
from various sections of the old Navy Board department. The
commissioners were given a salary of £800 per annum (to each in lieu
of gratuities, house, rent, coals and. candles, etc. at £200 per
annum). The secretary received a salary of £400 per annum. Clerks
received from £250 to £80 per annum.2
On 25 September 1795 the Transport Board received the
assistance of two more members, a sea officer and. a civil commissioner,
when the business relating to the care and custody of prisoners of
war in health was transferred from the commissioners for Sick and
Wounded Seamen to the Transport Board. The commission was accord-
ingly instituted under the Great Seal, consisting of five members.
They were: Rupert George Esq., Captain in the Royal Navy and chairman
of the Transport Board ainoe Christian left that post in June 1795;
John Schank Esq., and. William Albany Otway Esq., Captains in the Royal
Navy; Ambrose Serle Esq. and. John Marsh Esci.3 The branch for Sick
and Wounded Seamen was transferred to the Transport Board in 1806 with
one additional member, a physician. 4 Therefore, the Transport Board
commissioners to stay on the Board throughout the war.
1 • The secretary of the Transport Board throughout the war against
revolutionary France was Alexander Whitehead.
2. PRO, ADM/108/31, 20 Aug. 1794.
3. PRO, kDM/1/3730, 30 Sept. 1795; see also, T/64/218, 25 Sept. 1795,
f. 40.
4. Parliamentary Papers, 1809, op. cit., Ninth Report, 6.
52
in 1806 consisted of three divisions: a branch relating to the
transport service, a branch for sick and wounded seamen, and. a
branch for prisoners of war. This was the constitution of the
Transport Board until it went out of existence in 1816.1
This thesis is concerned only with the branch relating to
the transport service. The special duties of the Board under
this division, according to the commissioners of 1809, consisted
in the hiring and appropriating of Ships and Vessels
for the conveyance of Troops and. Baggage, Victualling,
Ordnance, Barrack, Commissariate, Naval and Military
Stores of all kinds, Convicts and. Stores to New South
Wales, and. a variety of miscellaneous Services, such
as the provision of Stores and a great variety of
articles for the Military Department in Canada; the
purchase of annual presents for the Indians in Upper
and. Lower Canada; the procurement of clothing, iron-
mongery, and. all sorts of wares, together with various
articles of Stores for New South Wales, Goree, the
West Indies, many articles of Store for the Cape of
Good Hope, and. for other foreign stations (not attached
to other Boards) under the immediate direction of the
Lords Commissioners of Your Majesty's Treasury, and.
to fulfil such Orders from other great Officers of 	 2State as may be sanctioned by their Lordships authority.
Within this branch, however, the thesis is concerned with the hiring
and appropriating of ships and vessels for the conveyance of the
army - the troops and their baggage, victualling, ordnance and.
military stores of all kinds to the areas of military activity.
1. In that year the Transport Office reverted to its old position -
a branch of the Navy Office. A separate Transport department was
re-established during the Crimean war and. went out of existence at
that war's termination.
2. Parliamentary Papers, 1809, op. cit., Ninth Report, 9.
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The Transport Board acting -together at one table dispatched
its business by common counsel and. consent. When a resolution was
agreed upon the initials of the members present were affixed to it
and the necessary orders were given.
The chairman was always a sea officer. His special duties
consisted.
in presiding over and superintending -the whole Office,
and. its various concerns; in attending the Treasury,
Admiralty, Secretaries of S-tate, and. Secretary at War,
for their respective directions; in occasionally, and.
as often as -the curren-t business of -the Office will
admit, visiting -the Transport Yard at Dsptford, and.
examining Ships offered for Service; in appropriating
Tonnage for the various purposes required by -the several
Boards; in assisting at the discussions of -the Board,
whether upon the subject of Transports, Sick and Wounded
Seamen, Hospitals, Hospital Ships, Surgeons, Prisoners
of War, or the numerous Duties attached to -these respect-.
ive Heads of Service, witj other miscellaneous directions
received from government.
Since the ohairman was the main channel of communication and. confid-
enoe in the preparation of transports his attendance was daily and.
unremitting and. during the war admitted of no absence.
The other -two sea commissioners were chiefly employed in
assisting the chairman in his various duties;
in the inspection of transports proposed for hire; in
frequent visitations of Deptford Transport Yard; in
-the Survey, Appraisement, and Purchase of Stores, in
considering the -terms arid, conditions for Charter
Parties and. other Instruments belonging specially to
the Servios at Sea; in examining Log—books, Musters
1. Parliamentary Papers, 1809, op. cit., Ninth Report, 7.
54
of Men in Transports, and their Returns, transmitted
by the several Agents; in pointing out neglects of
Dirty in Masters of Transports, and the necessary
muj.ots for the same, in all which Duties their assist-
ance ppear7 highly important, as well as in the
5heW current business of the Office. Excepting
their occasional visitations at the Out Ports, etc.
their Attendance was also constant at the Office,1
The secretary was responsible for the correspondence of
the Board; he accordingly arranged and prepared it for the Board's
approval and. signature. He superintend.ed. the general conduct of
the office seeing that there were no irregularities or abuses, or
waste of time in the several persons employed and saw that the
minutes were properly kept.2
The transport agents of the Navy Board became the agents
of the Transport Board. 3 All new agents were selected in the
future by the Transport Board but they had to receive the approval
of the Admiralty. Upon its establishment the Transport Board in-
creased the number of resident agents since they found it necessary
to have a resident agent at some of the principal ports. The cadre
of resident agents established by the Navy Board during the American
war had been largely disbanded, and in the opening year of the
French war there were two only - at Deptford and Woolwich. During
that year arrangements about the hiring of transports or the conduct
1. Parliamentary Papers, 1809, op. cit., Ninth Report, 7.
2. Thid.
3. o, .AlçI1o6/2651, 23 Aug. 1794.
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of embarkationa at the outports or in Ireland. were handled by
sending an agent there to deal with each particular piece of business.
The Transport Board stationed resident agents at Deptford., Woolwioh,
Southampton, Plymouth, Portsmouth, Gravesend, Deal, Dover, Guernsey
and. Cork; resident agents were sometimes stationed at Cowes, Liverpool,
Spithead, Leith, Bristol and. Waterford. In 1795, '96 and. '97, however,
several resident agents and. agents afloat were dismissed because of
the Board's economising efforts. 1 The duties of the resident agents
and. floating agents. were much the same under the Transport Board as
they had been under the Navy Board.. Some of the instructions,
however, were made more explicit. Since floating agents often re-
ceived their orders through resident agents who were inferior in
rank, Rear Admiral Christian and. Patton drew up the following instruc-
tions and ordered it to be inserted. as the 41st article of the
printed. general instructions to all agents. "You are at all times
to receive directions upon Service from our Resident Agents, though
inferior to you in Naval 1an1c; but, when two or more other (i.e.
floating) agents are upon Service together, the ReportB of each
Division of transports must be collected and. transmitted. to us by
the Senior Captain, or Lieutenant in the form of a regular abstract."2
Thus the order of the naval service respecting rank was attended to
while resident agents continued as channels of conveyance for orders
from the Transport Board to floating agents.
1. See below, p. 233.
2. PRO, ADM/1/3741, Transport Office to E. Nepean, 19 Aug. 1801.
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Soon after its creation the Transport Board resolved that
"all transport agents particularly those in England and elsewhere
if possible, having occasion to draw upon the Board for money,
should submit at all times, their intentions with their reasons
for so doing, and wait the Board's approbation and consent, previously
to their issuing the bills." 1 In November 1795 floating agents
were instructed to follow all orders of the convoy commander. 2
 The
Transport Board also made it explicit that if the agent was directed
to hire any ships, vessels or boats of any kind, for the transport
service abroad, he had to have a proper order in writing from the
commander-in-chief for so doing; he had to take care to agree on
the cheapest and best terms possible, and as nearly in tenor as
might be to the charter-parties made at the Transport Board.. The
counterpart had. to be sealed with his own seal; and the agreement,
with a copy of the order, by. which he had. acted had to be trans-
mitted by the first opportunity.3
There is much evidence that all transport agents corresponded
more regularly with the Transport Board than they had with the Navy
Board.4
31 August 1794 was the last day the transport service was
officially oarried on by the Navy Board. All expenses of the
1. PRO, &DM/108/31, 29 Sept. 1794.
2. PRO, ADM/1/3730, 6 Nov. 1795.
3. Article XII of printed instructions to agents of transports as
found in PRO, ADX/1/3737, 14 Jan. 1799.
4. PRO, ADN/108/31 - ADN/1O8/70.
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transport service prior to the let of September were settled at
the NavaX Office; after that period by the Transport Board. The
officers of the several yards and naval officers were directed. to
send a separate account of the expense of transports at their port
to the 31st of August.
On the 21st of that month the Admiralty ordered the Navy
Board to deliver all the relevant books, papers and instruments to
the newly appointed Transport Board. By 23 August the Navy Board
had done so and were preparing to assign over the charter parties.
On the same day the resident agents were informed that they must
now correspond with the Transport Board whose office was in Dorset
Square, Westminster.1
On 12 September 1794 the commissioners of the outporis were
directed to deliver all books and papers relating to the business
of transports to the commissioners of that department. Orders
were also sent to the yards to supply the Transport Board. with any
articles that the transports might need. immediately till further
arrangements could. be made. A list of all transports and all
agents of transports was sent to the transport commissioners.2
The main channel of communication for the Treasury and State
departments to the Admiralty respecting transports was now the
Transport Board; these departments instead of writing to the Admiralty
1. PRO, ADM/106/2651, 23 Aug. 1794.
2. Ibid., 29 Aug.; 12 Sept. 1794.
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communicated. with the Transport Board. The secretary of state
began writing directly to the Board soon after it was established,
to request conveyance and. then he wrote to the Admiralty to provide
a proper convoy. After a while the Transport Board gradually took
over from the secretary of state the duty of requesting convoy.
The letters from the secretary of state to the Admiralty requesting
convoy usually read: "The commissioners of Transports having been
directed to provide the necessary shipping etc. I am to signify
to Your Lordahips His Majesty's Pleasure that a proper convoy be
appointed. for the protection of the transports to be employed. in
the execution of	 " The key words in that paragraph are 'the
commissioners of transports having been directed.' Obviously the
secretary of state wrote to the Transport Board. first. Here is a
more specific example. On .14 October 1794 Drundas wrote to the
Admiralty that he had alrea&y directed. the commissioners of transports
to provide vessels for the reception of several officers of the
Brigade of Guards, who had received orders to join the anny under
His Royal Highness the Duke of York. Then he asked the Admiralty
to provide an escort to protect them till they reached Hol].and.
But even this kind of letter to the Admiralty becomes infrequent
and disappears altogether by early 1795. From then onwards the
secretary of state corresponded only with the Transport Board oon-
cerning transports.
1. PRO, ADM/1/4162, 14 Oct. 1794.
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The change was gradual and took about five months to be
completed. From about 25 August 1794 when the first Transport
Board. letters to the Admiralty appear to about January 1795, when
the Transport Board. had. a firm hold on its duties and. responsibilities
the transport system was passing through a transitional phase. It
was natural during this period for the Transport Board to work
closely with the Navy Board to get things done. The minutes of the
Navy Board for the month of August reveal that the Navy Board was
advising the Transport commissioners on the procedures to take; it
told. them the directions that should be used and the persons who
should carry them out. During this period. also at the request of
the commissioners of' transports, the Admiralty continued to give
orders to the Navy Board and. Victualling Board for such stores and.
provisions as were needed for immediate service until the Transport
Board was further prepared.1
During the transitional period requests for convoys passed.
through several different channels. They were made from the
2
secretary of state to the Admiralty, from the Transport Board to
the Admiralty via the secretary of state, 3 and from the Transport
Board directly to the Admiralty. 4 The latter method became more
frequent until January 1795 when it appeared. to be the duty of the
PRO, ADM/1/3730, 29 Aug. 1794.
2. E. g., PRO, ADM/1/41 62 , 22 Nov. 1794.
3. E. g., Ibid., 5 Sept. 1794.
4. E. g., PRO, ADM/1/3730, 2 Oct. 1794.
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Transport Board to request a convoy when informing the Admiralty
about the transports which were being used. From then on the
secretary of state corresponded only with the Transport Board when
discussing transports. This was an important and radical change
in the channel of command.
One cannot over-emphasize the authority which was conferred
upon the Transport Board. It received the King's commands directly
from the secretary of state instead of from the Admiralty as was
the case when the transport system was conducted under the auspices
of the Navy Board; it was the Transport Board. which informed the
Admiralty of the cabinet decision and requested a convoy at the
same time; it directed the transports to the place where they were
to pick up the troops; it ordered the transport agent to see that
the troops were embarked and. to wait for the commands of the Admiralty
respecting convoy to the place of destination.
The new chain of command operated in this way. On 6 September
1794 the Transport Board wrote to the secretary to the Admiralty re-
questing a convoy for the transports at Spithead which were to proceed
to the West Indies under the charge of Captain William Hollamby.
In obedience to the king's commands, signified to
us by the Right Honorable Henry Dundas, one of His
Majesty's Principal Secretaries of Staie,we have
caused the transports, named. in the inclosed list,
to be fitted for the reception of troops at
Portsmouth; and we acquaint you for the informa-
tion of the Right Honorable the Lords Commissioners
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of the Admiralty that the troops were embarked on
board them on the 2nd instant and. that the transports
are in readiness to proceed -to their place of destina-
tion under such oonyoy as their Lordships may be
pleased to appoint.'
The information in the list given to the Admiralty by the Transport
Board included the names of the transports, their tonnage, whether
or not cavalry were to be embarked, the number of horses fitted for,
the names of the regiments with the number of horses, men and. officers
to be embarked. Usually the names of the transport agents in charge
of the transports were given.
There were delays in service during the transitional phase
when the bulk of the transport system was being taken from under
the auspices of the Navy Board and transferred. to the Transport Board.
Orders were slow in being sent out as the boards and departments were
adjusting their procedures and. correspondence to the new system.2
By the creation of a Transport Board. many of the abuses
revealed by the commission of naval enquiry were eliminated, the most
important being the competition among the different boards for tonnage.
Soon after its establishment the Transport Board made efforts of its
own to eliminate some of the abuses that still existed.. One of the
first resolutions passed. by the Transport Board was to the effect
that no person belonging to, or under the direction of the Board
should. have any property vested in transports, nor share or shares of
1. PRO, .ADM/1/3730, 6 Sept. 1794.
2. Ib., 29 Aug. 1794.
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any ships, or vessels employed as a transport, directly or indirectly,
under pain of immediate dismissal from office. 1 It also appointed
professional members to the staff specifically for the purpose of
surveying, measuring, valuing and reporting on ships tendered for
transports, thus taking the burden away from the naval officers at
the yards. Almost immediately after the establishment of the
Board the duty of hiring and. inspecting victualling transports was
taken from the Hoytaker and was given to the Transport Board. About
this time also the commissioners of Victualling entered into a con-
tract for all small craft required for the conveyance of provisions
and. stores to the ships in the Thames, to the establishment at
Chatham, etc. The only part, therefore, now remaining of the duties
stated by the commissioners of 1785 to have been at that time per-
formed by the Hoytaker, consisted in occasionally taking up small
vessels to carry provisions and. stores to the outports, and in "attend-
ing the issue and loading of all provisions and stores for those
ports, foreign yards, etc. attending the unloading of such provisions
etc. as are returned into store, and in taking an account of remains
on board ships, transports, and victuallers."2
The commissioners of the Treasury continued to work closely
with the commissionersd the Victualling directing them to provide
provisions; only now the Transport Board provided the tonnage necessary
to convey provisions to both the army and the navy. The Transport
1. PRO, ADM/108/31, 26 Aug. 1794.
2. Parliamentary Papers, 1809, op. cit., Eleventh Report, 28.
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Board was given the duty of hiring vessels to carry provisions to
the army formerly undertaken by the Treasury. 1 It also asked the
Admiralty for convoy for these victuallera. It should be remembered
that before the Transport Board was in existence the Treasury re-
2
quested convoy from the Admiralty for the victuallers.
Soon after the Transport Board was established Charles Long,
one of the joint secretaries to the Treasury, wrote to the commissioners
of the Victualling directing . them at the command of the commissioners
"to cause ten thousand bags of biscuit containing one hundred and
twelve pounds each, to be immediately provided and sent consigned
to Brook Watson Esq., Commissary General, at Helvoets].uys on board
such vessels as the Commissioners for the Transport Service shall
be directed to engage for that service." 3 In this way the Treasury
directed the Victualling Board to provide provisions. One day later
the Victualling Board wrote to the Transport Board for the necessary
tonnage. Two days later when the Transport Board had already pro-
vided the ships to transport the bread, the Victualling Board ordered
the bread to be brought from the stores at Deptford, and. shipped under
the direction of the army storekeeper, on board the transports that
the Transport Board had provided. The bread would be replaced in
the stores at Deptford. in due time.4
1. See above, p.17.
2. See above, p.16.
3. PRO, .ADM/109/102 , 19 Sept. 1794.
4. PRO, AJM4/109/102, 19 Sept. 1794.
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The Transport Board, like its predecessor in the transport
service, the Navy Board, after receiving requests for troopships,
often acquainted the Victualling Board with the order to provide
provisions for the passage. The Treasury made sure the Victualling
Board carried out this order since provisioning the army and. navy
was a Treasury responsibility. To ensure the Victualling Board's
compliance with any demands made upon them by the newly created
Transport Board Dundas on 3 September 1794 asked the commissioners
of the Admiralty
to give the necessary orders to the Commissioners
of the Victualling to comply with any demands which
they may receive from the Commissioners of the
Transport Board, for victualling the transports under
their direction, in conformity to the requisitions
which in the execution of their duty, they may 'ake
from time to time to the abovementioned office.'
However, a dispute arose between the Transport Board and.
the Victualling Office concerning the chain of command. soon after
the Transport Board was established. This dispute concerned the'
giving of sailing orders to the masters of victuallers. In
September 1794 several letters passed between the Transport Board
and the commissioners of the Victualling in which there seemed to be
some difference of opinion respecting the conduct of the victualling
transports. In one letter the commissioners of the Victualling
claimed
1. PRO, ADN/1/4162, 3 Sept. 1794.
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a right to send out provisions, and by that right
to give their directions for the movements of the
transport8, not admitting that the Transport Board
had any power to do more than to hire in the first
instance, and. found this right upon the direotions
of the Right Honor.ble Lords Commissioners of the
Admiralty to them.
The dispute began when the Victualling Board gave sailing
orders to the rnster of the Active victualling transport which was
laden by that Board to proceed to Spithead and received a letter
of remonstance from the Transport Board. The Transport Board
was of the opinion that "the victualling service should extend no
further than with respect to the time of receiving and the species
of provisions they had occasion to embark." 2 The Transport Board
required of them by a letter of 5 September the information for whom
and to what place the victuallers were to proceed. 3 Subsequently,
on 20 September the Transport Board laid copies of the correspondence
between the two Boards before the Admiralty. It wished the Admiralty
to settle the dispute and give directions to the Victualling Board
accordingly. 4 It seems reasonable to conclude that the Admiralty
deemed it the duty of the Transport Board to give sailing orders to
viotuallers for the succeeding letters between the Transport Board
1. PRO, ADM/1/3730, 20 Sept. 1794.
2. Ibid., 17 Sept. 1794.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid., 20 Sept. 1794.
66
and. the Admiralty concerning the appointment of a convoy for
victuallers reveal that the Transport Board had. already given the
victuallers orders to proceed..1
By 6 October it was clear that the Transport Board had won
the dispute with the Victualling Board. On that day the Transport
Board. wrote to the Admiralty
the Commissioners of the Victualling having reported
to us that the Bessey victualling transport, John
Coverdale, Master, had completed. her lading of
victualling stores for the leeward Islands, and having
ordered her to proceed. to the Nore in her way to
Spithead; we acquaint you therewith, for the informa-
tiozi of the Right Honorable the Lords Commissioners of
the Admiralty, that their Lordships may be pleased to
appoint a convoy.2
The Transport Board had ordered. the Bessey victualler to proceed
and were now requesting convoy. Letters to the Admiralty request-
ing convoy for victuallers in future conformed to this pattern.
The Ordnance Board ceased to hire its own vessels once the
Transport Board came into being. It wrote to the Transport Board
to provide tonnage for ordnance and. other stores. The Transport
Board informed the Admiralty that the transports had been provided
and. were ready to sail under the charge of a specific transport agent.
At the same time the Board requested. a convoy. The Transport Board
had. also acquired the duty of ordering the convoy for ordnance vessels
I • On 17 Sept. the Victualling Board was informed that the Transport
Board conceived it most regular and advantageous to appoint agents
under the Transport Board's direction to proceed with the victuallers
when laden. PRO, ADM/108/31, 17 Sept. 1794.
2. PRO, ADM/1/3730, 6 Oct. 1794.
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as it had for viotuallers.1
The Transport Board had to meet five days a week; and the
commissioners decided to meet on Saturday if an absolute necessity
demanded it. From the very beginning it proved necessary that the
Transport Board meet on Saturday and it continued to have a six day
week throughout the war. It relayed all information regarding its
activities to the Admiralty and in return the Board executed orders
with respect to transports wanted for the navy or victualling service.
When tonnage was required for the conveyance of troops or stores
application was made to the Transport Board from the several depart-
ments, and they were usually provided without delay. Any requisi-
tions for transports whioh demanded particular consideration or
inourred great expense, however, had to receive the sanction or
2direction of the Treasury or the Admiralty. 	 Throughout the war
instructions were issued and improvisations made by the Admiralty
and. the Transport Board to increase the efficiency of the transport
service. For example, in October 1795 the Admiralty instructed
the Transport Board to transmit to the Admiralty a list showing the
navy and army victuallers and. storeships employed in the transport
service, the place from which they sailed and their proposed destina-.
tion. The list submitted four times a month looked like the
1. PRO, ADM/1/3730, 20 Oot. 1794.
2. Parliamentary Papers, 1809, op. cit., Ninth Report, 9;
PRO, T/64/218, 25 Sept. 1795 f. 40.
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following:1
List of navy and. army victuallere and. store
ships employed in the transport service
Naval Store
Navy Vict. Army Viot. Ships
At What	 Service Ordered
Place	 On
Example: Sailed from With provisions
Portsmouth for the West
Indies
Ships Tons Ships Tons Ships Tons
4 670	 4 1002 - -
This request of the Admiralty was adhered to throughout the war. After
a little more than a year in office the Transport Board displayed signs
of precision and organisation and its methods achieved a degree of
efficiency.
The minutes devoted -to the transport system while conducted
under the auspices of the Navy Board constituted about one and one
half pages daily. By contrast the Transport Board minutes averaged
about ten pages per day. One must remember that the Transport Board
1. PRO, .ADM/1/3730, October 1795.
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acquired the duty of hiring army victuallers and ordnance transports,
a duty which the Navy Board did not have. But taking this into
consideration there is still sufficient proof that a much more
detailed and conscientious effort to supply army and navy transports
and viotuallers efficiently was taking place. It stands to reason
that a Transport Board set up specifically to deal with these problems
could give undivided attention to them, whereas, the Navy Board with
its duties and. obligations to naval affairs as well as the transport
service could not.1
1. The bulk of the correspondence between the different branches of
government concerning the transport service was undertaken by the
following people during the war against revolutionary France.
B. Nepean, secretary to H. Duridas until 1795.
P. Stephens, "	 " after 1795.
P. Stephens, secretary to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty
until 1795.
B. Nepean, secretary " " 	 "	 " " Admiralty
after 1795.
0. Rose and. C. Long, joint secretaries to the Lords Come. of the
Treasury.La. Yonge, Sec. of War wrtil July 1794.
W. Wjndham, " " " after "	 "
H. Martin, Comptroller of the Navy Board.
A. Whitehead, secretary of the Transport Board.
0. Cherry Esq., Chairman of Victualling Board until 1800.
J. Marsh, " " after 1800.
J. Crewe, secretary to the Master General of Ordnance.
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CHAPTER III
THE TAKING UP OP SHIPS AS TRANSPOR!I
71
There were advantages for the merchant in letting his ship
to government service in wartime. Such wartime fears, as inter-
.1ference from the enemy, delays of convoy and difficulties of manning
were eliminated. If a merchant's trade was completely cut off due
to the war, tendering his ship to the government avoided the d.iffi-
culty of putting his ship to a new trade. By letting his ship to
the government the merchant's earnings were assured, and these earn-
ings compared favourably with those earned in peacetime. The govern-
ment paid in case of capture or damage that was not due to negligence.
When the British Navy established her supremacy on the seas aM the
interference from the enemy was practically eliminated then the
government had to offer compensation to the merchant adequate to the
sacrifice demanded of him. When a merchant returned home safely
with a cargo of goods, his profits were high, for goods were scarce
during wartime. But many merchants preferred to let their ships
to the government rather than take this gamble.2
1. Merchant seamen on board ships let to the government were supposed
to be free from impressment. See below, p. 201.
2. An approximation of British merchant ships taken between 1793-1802
was 3,919. 799 were retaken leaving 3,120 in the enemy's hands.
Losses during the American war of independence were 3,386 much the
same as during the French revolutionary war. However losses
during the French war were proportionately less because during
that war there were more merchant ships engaged in a more extensive
trade. (These figures were drawn up by John Bennett, the First
Secretary of Lloyds.) Charles Wright & C. Ernest Fayle. A History
of Lloyd's (London, 1928), 183.
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The government wanted ships to transport troops, provisions,
horses and. stores. It needed small bread ships (about 100 tons)
to carry bread to Holland; ii needed large East Indiamen (about
700 and. 800 tons) to carry troops and Bupplies to Capetown and
the East Indies. But most of the vessels taken up by the transport
service during the war against revolutionary France averaged between
150 and 300 tons.
Since the government wanted to hire transports that would
give the best performance possible with little delay for damages
and repairs, sheathed vessels were much preferred to unsheathed ones,
and those sheathed with copper were preferred to those sheathed with
wood. 1 In September 1796 all the transports not copper sheathed
2
were ordered home from the West Indies.	 As an incentive to owners
to sheath their ships a higher rate was paid to sheathed vessels and.
a still higher rate was paid to those sheathed. with copper instead
of wood.. Wood sheathing did not last as long as copper and. might
have been destroyed by worms in one year. For example, wood sheath-
ing that was put on the Sea Nymph in 1796 was found to have been
destroyed in 1797 by the time she returned from the West Indies.3
1. Copper sheathing was introduced into the navy during the American
revolution. Robert G. Albion. Forests and. sea power, The timber
problem of the Royal Navy, 1652-1862 (Cambridge Mass, 1926), 11.
2. PRO, .ADM/108/53, 13 April 1798.
3. PRO, ADM/108/49, 14 Oct. 1797.
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The cost of sheathing a three hundred. tons ship with wood.
was £158. The cost of sheathing a vessel of the same tonnage with
copper was £629. However copper endured. on an average, upwards of
six years, and. then was worth one half its original value - as in
three years it was worth three fourths - and. so in proportion.
Merchant ships sheathed. with copper were generally sheathed. with
wood. first, and. then, if in other respects good., they generally
ran a period. of aix years, without requiring any repairs to the
bottom. Therefore, H. Boyce, the Shipwright Officer at Deptford.,
thought that in valuing the ship copper sheathing should. have been
estimated. at the charge of both. 1 But the government met with
difficulty in procuring oopper bottomed. vessels unless at an
extravagant rate.2
When tonnage was needed. to convoy troops, provisions,
oavalry and stores the government sometimes advertised. in newspapers.
But more generally notice was sent to the Exohnge and. Coffee Houses
for the amount of freight for a particular expedition. Lloyd's
Coffee House had. become the centre for marine insurance during the
eighteenth century and. was frequented. by owners of ships and. ships'
brokers. Lloyd's kept in close touch with the Admiralty throughout
the war against revolutionary France. When the Pransport Board
came into existence notice of the need for ships was put up also in
the waiting room of the Transport Office where ship owners and.
1. PRO, .ADM/108/49, 14 Oct. 1797.
2. PRO, ADM/108/50, 23 Nov. 1797.
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brokers continually reported.
The broker was the intermediary between the government and
the ship owner. Before the Transport Board was established
nearly two thirds of the ships that were hired as transports by the
several boards were tendered by not more than a dozen persons and
had been in the charge of one broker, George Brown & Co. When the
tendering of transports was in the hands of George Brown the price
at which the public would be supplied with transports was rather
fixed by him and he would recommend to the owners not to tender
their ship until they obtained their price. 1
 After the establish-
ment of the Transport Board more and more brokers were used as part
of a deliberate policy to break the monopoly held by a few brokers.2
By the close of the war the Board held contracts with between 300
and 400 different persons many of whom were the actual owners.3
Sometimes the Board bypassed brokers and did business with individual
owners
The deciding factor as to whether or not a broker on behalf
of an owner or the owner himself would tender a ship to the transport
1. NLS, Melville 1455. 1044, f. 109; PRO, .ADM/106/2644-2651.
2. PRO, ADM/108/31-70; ADM/108/158, 159. Some of the brokers who
most frequently did business with the Transport Board were:
George Brown & Co., James and. Joseph Dawson, Gardner & Angus,
James Duncan, William Beatson, John Tullock, and Thomas Jameson.
3. NLS, Melville 1455. 1044, f. 109.
4. pao, LDM/1o8/158; &DM/1o8/163, 26 Sept. 1799. Ii should be noted
that members of Parliament could not tender ships to the Transport
Board. XDM/108/61, 17 July 1799.
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service was the rate of pay then being offered by the government,
The rate of pay plus the elimination of war risks had to offset the
sacrifice of a possibly lucrative trade.
The rate of pay differed according to the way the transport
was taken up. Transports were taken up on tonnage or on freight.
Tranports on tonnage were hired at a certain rate per ship ton for
each month they were employed in the service. Transports on tonnage
were of two descriptions: regilar transports or those taken up for
six months certain; and. those engaged for only three months certain.
Transports taken up on freight were hired in three separate ways:
they were hired at a certain rate per ton for the quantity of stores
conveyed to a particular destination. 1
 They were hired at a
certain rate per man, woman, or child, for the number conveyed to
a particular destination. 2
 And they were hired by the run; that
is, at a certain fixed sum of money for the use of a ship to convey
to a particular destination such stores or persons as might be
shipped on board.3
Public benefit required the government to hire transports
at the lowest rates possible while still maintaining its requirements
for s1rong, seaworthy vessels suitable for conveying troops, provisions
I • L g., PRO, 1DM/i 06/2645, 2 March 1793; 1DM/i 08/38, 20 Aug. 1796.
2. E. g., PRO, ADM/108/50, 27 Nov. 1797; ADM/108/66, 20 Feb. 1800;
NI4M, ADM/R.P./2, 26 Aug. 1794.
3. E. ., PRO, 11)1/106/2651, 12 Aug. 1794; 11)14/1/3735, 19 March 1798;
11)14/108/61, 29 June 1799, see also, Parliamentary Papers, 1809, op. cit.
Ninth Report, 13.
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and stores. However, the government had to offer prices that were
consistent with the cost of living. As the cost of stores aM
provisions rose and. wages increased the government raised the
freight rate of transports. Also it was reasonable for the govern-
ment to expect freight rates to be higher in wartime because of the
danger of privateers and enemy fleets. Since trade was seasonal
which effected the amount of shipping space available at different
times of the year the prices of transports hired on freight fluctuated
much more than those hired. on tonnage. When Britain established
her supremacy on the seas freight rates still could. not be reduced.
The merchant had to be offered. adequate compensation for sacrificing
a very profitable trade when tendering his ship to the government;
and. during the war against revolutionary France Britain' s trade
had. been extended. beyond. that of even the most flourishing periods
of' peace. 1 The price the government offered. to owners was also
determined. by the progress of the war and. the increased demand for
transports • When the demand for transports was great the govern-
ment was willing to pay a higher price.
Throughout the eighteenth century there had been a long
time stabilitrin freight rates. The peacetime rates were about
10/- to 11/- per ship ton. 2 The usual price at which the Navy
1. PRO, Customs 17/18, f. 1.
2. Ralph Davis. The Rise of the English Shipping Industry in the
Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries (London & New York, 1962),
223.
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Board. contracted for ships on tonnage during the American war of in-.
d.epend.enoe was ii/— per ship ton per month. Due to an increased demand
for transports, however, the rate was increased to 12/— in 1778. 1 The
Navy Board. had hoped at the beginning of the war against revolutionary
France to again pay 11/— per ship ton. 2 Just before the outbreak
of war, it had. contracted with George Brown for seven ships to
convey troops at that price. 3 However by February 1793 Brown
would not accept less than 12/— per ship ton per month. 4 By May
1794 he would. not accept less than 13/— per ton. 5 The Navy Board.
reluctantly accepted these terms which were an increase of 2/— per
ton per month over a period of fifteen months. In the interest
of the public, however, the Navy Board tried to keep the freight
rates as low as possible. The Transport'Board.'s efforts to employ
ships from many owners and. brokers was in keeping with these wishes.
But as the war progressed the costs of provisions and stores rose
and wages increased. It was inevitable that the owners would demand
higher freight rates. By 18 March 1796 the owners of reguJ.ar
transport ships a-b London, Sunderland, North Shields, South Shields,
Whitby and Newcastle upon yne had sent several memorials asking for
an increased allowance of freight in consequence of increasing wages
and the high cost of provisions. 6 By 5 April 1796 the Transport
1. Syrett, op. oit., 101, 107. For a short period, during the American
war the Treasury offered 12/6 a ton. Add. ISS., 38343.
2. PRO, ADM/1o6/2644, 19 Feb. 1793.
3. PRO, &DM/1o6/2643, 28 Dec. 1792.
4. PRO, ADN/106/2644, 22 Feb. 1795.
5. PRO, .ADM/106/2650, 10 May 1794.
6. PRO, ADM/108/5, 18 March 1796.
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Board. had to consent to an increase of 2/- per ton per month to
sheathed vessels. 1 That meant that regular sheathed vessels were
now being hired at 15/- per ton. By early 1798 a reduction in the
demand for and expenses of shipping enabled the Transport Board to
resolve that the additional allowances would cease on 4 July 1798
for wooden sheathed vessels. 2
 They would be hired at the old rate
of 13/.- per ship ton, the same as unsheathed vessels. The owners
of these vessels could lay claim to 2/- per ton by sheathing their
ships with copper. The government allowed them ten days to do
this and added the value of the copper to the value of the ship.3
This reduced rate of pay which lasted from 5 July 1798 to 5 April
1799 saved the government about £4o,0oO.	 By 1799 the difficulties
the Board was experiencing in trying to hire six months ships at
13/- a ton, and the statements of the memorialists, convinced the
Board that the price of naval stores, the pay of seamen, and the
increased demand of shipping, through the vast increase of trade,
justified an advance in the price of freight. 5 From 5 April 1799
the basic freight of a wooden sheathed transport was raised from 13/-
to 14/6 per ton. 6 And the freight of a copper sheathed transport
1. PRO, ADM/i08/42, 30 Nov. 1796; ADM/i08/i58, 30 Jan. 1799.
2. PRO, ADM/108/5, 24 June 1796; ADM/108/51, 5 Jan. 1798;
ADI/'108f52, 22 Feb. 1798.
3. PRO, .LDM/108/57, 15 Nov. 1798.
4. PRO, ADM/108/58, 30 Jan. 1799.
5. PRO, ADM/108/58, 19, 23, 30 Jan. 1799.
6. PRO, ADM/108/60, 23 April 1799.	 -
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was raised from 15/- per ton per month to 16/- per ton.1
However the Transport Board met with difficulty in obtaining
tonnage even at the new rate on account of the vast increase in
every branch of trade. 2 When it sought tonnage for the Mediterranean
Victualling service in May 1799, the broker, James Duncan, replied
to its request by saying that "the great encouragement shipowners
receive in the Merchant Service, makes them disinclined to govern-
inent service, unless higher terms be offered." 3 Lieutenant Flinxi,
the Transport Board's Agent in Cork, wrote three days later that he
was having difficulty in obtaining tonnage. And the following day
the Transport Board learned that because of the scarcity of tonnage
-troops were accumulating at Duncannon Fort and New Geneva Barracks.4
In the meantime preparations for Abercromby's invasion of the Continent
were taking place. For these preparations the Transport Board
relied heavily on the transports already in the service. The Board
refused to discharge any of its transports even at the persistent
request of the owners. 5 By -the end of October the owners had written
several memorials to the Transport Board requesting an increase in
1. PRo, .ADM/1o8/60, 30 April 1799.
2. PRO, ADM/108/60, 6 May 1799; ADM/1/3737, 20 Feb. 1799.
3. Ibid., 22 Nay 1799.
4. Ibid., 23 May 1799; 24 May 1799.
5. Ibid., 17 Aug. 1799.
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the freight rate or permission to withdraw their ships from the
serv-ioe. 1 The Transport Board's reply to the memorialists was that
it had not the power to raise the price of freight then established;
but that it would discharge those transports that wished to leave
the department as soon as the public service would admit.2
The public service did. not admit the discharge of transports
until January 1800. At that time the Transport Board began to
discharge the three months ships as they returned from Guernsey
and Jersey.3
At this time the Transport Board was also in the process of
seeking authorization for an increase of pay for regular transports.
By June 1800 an agreement was reached with the Treasury, wider which
wooden sheathed ships received 18/- per ship ton and copper sheathed
ships 19/6. The new rates were to be effective from the previous
first of January. Copper sheathed ships were given the additional
1/6 per ship ton per month as an encouragement to owners to copper
them. It was also considered just and reasonable that unsheathed
vessels should be paid 16/- per ship ton from 1 January 1800 in
place of the previous rate of 3/.4 These rates continued until
the Treaty of &miens.
1. PRO, ADM/1o8/63, 28 Sept. 1799; 2 Oct. 1799; .ADM/108/64, 30 Oct. 1799.
2. PRO, ADN/1o8/64, 30 Oct. 1799.
3. PRO, ADM/108/66, 2 Jan. 1800. Because of the scarcity of shipping
in 1799 Captain Popham, the Transport Board agent on the Continent,
hired 15 ships in the Baltic to transport troops, provisions and.
supplies to the Texel; see below p. 243.
4. PRO, ADM/108/67, 4 June; 13 June; 20 June 1800; see also,
MO 1/800, 18, 21 March 1800.
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Transports on tonnage for less than six months were always
hired at a higher rate and they were usually not guaranteed against
capture. 1 Ships engaged for three months were hired at the
beginning of the war at £4.1O.0 per ship ton per month. After 1799
the Transport Board was paying as high as £6.O.o per ship ton for
three months ships. When the three months ships' time of hire was
up and they were continued in the service they were paid as regular
transports 2
The Transport Board did. not employ ships from brokers who
offered new and extraordinary proposals. 3 But often exorbitant
rates and unnecessary expense of demurrage were paid to vessels
hired for short services and for emergencies. For example, between
16 and 23 May 1796, Captain Leoky, the transport agent at Cape
Nicola Mole, in the West Indies, took up eight ships for six months,
by order of Major General Forbes, at an expense of £30,000. Two
were chartered to convey troops at 40/- per ship ton (at this time
the usual price paid to sheathed vessels to convey troops was 15/-
per ship ton); four were hired at 30/- per ship ton to convey
provisions, barracks, ordnance and. hospital stores and. two more
were hired to convey provisions, one at £400 per month for five months
and the other at £600 per month for six months.4 Transactions of
1. PRO, ADM/108/46, 19 May 1797.
2. PRO, ADMJ1/3739, 25 June 1800;
ADM/i08/61, 10 July 1799.
3. PRO, ADM/108/37, 12 July 1796.
4. PRO, LDM/108/19, 4 July 1796;
.ADM/1/3735, 19 March 1798.
see also: ADM/1O8/158;
see also: ADM/108/48, 17 Aug. 1797;
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this kind were made out of necessity by transport agents and by
commanding officers • The latter had the added difficulty of a
lack of knowledge of shipping especially regarding size arid price.
In some oases of exorbitant rates collusion was suspected..
Then the Attorney and Solicitor General were consulted aM orders
were issued by the Treasury that the bills were not to be accepted
unless under legal compulsion. It was intended to give the parties
an opportunity to come to a fair settlement. If they did not then
the owners would risk disclosure of their malpraotices in the court.1
Transports on tonnage were paid in navy bills drawn upon
the Treasury. Advances of money were made to the owners of trans-
ports at stated periods, in part payment of the freight due for the
hire of the vessels. However, the Navy Board and. then the Transport
Board. always reserved the amount of six months pay from regular
transports to enable the government to indemnify itself for any
claims which it might have upon the owners.2
The rate of pay for transports hired on freight varied much
more than the rate of pay of regular transports. Also their pay
was considerably higher since they were employed for an uncertain
period of time. Transports on freight were used much more during
the French war than they were during the American war.
1. PRO, ADM/1O8/37, 30 July 1796; see also: ADM/108/5, 6 Aug. 1796.
2. Parliamentary Papers, 1809, p. cit., Ninth Report, 11; see also
11.0.1/800, 21 March 1800, f. 415.
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The price of transports on freight like the price of trans-
ports on tonnage was effected by the inflation that prevailed in
Britain in the 1790's. Here are several examples.
In the early part of the war the cost of conveying troops
per head to the West Indies was about £4.0.0. By the spring of
1796 , because of the rise in the cost of provisions and stores and
because of increased wages, the cost had. risen to £5.0.0 or £6.0.O.1
As early as 2 March 1793, the Navy Board. was paying for freight of
provisions from London to Barbados at the rate of 27/6 per ton of
provisions. 2 By the summer of 1796 the Transport Board. was willing
to pay 70/- per ton to the West Indies. At this time it would pay
40/- per ton for the freight of stores to Gibraltar, and 50/- per
ton to Corsica. 3
 It now allowed twenty days for loading in the
Thames4
 in contrast to 1793 when seven to ten days were allowed
for loading. By September of 1796 the Board allowed another increase
of 10/- per ton on stores to Gibraltar. At this time also an in-
crease was made in the amount of demurrage allowed. Demurrage began
once the transports on freight were reported ready by the owner. In
the early part of the war, the demurrage allowed was 13/- per ship
ton and. by the summer of 1796 it had. risen to 15/- per ship ton on
sheathed ships.5
1 • PRO, ADM/1 08/158.
2. PRO, .ADM/106/2645, 2 March 1793.
3. Early figures as a basis of comparison for Gibraltar and Corsica
have not been found.
4. PRO, ADM/108/38, 20 Aug. 1796.
5. PRO, ADM/108/39, 8 Sept. 1796.
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The reduction in the demand for and expenses of shipping
in 1798 %ffected the prices offered to transports on freight as it
had to transports on tonnage. As a result the Board was able to
resolve that all ships taken up on freight on and after 9 January
1798 would be allowed no more than 13/- per ship ton demurrage at
however high a rate their whole tonnage was engaged. 1
 (Demurrage
remained at 13/- per ship ton for ships on freight throughout the
war against revolutionary France.) In 1798 there was a noticeable
decrease in the cost of sending troops and provisions and stores to
the West Indies. The rate per head for troops dropped from £6.O.0
to £4.4.0. And. the cost of sending provisions and ordnance to the
West Indies fell to 40/- from 70/- at which it had stood during the
two previous years. However, by the end of 1799 and early 1800 all
these rates had. again risen to the 1796 level.
Transports on freight like transports on tonnage were paid
in navy bills drawn upon the Treasury. Transports on freight hired
to convey stores and. provisions had their whole freight paid on
certificates being produced showing that the cargo had been delivered.3
Transports on freight hired to convey troops received half freight
in advance and the second half was paid when the Board received
certificates of debarkation.4
1. PRO, LDM/1o8/51, 5 Jan. 1798.
2. PRO, ADM/108/158, 159.
3. PRO, .ADM/108/-38, 20 Aug. 1796.
4. PRO, ADM/108/158, f. 3.
18 March 1797; LDM/108/6, 8 March 1797.
ADM/1o8/46, 16 May 1797;
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Near the close of 1796 the Transport Board began to utilise
merchant ships to convey officers to the West Indies. The Board
preferred this to appropriating one or more transports for the
purpose. The merchant was given £1O.O.O for each officer's passage
plus 1/3 a day for his victualling. 1
 On 9 March 1797 the Transport
Board in conjunction with the Treasury decided to make an allowance
of twenty guineas to each officer in lieu of providing him with a
passage. The twenty guineas was to be paid to the master of the
merchant ship on board which the officer might embark, on production
of the necessary documents from the Duke of York's office of his
having actually received orders for sailing to the West Indies.
Passage money was also given to such officers whose names had been
2transmitted to him through the Transport Board.	 This allowance
was given for passage of officers to the West Indies only and not
to any other theatre of the war. 3 Even though officers were conveyed
by these means to the Caribbean throughout the war against revolution-
ary France the Transport Board was disappointed in the response of
merchantmen to this praotioe. Thus, in 1799 an insertion was made
in the charter parties of victuallers that those ships must receive
a certain number of officers together with their men.4
1. PRO, ADM1O8/42, 15 Dec. 1796.
2. PRO, ADM/108/44, 9 March 1797;
3. PRO, ADM/108/44, 21 March 1797.
4. PRO, ADM/108/19, 29 Dec. 1796;
see below, p. 100.
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A ship tendered as a transport on tonnage had to be
surveyed, measured and valued. The ship was surveyed to see if
she was fit to be a transport. She had. to be measured in order to
ascertain her tonnage since the owner of the transport was paid
monthly according to the tons burden of the ship. Finally she was
valued in order that just compensation would. be
 made to the owner
in case of capture or accident.
The Navy Board' s method of surveying, measuring and. valuing
a ship was expensive, time consuming and injurious to other dockyard
services. It consisted of three inspections made by its agent at
Deptford. together with the Deptford dockyard officers. The first
inspection to see if the vessel tendered was fit for a transport,
was made by the Master Attendant and the Clerk of the Survey in one
boat, the Builders Assistants in another and the Foreman with the
Agent in the third. If the vessel was found fit for service the
master was directed to put her into dock or upon the ground in order
to be measured. 1 The Navy Board measured the ship in accordance
with the Act of 1773 and the Navy Board order of 1781. The Act of
1773 stipulated:
The Length shall be taken on a straight line along
the rabbet of the keel of the ship, from the baok
of the main stern-post to a perpendicular line from
the forepart of the main stem under the bowsprit,
from which subtracting three-fifths of' the breadth,
the remainder shall be esteemed the just length of
1. Parliamentary Papers, 1809, op. cit., Ninth Report, 5.
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the keel to find the tonnage; and the breadth shall
be taken from the outside of the outside plank in the
broadest place of the ship, be either above or below
the main wales, exclusive of all manner of doubling
planks that may be wrought on the side of the ship;
then multiplying the length of the keel by the breadth
so taken, and the product by half the breadth and
dividing the whole by ninety-four, the quotient shall
be deemed the true contents of the tonnage.
On 16 February 1781 the Navy Board modified the method for calculat-
ing the breadth of the ship when it ordered that "the Plank or
Thickstuff above or below the Wale where taken all that it exceeds
the Thickness of the Plank of the Bottom" should be subtracted from
the breadth of the ship. Thus the following formula was used by
the officers of the Royal 1ockyards to ascertain the tonnage of
the ship:
(L-3/5B) x BxB/2
94
This was the formula used by the Navy Board in measuring vessels
until 1835 when a more scientific method of measurement was introduced.'
While the ship was on the ground having her dimensions taken
her bottom was also inspected. This second inspection and measure-
ment was performed by the same officers and agent who performed the
first. If the vessel was approved the master was ordered to take
his provisions and stores on board and. proceed to Deptford. When
1. For the Act of 1773 see The Mariner's Mirror 1958, vol. 44,
Answers - "Tonnage Measurement", 161-2. For the Navy Board
order of 1781 see Syrett, op. cit., 139. For another account
of Navy Board measurement jn the 18th century see Burney, William,
ed. A New Universal Dictionary of the Marine; Being etc. (London,
1815), 568-9. For a brief history of early tonnage measurement
see William Salisbury's "Early Tonnage Measurement in England",
The Mariner's Mirror 1966, vol. 52, 51.
88
the ship arrived a-b Deptford a third inspection was made by the same
persons with the addition of the Master Mastmaker, Foreman of the
Riggers, the Clerk of the Survey's Clerk, the Master Sailmaker and
some of his Assistants, the Master Joiner for marking out cabins,
and the Clerk of the Check for mustering the crew. The value of
the ship and stores was recorded in the Clerk of the Survey's office.
When her owner reported her ready to enter into pay she was delivered
into the charge of an agent, fitted out and hastened on the service
for which she was intended.1
If the tides were favourable these duties were usually
performed in a week's time. It can easily be seen how a great part
of the time of the dockyard officers was taken up by this service.
When the Transport Board. came into existence it was aware
of the disadvantages inherent in the old method of surveying and
measuring transports on tonnage. Therefore, very soon after its
establishment, on 30 Augu.st 1794, the Board adopted a plan for taking
up transports according to their registered tonnage, that is, the
tonnage registered with the Customs officials in accordance with the
Act of Parliament of 1786.2 The plan was proposed by an experienced
official, Captain Bowen, 3 who pointed out that the shipowners would
register the tonnage of their vessels with the surveyors of the
1. Parliamentary Papers, 1809, pp. cit., Ninth Report, 5.
2. 26 George III, c.60, see Appendix, p. 327.
3. He had been employed by the Navy Board and then the Transport
Board, in taking up and. equipping transports in the Thames.
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Customs as low as possible. Therefore, it was in the interest of
the Board to use the ship's tonnage as registered. 1
 Captain
Bowen calculating on several vessels then in the service, stated
the measured tonnage of those vessels to be on an average about
seven percent beyond the tonnage registered at the Customs. 2
 Thus,
taking up ships by their registered tonnage instead of measured
tonnage saved the time of a number of navy yard officials and. pre-
vented undue expense and. inconvenience. If the figures in the
Melville papers can be taken as correct, the amount of money saved
to the public between the years of 1795 and 1806, by the adoption
of this plan, was £261 ,980.	 It is possible, however, that the
financial benefits derived from this change were eliminated by the
higher ton rate; that rate might have been occasioned by the in-
creased pressure from owners and brokers to get the ton rate raised
because the Board was paying less for their ships.
When the tender of a ship was accepted by the Transport
Board the ship was sent down to the Transport Office at Deptford,
where she was surveyed and valued and a report was made out and
returned. The report according to the form issued by the Transport
Office specified the ship's tonnage by register, her class, whether
Ship, Brig, Snow etc., her height from deck to deck arid from deck to
beam, whether sheathed or unsheathed and when and. where built.4
1. PRO, ADM/108/31, 30 Aug. 1794; Parliamentary Papers, 1809, op. cit.,
Ninth Report, 12.
2. Parliamentary Papers, 1809, op. cit., Ninth Report, 12.
3. NLS, Melville 11155. 1044, f. 111.
4. Parliamentary Papers, 1809, op. cit., Ninth Report, 10.
1.
2.
3.
4.
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The survey team under the Transport Board consisted of
Captain Rains, the Inspecting Agent of Transports, and. H. Y. Boyce,
the Shipwright Officer. 1 Captain Rains estimated the rigging,
sails, cables, anchors and other equipment; H. Y. Boyce valued
the hull, masts, yards, pumps, boats and carpenter's stores. This
valuation was transmitted, in a form prescribed, to the Transport
Office, and. deposited with the Accountant for the transport service.2
None of the inferior officers who conducted the surveying and measur-
ing for the Navy Board were employed. by the Transport Board. By
1801 the Admiralty thought a Sea Commissioner should sanction or
reject the report of the survey team by his own personal inspection.
Thus, in April of that year, a naval professional member of the
Board was added to the survey team. With the Inspecting Agent and
Shipwright Officer at Deptf'ord he had to testify to the vessel's
fitness to be a transport by signing his name upon the report before
the ship would be engaged.3
If the ship was approved. the owner or broker was notified to
fit the ship for service on his part. When the owner made known the
fact that the ship was fitted and manned according to the terms of
the charter party, she entered into pay.4
PRO, ADM/108/31, 26 Aug. 1794; &DM/108/33, 8 Dec. 1794;
Lieutenant Uzuld was Inspecting Agent for the first three months
of the Transport Board's existence. ADM/108/31, 1 Sept. 1794.
Parliamentary Papers, 1809, op. cit., Ninth Report, 10.
PRO, .ADM/1O8/69, 13 April 1801.
Parliamentary Papers, 1809, op. cit., Ninth Report, 10.
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The method. of taking up tonnage when the Victualling Board
and Ordnance Board hired their own ships was not according to the
measured tonnage of the ship, but according to the quantity of the
stores put on board, a method subject to a variety of abuses alBo
noticed by the oinmissioners of flaval inquiry appointed in 1785.
The Hoytaker at Deptford. checked the tonnage of the stores laden
for the Victualling Board and the Inspector of Shipping did the
same for the Ordnance Board. But nobody checked the Hoytaker or
the Inspector of Shipping. Thus, the amount the public was to pay
to transport provisions and ordnance stores depended entirely upon
the integrity of these two men. The oomlniBaioners of e'nquiry
strongly suspected that the nature of the report too often depended
upon the fees.1
It is not difficult to comprehend the extraordinary expense
and other disadvantages which attended the hiring of transports by
persons not acquainted with shipping and naval affairs. When the
Transport Board came into existence and took over the business of
hiring vessels for the Ordnance and Victualling Boards it eliminated
the above abuses and eliminated the competition of those two Boards
in hiring vessels.
It is only fair to note that Lord Cornwallis, the Master
General of the Ordnance, was not pleased with the way the Transport
Board hired vessels for the Ordnance.	 In 1796 he advocated restor-
ing the provisions of transports to the Ordnance Board. He complained
1. Parliamentary Papers, 1806, op. cit., Eighth Report, 574-5;
see above, p . 45.
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that many of the accidents that happened to the Ordnance transports
and the delay which the service experienced in shipping the stores
would have been in a great degree avoided, "if the duty of hiring
the transports had. been committed to the care of those who by long
habit and experience in the peculiar duty of shipping ordnance
stores must be most capable of judging what description of vessels
are best suited for that service, and. would feel the whole responsi .
-bility resting on themselves only in case of any neglect or mis-
conduct." 1 However, the Transport Board continued to hire vessels
for the Ordnance until the end of the war. Ships loading with
Ordnance stores were always under the management of the Ordnance
officers.2
Vessels tendered on freight to carry troops had. to be
surveyed and. reported on by the Deptford officers, in the same
manner as has been described with regard to the regular transports.
When approved, the owner or broker had to prepare the ships on his
part, that is, provide the necessary stores, provisions and crew.
At the same time an order was given to the transport accountant
to make out a charter party. It was the duty of the Inspecting
Agent and Shipwright Officer to fit the transport at the expense
of the government with berths, hammocks and other necessaries for
1. PRO/30/11/236, Cornwallis to Dundas, 10 March 1796.
2. PRO, .ADM/108/31, 24 Sept. 1794.
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troops. 1 The government hired many ships on freight at a certain
rate per head to carry troops to the West Indies.2
Transports hired on freight to carry stores were taken up
and examined in the same way. If the ship was found fit a charter
party was drawn up and. the vessel hastened by the owner or broker
to the place where the stores were to be laden. The Navy, Ordnance
or Victualling Boards appointed their own officers to superintend
the lading. According to the proviso inserted in the tender of
these ships in 1796 the persons to be received and victualled if
necessary were not to exceed four to every hundred tons of stores
at the rate of two tons freight for the passage of each man or woman,
and. half that rate for each child. 3 Transports hired at a certain
rate per ton usually received demurrage of 13/— per ton per month.4
Transports by the run were usually hired at the Out Ports
of Leith, Portsmouth, Plymouth, Liverpool, Dublin and Cork where
the demand for short serrices was greatest. The prices for
freightage from place to place was generally well known. The
transports were hired. by the transport agents at these ports in con-
suliation. with the Transport Board. If the situation was urgent
and would. not admit of delay the transport agent stated the reasons
for having acted without consultation and forwarded the necessary
vouchers for the Board's inspection.5
1. See below, p. 95.
2. PRO, ADM/108/158.
3. PRO, LDM/108/42, 15 Dec. 1796.
4. PRO, ADM/108/62, 10 Aug. 1799; ADM/108/158.
5. Parliamentary Papers, 1809, op. cit., Ninth Report, 14.
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Most ships hired on the run were employed for about twenty days;
.1if detained after that demurrage of one pound a day was paid.
When a ship was approved as a transport a charter party or
contract was drawn up between the owner or broker and the Transport
Board. The charter parties used by the Transport Board were
similar to those of the Navy Board. In fact soon after the establish-
ment of the Transport Board five hundred copies of charter parties
similar to those used by the Navy Office were ordered to be printed
2for the use of the Transport Office.
The outstanding features of a charter party were certain
obligations on the owners' part and certain guarantees on the part
of government. These differed according to the way transports
were hired, whether on tonnage for six months certain or less, or
whether on freight.
Transports taken up on tonnage were guaranteed employment
for a certain period of time and therefore, the obligations of the
owners were greater. These transports were required to be sheathed
with wood or copper completed in men and stores and fitted for the
partioular service for which they were employed entirely at the
owner's expense. They could be sent anywhere with or without convoy;
and entered into pay when the owners made it known that the transports
were ready.3
1. For a list of ships hired by the Transport Board, the ships' brokers,
their rate of pay and period of hire, see PRO, ADM/108/158;
ADM/1 08/1 59.
2. PRO, ADM/108/31, 20 Aug. 1794.
3. PRO, ADM/106/2651, 28 July 1794.
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On the other hand transports on freight were completed in
men and stores on the owners part but were fitted (that is, with
cabins or hammocks etc.) on the part of government. Owners of
vessels hired on freight could not be expected to bear the cost
of fitting when their time of service with the government was so
temporary. These transports usually sailed with a convoy and
entered into pay on the day the dockyard officers certified them
ready, that is, after their cabins etc. were built.1
The government for its part guaranteed a certain rate of pay,
and. demurrage or compensation for damage to or loss of the transport
while employed in government service. The value and freight of
all transports burnt or sunk by the enemy was guaranteed by the
government. But it was customary for only transports taken up on
tonnage for six months certain to be guaranteed also against capture
2by the enemy.	 In such cases, if the captured ship was restored
it became the property of the crown. 3 These guarantees were ful-
filled providing there was no negligence on the part of the master
or ship's company. The freight would be paid but not the value of
a vessel which was lost by the fault of her master. 4 When an
owner was being paid for the value and/or freight of his vessel an
allowance for wear and tear was always deducted from the freight.5
1. PRO, ADJ4/106/2650, 24 Nay 1794.
2. PRO, .&DK/106/2653, 3 Nov. 1794.
3. NNM, ADM/R.P./2, 24 Sept. 1794.
4. PRO, ADN/108/37, 8 July 1796.
5. PRO, ADN/106/2652, 3 Nov. 1794; see also, NMM, ADX/R.P./2.
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The Navy Office calculated for wear and. tear of transports
in the following way. They multiplied the burthen in tons, by
eight shillings; which gave the amount of wear and. tear for one
year - from that amount for any longer or shorter period might have
been easily ascertained. The rule was formed upon the supposition
that a ship was eight shillings a ton the worse for use, every year.
The wear and tear of the bull masts and yards was estimated at five
shillings and of' the rigging at three shillings yearly.1
Other instances when denmrrage or compensation was paid to
the owners of transports on freight were: when a ship lost its
trade because the convoy was late; 2 when a ship was detained in a
foreign port remaining in the transport service longer than was
stipulated in its charter party and perhaps losing the ohanoe of
a return cargo; 3 and when alterations were made in the vessel as
a result of being employed in the transport servioe.4
1. PRO, .ADM/108/35, 20 Feb. 1795.
2. B. g., PRO, LDM/108/5, 31 March 1796; ADM/108/60, 11 May 1799.
3. B. g., PRO, .ADM/1/3732, 25 July 1796; ADM/108/60, 20 April 1799.
4. B. g., PRO, ADM/106/2649, 29 March 1794. Damage done by soldiers
to a transport while on passage was not the responsibility of the
Board as soldiers were not under the control of the Board.
ADM/108/62, 26 Aug. 1799.
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Since transports on freight were not guaranteed against
capture by the enemy the owners of these transports had to purchase
insurance to cover that. If the transport sailed without a convoy
the owner had to purchase additional insurance. 1
 Generally the
Transport Board provided transports on freight with a convoy. If
it did not provide the transport with a convoy then the ship's
additional insurance was paid for by the Treasury. The insurance
policies had to be produced to prove the additional premiums.2
However iii 1798 it became compulsory by Act of Parliament for all
merchant ships engaged in foreign trade (with certain stated
exceptions) to sail with a convoy.3
During the war the Transport Board improved the charter
party from time to time securing to the Board more disciplinary
powers over the masters and. enforcing the owner to strict performance
of his agreements,
The transport service suffered because of the behaviour of
masters throughout the war. A survey of the Transport Board minutes
reveal many instances of disobediences and. negligence on the part of
masters and subsequent mulcts of pay. Because of the disobedience
of orders by tasters transports failed to join convoys on time and
thus delayed an expedition or caused jeopardy to garrisons waiting
I • Merchants had been acquiring the habit of insuring their ships,
particularly at Lloyds, the centre for marine insurance, since
the beginning of the 18th century. (Davies, op. cit., 318.)
During the war against revolutionary France there was an increase
in the number of insurance subscribers and a growth of the marine
insurance business. (Wright & Fayle, op. cit., 196.)
2. PRO, ADM/106/2646, 26 June 1793; 22 July 1793.
3. 38 George III, c.76.
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for provisions and reinforcements. Other transports were lost to
the enemy due to the masters' negligence or disobedience to signals.1
In both cases transports were imilcted., that is, they received a
loss of pay. By failing to join a convoy on time a transport was
muicted the whole of her pay from the time she was supposed to join
-the convoy to the time she actually did. 2
 In fact transports were
muicted. for causing any delay. 3 	 The owner of a transport captured
through -the negligence of the master was denied the value of the
transport.4
As a further check to the misbehaviour of the masters the
Transport Board improved the charter party. On 29 March 1797 the
Board resolved to insert a clause in the charter party which stated
that the Board would not grant Imprest bills for the hire of trans-
ports on tonnage till a certificate was sent to the Transport Office
certifying "that the Master had behaved himself properly and was
always obedient to command during the time he had been under the
direction of the commanding officer or agent of transports."5
Unfortunately the Transport Board had no direct control over the
*asters of transports on freight. They were responsible only to
1. As an encouragement for transport masters not to let their ships
fall into the hands of the enemy the Transport Board allowed 15/-
a day for the transports' assistance in defending their ships from
the enemy. If any captures were made the prize money was divided
among the Board, the owners and crew. If any soldiers were on
board they shared in the prize money also. The Board decided the
portions. PRO, ADM/108/42, 2 Dec. 1796; &DM/108/61, 13 June 1799.
2. PRO, ADM/108/43, 6 Jan. 1797; ADM/108/46, 22 May 1797.
3. PRO, ADM/108/64, 22 Oct. 1799.
4. E. g., PRO, &DM/108/42, 19 Dec. 1796; see above, p. 95.
5. PRO, ADM/108/28, 29 March 1797.
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the owners for their conduct. The Board relied on its agents to
give explicit directions to these masters.1
At the same time the Board attempted to enforce a stricter
performance of agreemeflt8 upon the owners by a further improvement
in the charter party. The owners or masters were finding it bene-
ficial to keep the crew deficient or to substitute boys for able
seamen since the scarcity of seamen caused to a great degree by
their being employed by the navy, had increased the wages of the
men. This practice exposed the vessels as well as the troops and
stores aboard them to danger. For economy's sake transport owners
had also been tempted to keep their ships deficient in stores. Thus
the Transport Board resolved to insert a clause in the charter party
which would state that the Board would not grant Imprest bills for
the hire of transports till a certificate was sent to the Transport
Office oertifying that the ship was fit for the service for which
she was employed and was complete in men and. stores.2
At the time the Transport Board passed this resolution it
also initiated a Register which showed the deficiency in men and.
stores. If the transport was found deficient in men and stores
then it was subject to mulct, that is a deduction was made from
the freight of the ship when the accounts were passed.. 3 These
charter party improvements applied only to transports hired on
tonnage.
1. PRO, LDM/108/58, 11 Feb. 1799.
2 • PRO, LDM/1 08/28, 29 March 1797; NLS, Melvi lie MSS • 1044.
3. Ibid., PRO, ADM/108/51, 13 Jan. 1798; ADM/1O8/56, 2 Oct. 1798.
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In the same year an improvement came in the charter parties
of victuallers on tonnage and on freight. During the war the
Transport Board. repeatedly instructed its agents to make general
and liberal offers to the viotuallers and ships upon freight -to
take in as many officers, as could be conveniently accommodated. in
their respective ships. A very few at most were provided, for by
these means; victuallers and. merchantmen in general were reluctant
to receive officers only upon any tenns. Perhaps they felt the
inconveniences were not worth the money they would receive. As a
result transport agents were obliged to crowd more into the
transports. 1 Therefore, in 1797 the Transport Board wrote into
the charter party of all viotuallers that those ships had to receive
a certain number of officers together with their men.2
Further charter party improvements were made in August 1800.
The charter parties for vessels hired on freight to convey ordnance
stores and provisions were altered to include a clause binding the
owners to make good any deficiencies according to their evaluation
of them and. also to prevent freight being paid. for a larger cuantity
than was actually delivered. By September a form was issued. for
passing the account of a ship on freight.3
Once the transports were surveyed and valued. and. a charter
party was made 'out they were then fitted. for the service for which
1. PRO, ADM/108/19, 29 Dec. 1796.
2. PRO, ADM/108/46, 16 May 1797; see also, PRO, ADM/108/58, 11 Feb. 1799.
3. PRO, ADM/108/67, 7 Aug. 1800.
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they were employed. During the survey the beptford officers gave
their opinion which transports would be better used for the convey-
ance of troops, cavalry, provisions, or stores. The transport
agent would direct the transports to be fitted only when he received
orders to that effect from the Transport Board.1
Early in the war the Navy Board wished all troop transports
to be at least 5'6" between decks and issued orders to their officers
at Deptford. not to survey any that were not. 2
 By January 1794 the
officers at Deptford were finding it difficult to supply the press-
ing demands with the height restriction. The Navy Board had. to
lower its requirements and settle for not less than 5'2" between
decks, still much higher than those allowed in the American war.3
Eight months later the Transport Board had to reduce its require-
ments still further. They stipulated that they would not take into
service a transport unless her height between decks was at least
5 feet.4
 This remained the constant rule of the Transport Board
throughout the war. 5
 A vessel with its decks too low for carrying
troops but whose hold was very deep made an excellent victualler.
Ships that could not meet the height restriction for troop transports
were often made into victuallers.
1. PRO, ADM/108/31, 9 Sept. 1794.
2. PRO, ADM/106/2646, 30 July 1793.
3. PRO, LDM/106/2649, 13 Jan. 1794.
4. PRO, ADM/108/31, 18 Sept. 1794.
5. PRO, ADM/108/65, 11 Dec. 1799.
6. PRO, ADM/108/33, 14 Nov. 1794.
1795; ADM/108/61, 19 June 1799.
5 June; 6 June 1800.
1800.
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Generally troop transports were fitted with berths, cabins
and hammocks. For a very short voyage, however, beds were not
considered necessary and. they were not used on short servioea from
Jersey and. Guernsey to Plymouth or Portsmouth. 1 For example, in
the spring of 1800 the transports which brought the Russian troops
from Guernsey and Jersey were fitted at the low rate of three men
to four tons2 and. a blanket and pillow instead of a bed were put
on board for each soldier. An attempt was made to use no ship of
less than 200 tons in this operation.3
For voyages that were not very short the Transport Board
commonly fitted troop ships with berths, arranging them so as to
admit the greatest possible number. The berths occupied each
side and. the intermediate space was filled. with hammocks as the
ship might allow.4 A ship fitted up with berths carried more men
than those with hammocks. A ship of 600 tons carried. 300 men in
hammocks. If a ship having six feet and upwards height between
decks was properly fitted with berths it could carry 500 men, at
the rate of something more than one and. one half ton per man. The
same ship could carry 450 men in partly berths and partly hammocks
at the same rate of ton per man. These estimates are for vessels
on home service or short services, such as the Continent. The
Russian ships returning to the Baltic in i800 were ordered. to be
1 • PRO, 1DM/i 08/36, 24 Aug.
2. See below, p. 258.
3. PRO, ADM/108/67, 17 May;
4. PRO, ADM/108/66, 31 Jan.
5. See below, p. 258.
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supplied with hmnmocks if the men did not have berths. If the
material was prepared a ship was fitted in one day with berths.
The expense was about £100. Hammocks were about 4/6 a piece.1
Equipping transports with hammocks would have allowed more
room for the individual soldier and would have added considerably
to his comfort and health during the passage. Since this practice
meant that less troops could be embarked on one transport, the
Transport Board found it impracticable and. uneconomical at times
when there was a great demand for tonnage. Thus, the common
practice of fitting ships with berths. In fact the Transport
Board exercised. every ingenuity to make the transports capable of
carrying as many men as possible.2
In 1795 Major General Whyte wished. hammocks instead of
standing berths to be fitted into the transports that were to convey
his troops from Ireland to the West Indies. The Transport Board's
answer was that "the present great demand for tonnage rendered the
fitting with hammocks altogether impracticable, although the principle
was highly approved and had been adopted." 3
 The next day the
Transport Board informed Captain Patton that the Active might be
appointed, "but that the urgent demand. of tonnage, in the Transport
department, forbade any diminution of capacity for stowing troops...
1. PRO, ADI4/1/3739, 17 May 1800.
2. PRO, ADM/108/36, 18 Aug.; 19 Aug. 1795.
3. Ibid., 18 Aug. 1795.
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therefore, Sir Jeremy's plan of berthing in hammocks must be sus-
pended at present."1
Sir Jeremy Fitzpatrick, M.D., Inspector of Health for the
Land Forces, lamented that his advice had not been taken and. was
critical of the government's more practicable and lees comfortable
way of conveying troops. "When ships of only 5'4" between decks
(werg fitted with two heights of berths," Sir Jeremy said, "the
men er7 too crowded and. imbibL7 their own morbid exhalations 1"
He went on to say, "that 25000 men crowded in a huddled way into
transports, ou]47 only be on paper, that number. At the place
of their destination, not more than 15000 of them oui7 appear in
their shoes.., that both charity and policy dictatL7 the fitting
ships under 5'4" for hammocks."2 It was unfortunate that Sir
Jeremy's plan was not adopted for many of the troops that were sent
to the West Indies were not in a state to march much less to bear
aims upon their arrival. This fact coupled with the deadly West
Indian climate considerably decreased Britain's military strength
in that area.
However other attempts were made to make the soldier's
passage on board a transport more comfortable. In order to give
more air to the troops scuttles were cut in the upper decks of the
troopships according to a fixed plan. They were cut in a manner
1. PRO, LDM/108/36, 19 Aug. 1795.
2. Thid., 29 Aug. 1795. On 8 Sept. 1794 the King appointed Sir
Jeremy Fitzpatrick, Inspector of Health for the Land. Forces,
with a particular view to their situation when on board transports.
105
least prejudicial to the ship, the government made good to the
owner the expense of the damage done to the deck. But no more
scuttles than were absolutely necessary were cut.1
While the troops were being conveyed in berths and. hammocks
the officers on board troopships usually resided in cabins. Most
vessels taken up as transports had to have cabins fitted in.
Richard Martyr was the contractor for the Navy Board and then the
Transport Board who fitted. the transports with cabins and with
stalls for horses, 2
 His work was supervised. in the Deptford yard
by H. Boyce, the Shipwright officer. 3
 The East India ships like
transports on tonnage were fitted at the expense of their owners
or by the East India Company. 4
 However, consistent with the
practice of the Navy Board, the Transport Board supplied the East
India ships with air tubes and with beds. 5
 On the whole East India
ships were expensive troop transports. They were large ships so
their cost per ton was high. Admiral Sir Hyde Parker at the West
Indies preferred the coppered North Country built ships, armed with
close quarters. He recommended that they be sent out, "in preference
to the large East India ships, for accommodating troops - as manage-
able with fewer seamen!"6
 Though East India ships had been used to
1. PRO, ADM/106/2649, 29 March 1794.
2. PRO, ADM/108/31, 20 Aug. 1794.
3. PRO, ADM/108/52, 15 March 1798.
4. PRO, ADM/108/37, 1 July 1796.
5. PRO, ADM/108/57, 12 Dec. 1798.
6. PRO, ADM/108/49, 4 Oct. 1797.
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transport troops and provisions from the very beginning of the war
regtdar transports and ships on freight were preferred.
The extent to which shipa would be fitted with cabins,
berths and hammocks, depended on the size of the ship and the
number of troops and officers who were to embark. Here are
examples of the fitting out of armed transports of three decks
and two decks. The transport of three decks was fitted with two-
men cabins on the lower deck from the bulkhead of the store rooms
to the gun room, and. the middle part was fitted with hammocks;
the forepart of middle deck was appropriated for the ship's company;
the space between the separation bulkhead and the wardroom was for
soldier-officers, with mess tables and. benches, and cabins against
the Bides - the round house was for the commander of the ship, the
commander of the troops, and for some of the officers of the ship.
Armed. transports of two decks were fitted with two-men cabins on
the lower deck from the manger to the gunroom bulk head, the middle
part was fitted. with hammocks; the ship's company was berthed
under the half deck; the wardroom was for the soldiers' officers
with a mess table and benches and. two cabins against the Bide aloft
the after gun; the round house was for the commander of the ship
and. master while the rest of his officers were in the gun room.1
'When there was little time to fit ships for an expedition
that was departing rather quickly, beds and hammocks were supplied
1 • pRo, ADM/1 08/52, 9 March 1798.
107
to ships with no cabins.1
The Transport Board continued with the practice first
suggested by the Navy Board of dividing the troops into watches, so
as to keep one third upon deck at a time. 2
 This meant that the
troops below deck would have been much less crowded and the chances
of sickness prevailing would have been lessened. When sickness
did occur, however, in order to prevent it from spreading, the
sick were usually transferred into hospital ships. Also, after
1794, at the suggestion of Sir Jeremy Fitzpatrick, the practice
of laMing the men, especially the sick, from a ship in port in
order to take in fresh air, was begun. 3
 Ships that had sickness
were well white-washed and. fumigated before other troops were
embarked. 4
 Because of the prevalence of' sickness among the troops
in the West Indies, all the transports coming from those Islands
were placed in tiers for inspection. That is, as they arrived in
the River Thames, they were placed distinct from all others. They
were fumigated and the unfit beds were destroyed. 5
 In fact all
ships returning from Gibraltar as well as the West Indies were placed
in quarantine until the secretary of state's permission was given
1. PRO, ADM/106/2645, 13 May 1793.
2. NMM, ADM/R.P./2, 4 April 1794.
3. PRO, ADM/1/4160, 16; 22 Feb. 1794. E. g., see Sir John Moore.
The Diary of Sir John Moore. Edited by Major General Sir J. F.
)Iauroie, K.C.B. (London, 1904), vol. I, 384; vol. II, 56;
Sir R. P. Wilson. A Narrative of the Expedition to Egypt under
Sir Ralph Abercrombie containing an Exposition of the PrinciDle
a.nu. ionauo 01 iiaoieone tonaparte,	 S
of the Campaigne (London, 1803), 4.
4. PRO, ADM/108/49, 4 Oct. 1797.
5.
W.0.1/798. 2 Feb. 179.
PRO, ADM/108/31, 25 Sept. 1794; .ADM/1O8/34, 24 Dec. 1794; see also,
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for their release.1
Once the government fitted the ships for troops the Agent
Victualler was applied to for water casks and for sufficient pro-
visions. 2 Regular transports were usually provided with enough
provisions for four months. 3
 However by 1800 transports taken
in-to service for the Continent and. Mediterranean were only victualled
to two months though those for the West Indian services oontinued
to be victualled to four months. 4 The master was answerable for
all provisions and stores put on board his ship and it was his duty
to issue the provisions to the troops.5
The Navy Board and then the Transport Board paid the sub-
sistence of the soldiers only during their passage. It was the
responsibility of the commanding officers to provide for their
subsistence before they embarked. Residence on board a transport
where there were no victualling stores on board was considered as
quarters only for the convenience of the troops and the town and
was not considered an embarkation.6
Horses, like soldiers, had to be conveyed great distances
with as little discomfort and injury to health as possible. They
1. PRO, ADM/108/19, 16 Oct. 1797.
2. NMM, AD$(/R.P./2, 26 Aug. 1794.
3. PRO, .ADM/108/31, 23 Aug.; 13 Sept. 1794.
4. PRO, ADM/108/67, 13 June; 23 June 1800.
5. PRO, ADM/108/46, 18 May 1797.
6. PRO, ADM/108/28, 6 Feb. 1797.
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were conveyed in stalls built into the vessels taken up as cavalry
transports. Each horse's stall had to be 2'6" in breadth, and
the heavy horse required a stall 7'4" in length. 1
 Horses were
hoisted onto the cavalry ships by means of large sweep blocks
2
and halters.	 To facilitate the embarkation of the cavalry at
Southampton a temporary stage was erected in the Itchen River by
order of Captain Woodriff the transport agent there. 3
 The slings
were made for the horses at Deptford. and. Woolwioh. Many other
items such as horse hammocks, collars, halters etc., used on
cavalry ships were also issued there.4
Here is an example of how Richard Martyr turned nine troop
transports into horse transports. The nine transports had stowed
their holds with two tiers of casks. The height wider the beam
was only six feet which was not a sufficient height for horses to
stand under. In order to make the ships capable to receive
horses on board, the hold had to be unstowed., one tier of casks
taken away and the lower tier had to be covered with ballast and
bavins. The horse ships were then ready to be fitted with stalls
for 180 horses. Martyr's people assisted by house carpenters from
the yard required four days to complete them. Cabins were not
interfered with, except the hatches, which having been covered over
for the soldiers' messplaces, were required to be opened to admit
1. PRO, ADM/106/2645, 28 May 1793.
2. PRO, ADM/108/42, 21 Dec. 1796.
3. PRO, ADM/108/43, 4 Jan. 1797.
4. PRO, ADM/1o6/2645, 8 April 1793.
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air to the horses.1
Cavalry transports conveyed one cavalry man to each horse.
These men were usually accommodated with hammocks under the lower
deck. Some of the larger transports could take sixty or seventy
additional men by hanging in more hammocks. 2
 The provisions for
the men on board were stowed. in the afterhold so the steam of the
horses would not damage them.3
Hay, bran and oats had to be put on board for the horses.
Each horse was allowed ten pounds of hay, eight pounds of oats and
a small parcel of bran per day. 4
 Each horse also was given six
gallons of water a clay. 5
 The rasters were responsible for the
forage as they had. been for the provisions. The space of six
stalls were appropriated to store the forage.
Shipping of hay was out of the question during the American
war sinoe fodder in general was bulky to ship. 7 During the war
against revolutionary France the process of pressing hay before
stowing it on transports was begun. At a cost of 71/- per ton8
1. PRO, ADM/106/3323, 19 l4arch 1793.
2. PRO, ADM/1O8/31, 9 Sept. 1794.
3. Ibid., 9 Sept. 1794.
4. PRO, ADM/108/32, 10 Oct. 1794.
5. PRO, ADX/108/36, 30 July 1795.
6. PRO, ADM/1o8/33, 14 Nov. 1794.
7. Mackesey, p . cit., 66.
8. PRO, ADM/106/2649, 3 Jan. 1794; ADM/106/2645, 8 April 1793.
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hay could be compressed into trusses weighing 224 pounds 1 which
took up only 1/6 of the space required for impressed hay.2
Victuallers and etoreships required less fitting than troop
and cavalry transports. The only fitting that had to be done was
the erection of bulkheads to secure the provisions and stores and.
the building of berths to aocoinznodate the officers that viotuallers
by charter party had. to receive. 3
 Their readiness for service was
reported to the Ord.nance and Victualling Boards who had the stores
and provisions prepared for transportation. The lading was then
entrusted to their own officers.
each transport was supplied. with a flatboat which was used
for embarking and diseinbarking troops. 4
 Most transports had long
boats also which were used for scouting purposes and for oommunicat-
jug with other ships when sailing in a fleet. During 1798 the long
boats were fitted with a gun for security against attacks from the
enemy's privateers etc. The owners of transports then engaged were
requested to adopt the measure and a clause referring to this was
inserted in the charter parties of all transports then subsequently
engaged.5
The troopships, cavalry ships, victuallers and storeships
usually returned to the Thames after completing their assignment.
1. PRO, ADM/108/28, 2 Jan. 1797.
2. PRO, ADM/108/61, 19 June 1799.
3. See above, p. 100.
4. PRO, ADM/106/2647, 13 Ang. 1793.
5. PRO, ADM/108/53, 13 April 1798.
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If they were not needed they were discharged on the usual allowance
if the owners would accept it. The usual allowance was one month's
pay. 1
 One month's pay was also given to transports in lieu of
returning to Deptford. 2
 For example, in 1800 during the acute
grain shortage in Britain, the Transport Board. allowed transports
in the Gibraltar and Mediterranean services to be discharged there
and. given one month's pay in lieu of being discharged at Deptford,
provided they loaded without delay a cargo of wheat for any port
in Great Britain. 3
 Most transports accepted this offer.
Transports were repaired at the Deptford and. Woolwich Navy
yards. This arrangement included the East India ships that were
used as transports. 4
 The usual time allowed for repairs was five
weeks, after that the ship was mulcted. 5
 There was no delay for
the materials were at hand since the storehouses and timber piles
had been well stocked by Midd.leton after the American war.6
In a letter to Secretary Dundas, of 29 Dec. 1796, the
Transport Board offered a defence of transport conditions at the
time.
1. PRo, ADM/1/3732, 25 July 1796.
2. PRO, ADM/1O8/40, 19 Oct. 1796.
3. PRO, ADM/108/66, 8 March 1800.
4. NMM, .ADM/R.P./4, 6 Feb.; 10 Feb. 1796.
5. PRO, ADM/108/57, 12 Nov. 1798.
6. Albion, op. cit., 371.
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It will not escape your goodness to observe, how
extremely difficult it is, in services like these,
where foreigners as well as our own people are con-
cerned, to prevent every murmur; and especially
where the accommodations, at the best, must necessarily
fall very far beneath what such persons have been
accustomed -to on shore; although we may be permitted
to add, that never, before the present War, were so
many comforts and. conveniences administered to troops,
in Extra—Provisions, and. Stores particularly, as have
been afforded by the Liberality and Indulgence 2f
Government, upon the late and present Services.'
1. PRO, ADM/108/19, 29 Dec. 1796.
114
CHAPTER IV
THE HIRING OF SHIPS IN HAMBURG, 1795
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Between August and November 1795 the Transport Board.
chartered eighty two ships from Messrs. Parish and. Company, a
brokerage firm in Hamburg, to convey from the Continent to England
and. the West Indies foreign troops and. cavalry, most of whom were
destined to serve under Sir Ralph Abercromby in the Caribbean.
The price paid. per ship was about one third more than the cost of
hiring a similar ship in Britain - the result for the main part of
a different method. of ship measurement in Hamburg. The extra-
ordinary expenses incurred in hiring these ships initiated. an
inquiry into the accounts of Messrs. Parish and Co. and into the
conduct of Captain Home Pophaan, the transport agent in Hamburg.
It was indeed. unfortunate that this episode oocurred just at the
time when the Transport Board was under great pressure from the
ministry to economise in every possible way. The Hamburg ships
proved a grave disappointment also, since none of the vessels would
go further than England; new tonnage had. to be obtained. from the
maritime resources of Britain resulting in delay and inconvenience
and. additional expense. In order to understand the necessity of
hiring ao many foreign ships for this service one must briefly look
at the military situation on the Continent in 1795.
Sinoe the beginning of the war the allied. forces had been
meeting with little success on the Continent. The British govern-
ment was slow to mobilise its forces. Apart from this there were
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conflicting ambitions and lack of cooperation among the European
nations that made up the coalition which hampered operations. As
a result the first expedition to the low countries mounted by Pitt
and Dundas met its end disgracefully in the Spring of 1795. At
the beginning of March 1795 French forces occupied the Dutch
Netherlands. On the 8th of that month the British cabinet decided
to withdraw its troops from the Continent and. three days later
information was sent to General Harcourt that transports for 23000
men were on their way to him. On the 22nd the British began their
march to Bremen for embarkation. Two weeks later, Prussia, whose
troops had recently arrived. to hold the line of the Ens after the
British withdrawal, signed the Treaty of B21e with France in order
to be free to use the threat of military force to vindicate her
claims upon Austria and Russia for a larger slice of Poland. She,
then, occupied the	 of Hanover in an attempt to force its
neutrality. The French were freeer to act in Germany because
Tuscany had fallen the previous February. On 19 April the British
infantry and part of the British artillery took ship for England,
leaving the remainder of the artillery and. the whole of the cavalry
behind them under Lord Cathoart and Lieutenant General David Dundas.
The number embarked was nearly 15000. Rear Admiral Harvey was in
conunand of the convoy sent out to protect the transports on their
passage from Bremer Lehe to England.1
1. Add. MSS., 27595, 17 April 1795; see also: PRO, ADM/108/169,
8, 18, 19 April 1795. Captain Popham, in February 1795, hired
14 vessels from Messrs. Bavinck and Company, merchants in Enden,
to convey British hospitals to England. PRO, ADM/108/172,
11 Feb. 1795.
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The entire defence of northern Germany had broken up with
the Treaty of Btle and. the subsequent withdrawal of Prussia from
the war. Therefore the British cavalry and. artillery remained in
Germany until the end of 1795 when the Hanoverian Regenoy agreed
to the neutrality imposed by Prussia.1
Henry Dundas, as Secretary of State for War, employed the
British forces left on the Continent as a recruiting agency and
relied on them to raise a number of foreign regiments for service
with the British forces. The recruiting and inspecting of the
foreign corps was under the immediate direction of Lieutenant
Colonel Nesbit. The British government hoped -to raise French,
German and Dutch troops. The greater part of the French Emigre
and. Dutch Corps were to be conveyed to England and then to Guernsey
and Jersey for the purpose of returning with an invasion force to
the Continent. A small French contingent, some Dutch artillery
and all of the German corps were to be conveyed to England and
thence to Guernsey and Jersey for the purpose of serving in the
West Indies. Later the Transport Board wanted to drop the plan
of sending the foreign infantry to the West Indies via the Channel
Islands, but none of the transports hired from Parish and Company
would go out of Europe.
Several French igr4 regiments (Roharis, Beors, Dainas, and
Pergord.) had. been collected by Colonel Nesbitt at Stade and Zell
1. John W. Foriescue. A history of the British Army (London, 1915),
vol. IV, 323, 388, 409, 410.
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by the end of May 1795. The english transports that conveyed
these regiments had arrived at Cuxhaven by the 15th of June under
Lieutenant Marshall. 1 The troops were embarked at Bremer Lehe and
by 7 July they were in Portsmouth.2
The foreign troops raised to serve in the West Indies con-
sisted for the most part of German corps of infantry and. cavalry.
The ministry was hoping that the employment of foreign troops in the
West Indies would relieve more British troops for service in other
areas in this over-extended war. "The present critical situation
of the West India Islands and the various other services now in
contemplation which must be provided. for by this country", wrote
Portland, Secretary of State for Home Affairs, to Lieutenant General
Dundas, Commander of the British forces on the Continent, "make it
very desirable that as great a proportion as possible of German
infantry should be procured by the beginning of September."3
Although the service for which the German corps of infantry
and cavalry were intended. was considered very important, their
transference from the Continent was not to interfere with the with-
drawal of British troops and. cavalry if the situation on the Continent
aad.s it necessary to take away the British forces earlier than had been
1. PRO, ADM/1O8/169, 15 June 1795; see also, ADM/108/169, 29 June 1795.
2. Add. ES. 27595, Portland. to D. Dundas, 7 July 1795.
3. , 3 July 1795.
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expected. If that was the case, the transports intended for the
embarkation of the foreign corps were to be employed in removing
British troops. Before issuing that order, however, the army
commander had to examine the situation very carefully since transports
were being prepared in England to take away the British forces. Henry
Duzid.as writing to Lieutenant General David Dundas explained. "Although
under such pressing urgency, as that to which I have referred, I have
given you discretionary power to withdraw the transports prepared for
other services, and to apply them to the object of effecting the safe
retreat of the British cavalry under your command., I must particularly
mention to you that they are not to. be so applied unless such urgency
does exist, as other arrangements are making for bringing away the
British troops in consequence of the orders to be conveyed to you by
His Royal Highness the Duke of York." 1 The withdrawal of the re-
mainder of the French Einigr4 and. mitch corps were not to interfere
with the removal of the troops intended for the West Indies or with
the preparations for bringing away the British cavalry.
The British cavalry, about 3,000 horses with their riders,
and about 5,000 British infantry with a certain proportion of artillery
and stores, were withdrawn from the Continent of Europe in British
2transports by the end of 1795. The Transport Board provided nearly
25,000 tons of shipping for this service. 3 The German infantry and.
1. Add., 1455., 27595, H. Dunda to D. Dundas, 23 Sept. 1795.
2. PRO, ADM/108/170, 29 Sept. 1795.
3. Add. 1455., 27595, 15 Oct. 1795, H. Dunclas to D. Dundas.
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cavalry consisting of Irvine's Hussars, Hompeech's Hussars, regiments
commanded. by Colonels Hardy and Ramsay and the Prince of Balm's
battalion, intended for service in the West Indies were for the most
part conveyed to England .in the transports hired by Captain Home
Popham at Hamburg. A further quantity of tonnage was also hired in
Britain, and sent to Hamburg for this service. 1
 Some French corps
were embarked in British transports and in some of the Hamburg ships.
A corps of Dutch artillery destined for St. Domingo were embarked
also in transports sent from Britain.
The idea of chartering ships in Hamburg for the transporta-
tion of troops was adopted early in the summer of 1795. The ahipa
were chartered under the direction of Henry Dundas and carried. on,
without the immediate intervention of the Transport Board, by
Captain Christian, one of the Transport Board's commissioners, in a
correspondence with Captain Popham, the principal transport agent
on the Continent. 2 Dundas and Christian had. been of the opinion
that it might be practical and convenient to hire foreign ships to
transport the Continental forces rather than send more British tonnage
across the Channel. The available tonnage in England was being
prepared for the Abercromby-Christian expedition to the West Indies,
and some of it was being held ready to withdraw the British artillery
and cavalry from the Continent.
1. PRO, ADN/108/66, 22 April 1800.
2. Pophain was also Inspector of Inland Navigation on the Continent
for the army, an appointment he received at the request of the
Duke of York on 20 February 1795. PRO, &DM/108/4B, 20 Feb. 1795.
He had been appointed. an agent for transports at Ostend and Nieuport
on 6 Sept. 1793, when he was a Lieutenant.
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The first correspondence that appears on the Bubjeot is a
letter dated 26 July 1795 from Popham to Christian concerning the
quantity of tonnage that could be procured on the Continent. Popham
had been asked earlier to ascertain the capability of Germany to
furnish tonnage. He informed Christian that he could procure from
10,000 to 20,000 tons from Messrs. Parish and Company "at £3.0.0 per
ton for the voyage, allowing twenty days after they are fit to receive
horses or men, as lay days; and ten more after their arrival in Port
for their discharge."	 Popham said that it worked out to about 15/-
per ton per month, "calculating on the time of fitting, and the long
casualties of passages out and home which with their thirty days
demurrage will make near four months." He told Christian that he
had chartered 10,000 tons at the time and planned to charter more
when he knew the exact quantity that was wanted; that he hoped
Parish and Company would agree to tendering them by the month instead
of by the run "as it would prevent any possibility of dispute about
demurrage;" that he sent round a proper person to survey the ships
before they were chartered with directions how to fit them and. he
gave orders to hire every carpenter in Hamburg and Altona; that he
planned to inspect them himself as soon as possible; and that he
told Parish and Company they had to supply money for the purchase of
all materials and for the disbursements of outfit they would be
allowed a two percent commission which was the same allowed to the
Commissary General on such occasions. Popham told Christian that
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he planned. to give bills on the Board for the "exigencies of the
moment" but he wished to wait the authority of the Board before
he drew for any considerable sums; that under the present oontract
they were to have half freight paid. immediately and if they agreed
to charter by the month Popham supposed they would. ask an advance
of two months freight.1
On 2 August Popham wrote again to Christian and informed.
him that he was "getting on very fast in the equipment of transports",
and was apprehensive of having to wait for convoy. 2
 On that day
Messrs. Parish and Company agreed to supply Pophani with 20,000 tons
of shipping to carry cavalry to England or Ireland and. on that day
also the Heads of a Charter Party (the preliminaries to a charter
party) were signed. All the transports taken up on freight in
Hamburg were hired on these terms. The Heads of the Charter Party
read as follows:
Heads of a Charter party between Messrs. Parish & Co.
of Hamburgh and Capt. Home Popham on the part of the
Commissioners for conducting His Majesty's Transport
Service.
Messrs. Parish engage to lett to Capt. Pophana by the
25th of August 20,000 Tons of Shipping at the rate of
60 shillings sterling per ton to carry Horses from Stade
to Ireland or the limits of Ireland 20 d,aya to be allowed
for the fitment and Shipping which is to be at the erpence
of Capt. Popham 10 days to unload £15 percent to be paid
Primage to the Captains as is the custom of this Port
extra Port Charges except to the Port of Delivery
to be paid by Capt. Popham
1. PRO, .ADM/108/169, Popham to Christian, 26 July 1795.
2. PRO, AD14/108/169, Popham to Christian, 2 Aug. 1795.
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The Ships to be all examined by Capt. Popham or
his Officers as none will be accepted that are not
tight and in every respect well fitted; after
they are examined and approved they are to be
considered as chartered.
Messrs. Parish & Co. are to forfeit the hire
of as many Tons as are not ready by the 25th
August and. Capt. Popham has leave to stop their
Progress by giving 24 Hours Notice provided the
Ships are not approved; as Messrs. Parish & Co.
immediately hire them on the Approval of Capt.
Popham.
One half of the Freight Money to be paid to Messrs.
Parish & Co. on the day of Signature of the Charter
Party by Bills on the Commissioners of Transports
at 30 days sight the other half one Month after
the Transports leave Stade by Bills of the same
date.
Messrs. Parish & Co. to pay all the Bills of
Outfit and. on producing their Bills certified
by the British Consul and a respectable Merchant
to have a Commission of £2 percent and the whole
to be paid by Bills at 30 days sight as aforesaid.
All Risks of the Enemy to be sustained by Capt.
Popham; and any Deviation or other Dispute to be
settled by arbitration.
Bremer Lehe Signed August 2, 1795. 
1
According to the Heads of the Charter Party the ships were
to be chartered by the run. But the charter party was left open
as was the custom of the Transport Board in case Messrs. Parish and
Company would charter by the month. Originally twenty one ships
were chartered by the run according to the terms of the above charter
party. They were let by different owners to Parish and Company who
then chartered them to the British government. (miring the third
week of August Popham began to show signs of apprehension about his
basis of authority for carrying on these transactions and. he wrote
1. PRO, ADM/108/170, Case From the Honorable Commissioners for Transport
Service.
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to Christian on the subject on 17 August. Up till then all his
correspondence had been with Christian personally and he only began
to correspond formerly with the Transport Board on 2 September. In
fact Popham had acted without proper authorization and this was to
cause difficulties later. 1 ) By 19 August he had secured twenty
seven ships on freight to convey the cavalry to England or Ireland.
On that day a charter party for the twenty seven ships was signed
on the terms of the above Heads of a Charter Party between Popham
and. Messrs. Parish and. Company. 2 At least eight of the twenty
seven ships were owned by Parish and Company.
At this time Pophazn proposed to take as many of the twenty
seven ships into monthly pay as were willing to engage. Thirteen
out of the original twenty one acceded to this proposition and went
into monthly pay on giving up the half freight paid at Hamburg.
Fourteen of the twenty seven ships remained to proceed by the run.
These fourteen were to receive the horses of the Duke fl/B Choiseul's
regiment and. sail from Stad.e on 12 Oct. 1795.
	
On 19 August charter
parties were signed between Popham and the individual owners whose
ships went into monthly pay. All ships taken upc3l tonnage in
Hamburg were to be chartered on similar terms. Here is the charter
1. PRO, ADM/108/169, 17 Aug.; 2 Sept. 1795.
2. Ibid., 19 Aug. 1795. For the actual charter party of the twenty
seven ships see Appendix, p. 329.
3. PRO, ADM/108/169, 16 Nov. 1795.
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party of the Rambler one of the twenty seven ships that went into
monthly pay.
By this present Charter party be it known
unto whom it may oonoern that on the 19th
day of August in the Year of our Lord. 1795
before me Charles Conrad Frederic Hartman
Notary Public practising in the free Imperial
City of Hamburgh personally appeared Capt.
Home Popham Esq. on behalf of his Britanick
Majesty's Commissioners for conducting his
Transport Service, affreighter, on the one
part and. Captain Joseph Green Master or
Commander of the Ship or Vessel called
Rambler of the Burthen of 122 Lasts as
ascertained by the Sworn Harbour Master
of this city by his Report annexed who
declared. that by the Interposition of
Mr. Christ Died. Glashott of Hambourg Sworn
Ships Broker they had covenanted and agreed.
on the freighting and. letting said vessel
to the disposal of the British Government
for Six Months certain and as much longer
as the British Government chuses to keep
her in their Service on the Terms as follows
that is to say.
Capt. Joseph Green is obliged immediately
on signing these Presents to let and deliver
his said. Ship and Boats tight and staunch,
well tackled, apparelled., mnned with ten
Men for every Hundred. Lasts and provided
with everything else necessary for the per-
forming of said. Service to the sole Use and
free Disposal of the British Government (the
proper Place for putting in the Sails, Cables
and. provisions, as also the necessary Room
for the Crew excepted, as being for the Ship's
Use) he not being permitted to load any Goods
or Wares for any Body else, wider any Pretence
whatsoever.
The Freighter may get shipt on Board the said
Vessel as many Troops, Horses and Stores of
every Description as they may think fit and.
suitable to the Burthen of the said Ship, for
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all which Stores and Provisions the Master
is to sign a Receipt and. to be accountable for
the same. He is further to Bail under such
convoy as may be appointed for the Service.
The Freighter is obliged on Account as aforesaid
to cause to be paid. unto the said Captain or
Owners or to their Order, exactly and without
Exception, his Freight money stipulated at the
Rate of thirty six Schillings Sterling good
and lawful Money of Great Britain for each Last
for every Calendar Month the Ship is in the
above Service, and besides Fifteen percent
Primage and. Hatmoney of the Amount of the
said Freight. The Payment to be made in the
following Manner: The Ship to enter into Pay,
on signing the present Charter-party when the
Freighter will pay two Months Advance by Bills
as aforesaid at Ninety days Sight, after which
the Commissioners for conducting His Britaniok
Majesty's Transport Service are to pay to Messrs.
Parish and Co. Owners of said Ship or their
Order the Freight every two Months as it is
due on producing a Certificate of the Ships
existing from the Senior Agent of Transports
or Commanding Officers of His Majesty's Ships
at the Place where the said Vessel then is,
after they have been long enough in the Service
to allow of two Months to be kept in arrear;
which is to be paid on the Ship's being discharged
and. if out of Europe she is to have Six Weeks
Pay exclusive of the Freight due to the Captain
at the Time of his Discharge as an Equivalent
for his Passage to Europe.
The Captain is to find cooking Utensils at the
Rate of one Man for every Last as also Firing,
Candles, wooden Bowls, Platters and Spoons for
which shall be allowed him one Penny Sterling
for each man per day.
The Freighters pay the Expence of Outfit of
Cabins for the Officers and Soldiers and a Cabin
shall be put up for the Master and Mate of the
Ship. The government also pays all Pilotage,
Light money, Harbour Dues etc. etc.
Should the vessel be burnt, sunk or taken by the
Enemy, in and during the Performance of the
aforesaid Service and it shall appear to a
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Court of Enquiry that the same did not proceed
from any Fault, Neglect or otherwise in the
Master and Ship's-Company, the value of her
shall be paid for by the Freighters with
twenty nine thousand six hundred Marks current
Money according to the annexed appraisement of
the Aldermen, Captains and. Carpenters, or the
value thereof, a reasonable Tear and Wear being
deducted.
If any Carelessness, mismanagement or Neglect
of the Master or Crew occasions any Detention
of the Service, the Shin shall be responsible
in the same Manner as all British Transports are.
And. for the -true Performance of all and singular
the above Contracts and Agreements both Parties
above named bind, themselves mutually in the
penal Sum of double the Amount of the Freight
and Primage above fixed for six Months, which
the Party failing is to pay without any Object
or Benefit of the Law to the Party performing
And. in Witness whereof have hereunto set their
Hands in my Registry in Hamburgh the Day and
Year aforesaid.
Home Popham
Edward Carness owner
Which I attest under my usual firms and Seal
of Office of' Notary hereunto affixed-
Charles Hartmen 1795 1
(Notary Public)
Between 12 August and 31 October 1795 Popham chartered
fifty five ships from Parish ai-id Company for six months certain.
Their charter parties were the same as the above. Therefore there
were eighty two separate charter parties signed between Messrs.
Parish and. Company of Hamburg and Captain Popham between August and
November 1795 - the fifty five ships chartered for six months certain
1. For the charter parties of the 82 ships hired at Hamburg, see
PRO, ADM/108/171.
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and the twenty seven hired by the run to convey cavalry to England
or Ireland.	 The fifty five ships were used for the most part to
convey the foreign infantry to England.
By 28 August Captain Popham had acquired 8000 tons of
shipping for six months certain. It is interesting to note that
wooden bottomed ships received eighteen shillings per ton and copper
bottomed nineteen shillings. The price offered in England at this
time was thirteen shillings per ton for vessels whether sheathed with
wood or copper. 2 The owners received fifteen percent primage on
the freight as was the custom of the port because in Pophain's own
words "without this last clause no person would agree." 3 The
8000 tons was adequate to 4000 infantry. Popham continued to take
up transports to meet the demands of Colonel Nesbitt's 8000 men.
"Every ship fit for service that can be procured shall be taken up
at Hamburg, to fulfill the extent of the Board's order" he wrote
on 25 September.4 (As has been mentioned earlier Popham began to
correspond formerly with the Board on 2 September. 5) Popham built
wharves in the Elbe for the embarkation and disembarkation of troops
and. he ordered hammocks and beds which were very expensive in Hamburg
1. Some of these were hired on different terms later as explained on
p. j14.
2. See above, p. 77.
3. PRO, .ADM/108/169, 28 Aug. 1795.
4. PRO, ADM/108/169, 25 Sept. 1795.
5. See above, p. 124.
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from England.. He built a sick room in all the larger ships, with
two decks and two side scuttles. He ordered the provisions for the
transports to be purchased in Germany and he drew on the commissioners
of Victualling for the cost. 1 He was able to obtain forage in the
river Elbe; but since German hay was very bad, he directed Captain
Leckr, a transport agent sent to Hamburg to assist him, to supply
h&y from a sea stock brought over in English transports and. only if
more hay was needed. to use the German hay. 2 When the ships were
fitted out and provisioned ensigns were hoisted to the foretop
gallant masthead to signify that they were ready for embarkation.3
The operations of Popham in the Stade were greatly impeded
by the foreigners involved. There was the problem of managing the
foreign troops, the foreign captains and masters, and the foreign
sailors. The masters were totally unacquainted with the transport
service and. the difference of language made it necessary for Pophazn
to send an interpreter with his agents to give them instructions.
One can appreciate Popham's difficulties when one recalls that the
transport service was continually being hampered by English masters
who spoke the same language as the transport agents. Other diffi-
culties were caused by the French agents, the Hanoverian government
1. PRO, ADM/108/169, 2 Sept. 1795.
2. Ibid., 20 Oct. 1795.
3. Ibid., 4 Nov. 1795. There is evidence that Popham fitted and.
provisioned for the West Indies the ships taken up by the month
that were to accommodate Hardy's and Ramsay's corps. PRO,
W.O.1/798, Pophain to Christian, 25 Aug. 1795. However, these
ships did. not go past England.
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and. the weather. Since Popham was working in a free port he had
to compete with the French agents who were trying to procure tonnage
to convey corn and stores which they shipped from Altona and. other
places in the river Elbe. 1 He also had. to contend with the inter-
ference of the King of Prussia and the Regent of Hanover in the
embarking of troops. They had been adding to Pophazn's difficulties
ever since the Peace of Hanover. On 25 October Popham wrote to
the Transport Board, "We are positively denied the privilege of
embarking at Stade; unless any subsequent arrangements from England
should prevail on the Regency to change their determination." At
the same time he informed the Board that the Regency of Hanover
required the British cavalry ships then in the Elbe to quit that
River and proceed to the Weser. 2 Finally the continuity of stormy
weather during the winter months in Hamburg greatly interfered with
the sailing of convoys and transports. All these obstacles together
with the daily increase in the demand for tonnage made the need for
assistants absolutely essential. As early as 30 August Christian
had promised Popham the assistance of two transport agents. When
they had not arrived by 2 October Popharn applied to the Board for
the assistance of three or four lieutenants. 3 Later in the month
the Transport Board. sent Captain Leoky and Lieutenant Elliott to
assist him. Popham appointed William O'Brien, a proprietor of three
1. P1w, ADX/108/169, 2 Sept. 1795.
2. Ibid., 25 Oct. 1795.
3. PRO, ADX/108/169, 2 Oct. 1795.
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ships in the transport service, and who had been six years in the
Navy, an acting agent of transports. 	 He also appointed Lieutenant
Graham in the same capacity.2
By 11 October IrvinJs Hussars, Choiseu]!s Hussars, Rohas
Hussars (two dismounted troops), Lowensteirs Chasseurs, and D'Allon-
villas Corps were on board the Hamburg ships. 3 They sailed for
England and Ireland a few days later. By December Mortemart's,
Castries' and Ramsay's Infantry as well as Hompesh's Hussars were
embarked. William O'Brien was given charge of all the transports
fitted at Hamburg for infantry and he proceeded. with them to their
destination. 4 Lieutenant Elliott was put in charge of the transports
that contained Hompesch's Hussars. 5 On an average three months'
corn was put on board for the German horses; but since the hay
grown locally was of very poor quality and since the English hay
had. been given to the cavalry that left the Elbe in October, only
enough German hay for the passage to England was put on board. The
transport service was to supply these vessels with hay for their
voyage to the West Indies. At the direction of Colonel Nesbitt
they were allowed only eight pounds of hay and six pounds of oats
1. PRO, .ADM/108/169, 1 Dec. 1795.
2. Ibid., 24Dec. 1795.
3. Ibid., 11 Oct. 1795.
4. Ibid., 1 Dec. 1795.
5. Ibid., 5 Dec. 1795.
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per day. At this time horses embarking in England in English
transports received ten pounds of hay and eight pounds of oats. Also,
the only ballast available in Germany was Band. which was by no means
suitable for horses to stand on during a long voyage, since it settles
and wastes. Pophain therefore recommended that Elliott obtain about
three inches of shingle for each ship as Boon as he arrived at Portsmouth.
He had. already informed the Board of his recommendations to Lieutenant
Elliott. As the ships were waiting to sail fresh beef was Bupplied
from on shore. Lieutenant Elliott and. William O'Brien left the Elbe
with the transports under their charge in the middle of December.1
On 23 December an additional number of Hompesch's Hussars arrived
and were embarked on board the Thetis, the last Hamburg ship to be
chartered.2
By the end of October Popham had stopped engaging neutral
ships and began to conclude his accounts. The Transport Board. had
informed him that there were ships fitting in England fully adecruate
to the remainder of the services that were to be performed in Germany.3
(The issuing of this order was probably influenced to some extent by
the Transport Board' s disturbance over the expenses in Germany, the
bills for the Hamburg ships having begun to arrive at the Transport
office about the middle of October). 4 For the reception of the
1. PRO, ArsM/1o8/169, 5.
2. Ibid., 23 Dec. 1795; The Thetis has been chartered on 31 Oct.
3. PRO, ADM/108/170, 31 Oct. 1795.
4. Ibid., 11 Oct. 1795.
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British cavalry and. infantry the Transport Board had already prepared
transports in the Thames and provided about 12,000 tons at Shields.
At the same time as preparations for the British cavalry were pro-
ceeding directions were given to the agent at Portsmouth to prepare
tonnage and. victualling for Salm' s infantry, Latours infantry and.
Dutch artillery destined for St. Domingo, amounting to about 1,200 men.
The transports from Shields proceeded to the Elbe under the command
of Captain Williams and. Captain Poulden. The transports from the
Thames and Portsmouth were dispatched to the Elbe in October under
the direction of Captain Lane. 	 Due to the enormity of the expense
Dund.as ordered that no horses whatever, excepting those really
belonging to the British cavalry could. be  admitted into any of the
transports and consequently none of the commissariat battalion
horses, artillery, wagon or private horses were received. All of
them were disposed of on the Continent.2
The whole of the British cavalry and infantry were embarked
by 14 December 1795; and. sailed with the convoy under Captain Bayly.
They included part of the 15th, the whole of the 16th and the 11th
light dragoons. Lieutenant Graham, one of Popham's appointees, was
put in charge of the ships left in Germany and. the services to be
performed. by them.3
1. PRO, kDM/108/170, 16 Oct. 1795.
2. Ibid., 20 Oct. 1795.
3. PRO, ADM/108/169, 24 Dec. 1795.
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After the embarkation was completed. the Transport Board's
busineas on that side of the Continent was finished. By February
1796 the Board began looking into the activities of Captain Popham
and examining thoroughly the accounts of Messrs. Parish and Company.
It is not difficult to understand the Transport Board's concern over
these accounts when one considers that the Board was under contract
to pay one third more for each of the eighty two ships chartered in
Hamburg than for similar ships chartered in Britain.
The first sign of discontent at home about the way Popham
was hiring ships in Hamburg appeared in the middle of October when
Popham wrote a letter to the Transport Board defending himself
against the charge of irregalarity.	 Since 11 October Popham had.
been sending to the Board. bills drawn on them for the freight of
the Hamburg ships. 2 On 20 Ootober the Transport Board informed
Popham that "the purchase of ships, merely with a view of passing
over troops, or even for a distant expedition - extraordinary
business both in magnitude of expence and. other consequences - cannot
be done without the most explicit orders of government" - another
indication of concern over the mounting expenses at Hamburg 3 and
on 31 October Popham received the order from the Transport Board
to discontinue engaging neutral ships and conclude his accounts.4
1. PRO. ADM/108/169, 16 Oct. 1795.
2. Ibid., 11 Oct. 1795.
3. Ibid., 20 Oct. 1795.
4. See above, p,.132.
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On 2 November Popham enclosed, in a letter to the Pransport Board
a list of all the transports chartered at Hamburg either by the run
or by the month. In that letter he mentioned he was "sorry to find
himself loaded with reproaches at a time he is doing all in the
power of man for the good of the Service." He hoped "the Board
ouiØ in future be more lenient in their strictures, when they
consider the many disadvantages he labour7 under in this country."1
On 4 November Popham said he was "misunderstood about the purchase
of ships."2 Soon after he was called to headquarters on the Weser
by Lieutenant General Dundas. Later in December after his return
to Stade he indicated in a letter to the Board that his pride was
damaged by Commissioner George's two last letters. 3 In January of
the New Year after completing the embarkation Popham returned to
England and in February he appeared before the Board. 4 An examina-
tion into the accounts of Parish and. Company followed soon after.
The great feature in the disagreement between the Transport
Board and Messrs. Parish and Company was measurement.
There were differences in the mode of measuring ships in
Hamburg and in England. Hamburg measurers took the depth of the
hold whioh was not done in England and therefore their calculation
was different. Hamburg ships were measured in lasts instead of tons,
1. PRO, ADM/108/169, 2 Nov. 1795.
2. Ibid., 4 Nov. 1795.
3. d., 11 Dec. 1795.
4. 5 Feb. 1796.
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a last being equal to two tons according to the sworn measurers
of Hamburg. They calculated a last at eighty square feet or in
their own words two tons of forty square feet each. 1
 But the
Hamburg foot was 3/4 of an inch or 1/16 shorter than the English
foot. This of course effected the measured tonnage of a ship.
For example, the ship Prins Carl von Hesee measured at Ramsgate
was said to be 330 tons; if one added. to it the difference of the
foot, which is exactly 1/16 she would measure an additional 20 and.
1/2 tons. Therefore measuring with the Hamburg foot even in the
English mode she would have been found to measure 350 and 1/2 tons.2
The charter parties of the Hamburg ships were made out in
lasts instead of tons. In Popham's first letter to the Transport
Board concerning these ships dated Stade 2 September he informed the
Board "that the only alteration since (his letter to Admiral Christian)3
has been to accede to the charter parties being made out in lasts,
as the Sworn-measurer of Hamburg always measures in lasts, which they
deem equal to two tons."4
-	 Popham's mistake was that he took the word of the Hamburg
measurers without checking their calculations to see if a Hamburg
last actually did equal two English tons and omitted to insert a
clause to that effect in the charter party. Also, contrary to the
rules of the transport service both under the Navy Board and the
1. PRO, ADM/108/170, 13 Aug. 1796.
2. PRO, ADM/108/169, 14 April 1797.
3. See above, letter of 26 July 1795, pp. 121, 122.
4. PRO, ADI4/108/169, 2 Sept. 1795.
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Transport Board he omitted to insert a clause in the charter parties
"subjecting the owners or contractors to abide by a remeasurement
by Transport officers when opportunity should offer." He did not
check for other possible deviations, an oversight, thought the
Transport Board, for the Hamburg measurers were probably in the
disposition to please their employers who were not strangers, as
the transport agents must have been.'
Aware of these two omissions in the Hamburg charter parties
the Transport Board directed their officers to remeasure the ships
when they arrived in England. In this way the Board hoped to have
a check upon any demand. for lastage which the contractors might
make. Some of the shipwright officers in charge of remeasurement
were H. Boyce at Deptford, R. Fabian at Southampton and Luke Ladd
and Matthew Norris at Dover. The shipwright officers in each port
remeasured. the ships under the guidance of the transport agent
stationed there. Thus, Ladd and Norris remeasured. the ship Hoopt
in the transport service in Dover Harbour at the request of transport
agent, Lieutenant Edward Down. The shipwright officers set down
on paper the names of the ships and. masters, the length of -the ship's
keel, the ship's extreme breadth, their tonnage found in England
and their lastage chartered at Hamburg. Then calculations were made
for the overcharge in lasts. Here is R. Fabian's Report for the
1. PRO, ADM/108/170, 8 Aug. 1796 , Transport Board to G. Rose. At
least 70 of the ships hired in Hamburg were measured by J.J. Schaffer,
Harbour-master in conformity to the usage and rules governing Hamburg.
.ADM/108/169, 8 Nov. 1796.
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Adrneasuremeni of six foreign ships at Southampton, dated 11 December
1795.1
In ooplianoe with your 5ransport agent Li. R.P.
Youn/ orders, I have carefully readmeasured. the
under mentioned ships engaged at Hamburg on freight.
Ships
Names
Beckey
Hope
Amelia
Juliana
Bergen Galley
Pomkie )targaretha
Masters
Names
W. Bryden
C. Sansted
H. Plor
M. Welling
A. Johnson
J. Kim
Dimensions
Length Breadth
ft • inches
	
96.6	 28.1
	
73.2	 25.3
	
86.5	 23.10
	
92.5	 29.10
	
92.	 25.7
	
85.4	 21.5
No. of	 No. of
Tons Lasts
334.14/94
196.71/94
217.82/94
352.80/94
266.77/94
176.79/94
200
190
140
220
203
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The transport officers remeasured eighteen of the twenty
seven ships chartered to convey cavalry to england. or Ireland. They
found that upon these eighteen ships the number of lasts overcharged
were 1,212* lasts, which at six pounds per last, according to their
oharter, amounted in sterling to £7,275. The Transport Board calcu].at-
ing on the other nine ships which were not measured and taking them
to have exceeded in the same ratio of nearly one third stated their
overcharge of lastage to be 557 lasts. The overcharge in sterling
on the nine ships amounted to £3,342. Therefore the Transport Board
calculated the overcharge on the twenty seven ships to be £10,617.
This calculation did not include the overcharge for primage of fifteen
percent charged upon each of the twenty seven ships.
1. PRO, ADM/108/169, 11 Dec. 1795. By multiplying by two (since one
last equalled two tons according to the Sworn Harbour-master of
Hamburg) the number of lasts specified for each ship in the above
report, it becomes clear the excess tonnage per ship for which the
Transport Board had. to pay.
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Fourteen of the above ships which proceeded on the voyage
were to be paid the remaining half freight and primage in London.
Eight of these ships were measured in Hamburg at 1,478 lasts and
after being remeasured in the English mode and by the English foot
were found to contain only 1,052-4 lasts. The difference therefore,
was 425 lasts or £1,276.10 which was about a two-sevenths overcharge
besides prima-ge. Therefore, the demurrage on the fourteen ships
according to the above statement amounted to £2,779.15.1.
The Transport Board remeasured forty six of the fifty five
ships taken up for six months certain. They found the general
overcharge in the freight and primage of these ships to be about two-
fifths. Taking the remaining nine ships in the same proportion
they arrived at the total overcharge. By the Hamburg measurement
the government was charged for 12,416 lasts which for six months at
the rate according to the charter party amounted to £154,809.15.7.
By the English measurement the freight and primage of those ships
should have been charged at 7,436 lasts. Then the amount due to the
Hamburg owners would have been £92,746.13.10. Consequently the
whole overcharge for the freight and prima-ge of the fifty five ships
was £62,063.1.9.
Since these ships were over-rated in their la-stage and charge
a proportional excess arose in their brokerage. The Transport Board
estimated the overcharge for brokerage at £629,11.l.
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In scrutinising the accounts of Messrs. Parish and. Company
the Transport Board found other articles exaggerated and. they also
reported on them, though not with the same degree of certainty as
they did. with measurement. They found an overcharge in the article
of exchange. To calculate this overcharge the Transport Board
obtained through mercantile channels the course of exchange on
the several days, in which the bills were drawn upon the Board.
They found a material difference in the course drawn and the course
existing. The difference on all the bills drawn amounted to an
overcharge of £1,547.11.5. The Transport Board was also concerned
with the two percent commission Parish and Company were to receive.
They thought one percent would have been sufficient especially since
the brokers were the owners of several of the ships. The Board
concluded also that the Hamburg ships were engaged at a disadvantage
in pilotage and light money though no calculations were made to
determine the amounts. ( pilotage, port charges and light money,
like Primage were all new expenses to the Transport Board. The
Transport Board did not pay these when it hired ships in England.)
They also calculated there were overcharges for measuring and. fitting
out each ship, for each charter party and for store or warehouse rent.
On the above data concerning freight, primage, demurrage and.
exchange the Transport Board concluded that there was a general over-
charge of £76,003.18.10 on the bills drawn on the Board as a result
of contracts made between Captain Pophain and Messrs. Parish and
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Company.1
The Hamburg ships were discharged as soon as the terms for
which they were contracted ceased; not one was in the employ of
the transport service after )tay 1796. However two months' pay
remained unsettled. on the whole of the fifty five ships. The
Board planned to use this as a set off against the overcharges.
In the meantime Popham was held responsible till the accounts of
Parish and Company were fully examined. He was thought to have
acted precipitately and contrary to his inBtruotions particularly
concerning the two omissions in the charter party.
Papers with the above calculations and other papers relative
to the Hamburg proceedings were sent to the Treasury in August 1796
for their perusal. The Transport Board also submitted their case
against Parish and Company to the Attorney and Solicitor General
for their opinion. The commissioners of transports wished to know
whether they were bound by the several charter parties made between
Popham and. Parish and Company to pay for the vessels at the measure-
ments expressed in each contract, or whether if the contractors
were compelled to submit to a remeasurement the Transport Board would
consider the proposals as an engagement that each last equalled two
tons. The Attorney and Solicitor General, John Scott and John
Mitford. respectively, gave their opinion of the case respecting the
1. For the calculations for lasts and overcharge see: PRO, ADM/108/170,
8 Aug. 1796, Transport Board to G. Rose; ADM/108/170, 5 Aug. 1796,
the Transport Board's case as set down by solicitors W. & E. Bray
for the opinion of the Attorney & Solicitor General.
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accounts of Messrs. Parish and Company on 17 November 1796.
Scott and Mitford. mentioned that they found it difficult to
advise the transport commissioners upon the case because of the
manner in which the proceedings at Hamburg had been conducted,
particularly since Popham acted as their transport agent though con-
trary to his general instructions and he did contract for the vessels
without full instruction from the Transport Board.
It was the opinion of the Attorney and Solicitor General
that if the vessels "really contained respectively the numbers of
lasts expressed in their respective charter parties, according to
the measure, and the mode of measurement, established at Hamburgh,
and according to which they onght to have been measured by the Sworn
Harbour Master" the owners were entitled to be paid at the rate of
36/-. per last per month according to the charter parties. The
Hamburg measurement had to be accepted, they thought, even though
two tons did not equal a last according to British measure, unless
it was proved that some fraud had been practised on Captain Popham
to misrepresent the quantity of a last in order to get him to change
the form of the contract. However, the Attorney and Solicitor
General did not find proof of fraud among the evidence. It was
their opinion that if an enquiry was made the contractors would
probably insist and with good ground that they considered the ton
"according to the sense in which the word was used in Hamburg and
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the measurement established there, and not according to what would
be understood by the same word" in England.
The Attorney and Solicitor General gave their opinion also
on the charge for exchange and other articles which the Board thought
exaggerated. They thought the commissioners "ought to allow only
the sum due according to the real course of exchange, which 5asJ a
mere question on evidence of fact." The commissioners' charges
for fitting, measuring and. charter parties had to be judged on the
evidence the commissioners received of how much Parish and. Company
actually expended on the articles, and the propriety of such expend.i-
ture. Of course any articles that Parish and Company supplied them-.
selves, had to be paid for at the same rate the articles were pur-
chased in Hamburg. The charge for brokerage, however, could not
be claimed by Parish and. Company who contracted with Captain Popham
to procure vessels at a certain rate. The Attorney and. Solicitor
General were of the opinion that if the charter parties were adopted
the charge for primage, pilotage etc. would have to be paid according
to the terms of the charter parties, and the commissioners' of
transports "usual course of dealing cannot affect contracts which
have not been made according to their usual course of dealing, nor
under their authority." The charges were stated by Captain Popham
to Admiral Christian, "and if they were objectionable we presume
they would have been objected to by Admiral Christian, who must be
considered as standing in the place of the commissioners if they shall
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adopt his proceedings." The same held true for the two percent
commission upon the disbursements of Messrs. Parish and. Company
since it was an article distinctly stated. to Admiral Christian.
And. that stipulation of two percent seemed "to show that a commission
on the whole or any other parts of the transaction, was not under-
stood to be payable to the contractors."1
Thus the Attorney and. Solicitor General were of the opinion
that the Transport Board was bound by the charter parties and. that
the real blame for contracting for ships contrary to the usual rules
of the Transport Board. lay with Admiral Christian, who as a Transport
Board. commissioner was representative of the Board in those trans-
actions, and not with Captain Popham.
The dispute between Messrs. Parish and. Company and the Transport
Board was finally settled. by arbitration, in accordance with the Heads
of the Charter Party signed at Bremer Lehe, 2 August 1795, between
Captain Popham and. Parish and Company. The Heads of the Charter
Party stated that "any deviation or other dispute asJ to be settled
by arbitration."2
1. PRO, ADM/108/170, Copy of the opinion of the Attorney and Solicitor
General on the case respecting the accounts of Messrs. Parish and
Company.
2. See above p.123; The arbitrators in the dispute were Alexand.er
Champion, John Deffell, George Burton and Josiah Cotton.
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After sifting the evidence (both Popham and. Christian gave
evidence before the arbitrators during February 1797) -the arbitrators
reached conclusions similar to those of the Attorney and Solicitor
Genera].. By September 1797 the dispute was settled in favour of
Messrs. Parish and Company and orders were issued that their accounts
be concluded.1
Captain Popham was exonerated and. returned to active employ-
ment in the transport service. He resumed his position as principal
transport agent on the Continent and. was in charge of the transporta-
tion of the axny during the Ostend. expedition of 1798 and the Helder
expedition of 1799. During the latter expedition he was sent to
Russia to take charge of the embarkation of Russian troops and there
he chartered fifteen ships in the Baltic to be used as transports.2
1. PRO, .ADM/1O8/49, 27 Sept. 1797; see also ADM/108/170, Hagu.e to
Marsh, 8 Feb. 1797.
2. See below, p. 243.
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CHAPTER V
PASSAGE ON BOARD A TRANSPORT
DURING THE WAR AGAINST REVOLUTIONARY PRANCE
147
Life on board a transport was considerably less comfortable
for a soldier than life on shore. Every effort was made, therefore,
to not embark the troops until there was the opportunity of immediate
sailing, especially when the troops were being embarked in small
vessels on a short voyage. The soldiers were taken from the shore
to the troopship in flatboats, one being supplied to every transport;1
a Jack flew from the foretop gall mast—head of the vessel as a mark
until all the troops were on board. 2 The amount of troops embarked
on each transport depended on the size and destination of the vessel.
A regiment going to the Continent would require less transports than
one going to the West Indies because the space allowed to one soldier
going to warm climates and for long distances was greater than for
shorter distances. It was a rule of the Transport Board to allow
two tons per man to warm climates and. for long distances and in pro-
portion for shorter distances. But the Board never allowed less than
one ton a man for the shortest. 3 For example, soldiers going to the
West Indies were always allowed two tons per man; soldiers going to
Gibraltar and. the Continent were sometimes allowed two tons per man
but usually were allowed a ton and a half per man; and soldiers going
from Geneva Barracks to Chatham were allowed one ton per man. 4 Allowing
1. PRO, .ADJT/106/2647, 13 Aug. 1793.
2. PRO, ADM/180/28, 6 June 1796.
3. PRO, ADM/108/38, 20 Aug. 1796 ; ADN/108/64, 16 Nov. 1799.
4. PRO, ADM/106/2645, 14 May 1793; ADI.IiO8/6O, 4 May 1799; ADM/108/67,
7 June 1800.
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two tons per man, a regiment consisting of 700 men required 1400 tons
of shipping; since most transports averaged, between 150 and. 300 tons
this one regiment required on an average six troopships for its
transport.1
There does not seem to have been a set rule for the allowance
of space to a commissioned officer on board a regular transport.
During the expedition to the West Indies some officers were allotted
the space of four privates and some the space of two. 2 Ships hired
on freight as a rule allowed two tons freight for each private and
two tons and one half for each commissioned officer. 3
 Since women
travelled. with the soldiers during the war against revolutionary
France, it was the custom to embark six women to a company of sixty
men. By the end of 1800, however, in order to out down on expenses
the Duke of York directed that only six women to every 100 men be
allowed to embark.4
Once the troops were on board the vessel they were accommodated.
in the hunmocks and beds with which the transport had been equipped.5
They were generally victualled at two thirds allowanoe of a seaman's
whole allowance; that is, six soldiers were victualled the same as
four seamen. Women and children were victualled the same as the
troops at the beginning of the war; 6 but during 1794 the children's
1. PRO, ADN/1o8/2648, 3 Oct. 1793.
2. PRO, ADW1O8/31, 10 Sept. 1794; ADM/108/60, 4 Nay 1799;
ADM/108/67, 7 June 1800.
3. PRO, ADI4/108/38, 10 Aug. 1796.
4. PRO, ADN/106/2647, 12 Nov. 1793; AD}1f108/68, 20 Nov. 1800.
5. See above, pp. 102-4.
6. PRO. &DN/106/2647, 9 Sept. 1793.
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portion was reduced to one half of a whole allowance. 1 In August
1799 in another effort at economy women's allowance was cut to one
half and. at the same time children's allowanoe was reduced still
further to one fourth of a whole allowance. The troops continued,
however, to be victualled at two thirds. 2 The soldiers embarked in
ships on freight were also victualled at two thirds of a seaman's
whole allowance.3
Here is an example of the amount of provisions given in
one week to six soldiers on board. a transport going to the West
Indies. It consisted of: 28 pounds of bread, 28 half pints spirits,
12 pounds of pork, 8 pints of pease, 8 pints of oatmeal, 16 ounces of
butter and 32 ounces of cheese.4 Generally the Transport Board
provided provisions for the troops but if transport owners provided
them then an allowance was made to them. The owners were given one
shilling per day for each soldier to be victualled at two thirds of
a seaman's whole allowance. By 1800 in consequence of the high
price of provisions the owners were given one shilling and six pence
per day for each soldier to be victualled at the same allowance.5
1. PRo, ADM/1o8/32, 10 Oct. 1794.
2. PRO, ADM/108/62, 17 Aug. 1799; ADM/i08/66, 19 April 1800.
3. PRO, ADM/108/52, 28 Feb. 1798. After Sept. 1798 troops embarked
on board transports were supplied with whole allowance of fresh
beef but the whole allowance was confined to fresh beef only.
ADM/108/56, 18 Sept. 1798.
4. NMM, ADM/R.P./2, 26 Aug. 1794.
5. PRO, ADM/108/66, 28 April; 19 April 1800.
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The Transport Board insisted that the master issue the
provisions to the troops since he was answerable for all provisions
and stores put on board his ship. 1 On the other hand the army
insisted that their officers supervise the distribution of provisions.
It is most likely that both supervised..
The crew of all transports during the war against revolutionary
Prance was in the proportion of five men and one boy to every hundred
tons measurement; and for the fraction above the hundred tons they
had one man to every twenty tons. For example, the Mary transport
measured 313 tons, so that the nineteen she had on board was exactly
her complement. 2 If she was short her complement she would have been
considered not ready for service and ,consequently mulctecl.3
While the troops were on board the transports they were
subject to the discipline of the army commanders and not to naval
discipline. The authority for this regulation can be traced to an
act of parliament passed in 1749 relating to the government of war-.
ships, vessels and forces by sea. That act stipulated that no soldier
on any transport was to be tried by a naval court martial. 4 However,
during the war against revolutionary France soldiers were often
1. PRO, LDM/108/46, 18 May 1797.
2. PRO, ADM/1/3732, 31 Dec. 1796; .ADM/108/43, 11 Jan. 1797. A troop
transport during the American war had a common transport complement
of six men to 100 tons burthen. And a victualler had a complement
of seven men to 100 tons burthen. Syrett, op. cit., 113; Add..
MZS., 38343.
3. pio, &IW1o6/2646, 22 July 1793.
4. 22 George II, c. 33.
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transported on board warships, particularly during the Aberoromby-
Christian expedition to the West Indies in 1795 and. during the
expedition to the Helder in 1799. When soldiers were transported
on board warships a controversy over naval discipline ensued.
According to the Duke of York's regulations of October 1795
soldiers and. officers on board transports and warships were not sub-
jeot to naval discipline. 1 ?he Admiralty, however, objected. to the
regulations and Admiral Sydney Smith offered one of the strongest
objections in a letter to Lord Spencer dated 3 November 1795. He
claimed. that the 'regulations' were in direct violation of the act
of parliament of which the articles of war were ipso facto (22
George II) and which no army arrangement could. or should. affect.
He argued that the
aot expressly puts 'soldiers' and. all persons 'in
or belonging to the fleet' under naval discipline
and excepts those only who are embarked. on board
transport ships which exception marks the line more
precisely. It is contended that nothing can set
aside an Act of Parliament but its repeal, and pre-
sumed that Government can never wish to change the
mode of discipline as established in the Navy after
the experience in this reign and part of the last
in favor of it as it stands. The Article of War
annexed by the King to the Army code added weight
to the operation of the act. The 'regulations'
from the Duke of York if enforced do awa the
effect of both; and the Admiralty order by
1. These regulations were intended to apply to troops that were put
on warships for the purpose of being transported and did not apply
to such as were doing the duty of marines. PRO, ADM/1/4166,
4 Nov. 1795. For the regulations themselves see, PRO, ADM/1/4166,
11 Oct. 1795.
2. In October 1793 the Admiralty issued an order which stated that army
officers and their respective corps, whenever embarked on board
warships, were to consider themselves subject to the act passed in
1749. PRO, ADM/1/4159, 13 Nov. 1793.
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transmitting the regulations as well as the article
is considered as imposing the authority of the Duke
of York on the Navy in contradiction to that of an
Act orPariament.'
The controversy over naval discipline continued throughout
the war. In a draft paper circulated to the cabinet on 15 February
1798 , Spencer brought up the subject again. He remarked he would
rather see troops transported on warships for in point of expedition
and. security they were unquestionably the best method. But when-
ever troops had. been embarked on board. warships the question whether
these troops were subject to naval discipline or not had "excited
such jealousies and uneasiness in both the sea and. land servricet2
that it was detrimental to the service as a whole. It was Spencer's
distinct wish that if troops should be embarked on board a warship
they should. be placed under the discipline of the navy, because of
the absolute necessity of safeguarding the discipline of the warship
and investing her commander with a power adequate to the great res-
ponsibility of his position. 3 To avoid this difficult situation he
could see no other course than to contract for transports. The
subject of naval discipline arose before the sailing of the expedi-
tion under Admiral Hugh Christian to the West Indies. The troops
had already been embarked. After a compromise had been suggested
and discarded by all the admirals then at Portsmouth, the Admiralty
had to trust to the temper and right headedneas of the sea and land
1. NRS, Spencer, vol. I, 199.
2. Ibid., vol. II, 296.
3. NRS, Spencer, vol. II, 296.
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commanders of that expedition. 1 This most probably was the method
used. by the Admiralty for the duration of the war.
In addition to the regulations concerning army discipline
on board transports rules were formulated at the same time to pre-
serve the health of the troops during passage. As a result of the
prevalence of sickness among the forces en route to and. while serving
in the West Indies a Board of Military and Medical Officers was set
up in September 1795 at the suggestion of the War Office in order to
frame "Regulations for the better Preservation of the Health of
troops at Sea, and. on Service in hot climates." 2 The Board appointed
by Sir Ralph Abercromby suggested that for every one hundred men the
following medical stores for the use of the sick and. convalescents be
placed on board all troopships.
One dozen of Port Wine
Portable soup
Pearl Barley
Rice
Moist Sugar
Soap
6 lbs.
28 "
28 "
28 "
6 "
Immediately this suggestion was put into effect when the above items
were ordered in October 1795 to be placed on board the troopships of
2
the Abercromby-Christian expeth.tion leaving from Portsmouth and Cork.
1. NRS, Spencer, vol. II, 296.
2. For the Regulations themselves see Parliamentary Papers, 1795-6.
Accounts and Papers Presented to the House of Commons, respecting
the Expedition to the West Indies, under the Command of Sir Charles
Grey and Sir John Jervis, vol. 100, no. 840, pp. 92-100.
3. Ibid., 88.
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A. further preventive against the spread of sickness among troops while
on board a transport was the regulation that required army officers
to make sure the sick were separated from those in health as much as
possible; upon the first appearance of any acute infectious disorder,
signals were to be made to the hospital ship accompanying the fleet,
and the diseased man was to be removed to her. 1 Another regulation
called for fumigating equipment such as lime and brushes for white-.
washing between the decks once a month to be placed on each troopship.
Other rules were concerned with cleanliness, sanitation, exercise,
etc. all of which are distinctly illustrated in the general orders
given by Lieutenant General Gainfield and. Lieutenant Colonel Grey
presented below.2
The long haul to the West and. East Indies and the Cape of
Good. Hope required more tonnage per man, a greater supply of provisions
and a more organized and regulated life during the long passage as
compared to the short haul to the Continent; there was also a greater
emphasis on the comfort of the soldier. For a short voyage soldiers
might not have beds at all and since they were more crowded they were
less active, -though they were probably given the task of cleaning and
preparing arms while their voyage was completed. The organization
of a soldier's life and his daily routine while on board a transport
1. Parliamentary Papers, 1795-6, op. cit., vol. 100, no. 840, p. 99.
2. See below, pp . 155-8.
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was the responsibility of the military commanders and -they issued
orders to that effect before sailing. The general orders given by
Lieutenant General Gainfield to troops sailing from Calcutta to
Gibraltar in September 1798 present a picture of transport life during
a long voyage. The fact that the vessel was an armed transport does
not diminish the value of this representation of the soldier's daily
routine on board a transport. This would be true whether the vessel
was an East India ship taken up on freight, a warship or a regular
troopship. Lieutenant General Gainfield issued these orders to his
officers before sailing.
The military officers commanding in the different armed
transport ships are to do their utmost to promote a
good understanding between the sailors and soldiers,
and to preserve cleanliness and. regularity on board
their respective ships, and in order to be enabled to
make a proper defence in case of being attacked by the
enemy, a proportion of the soldiers are to be quartered.
at, and taught the exercise of the great guns, another
proportion for the use of small arms, and. those who
cannot be immediately employed with arms to be stationed
either so as to be useful, or not -to impede the defences
The troops on board each ship are to be divided into
three watches, and those watches again divided into two
equal parts, one half to parade on the starboard, and
the other on the Larboard side, the whole to be again
divided messes of six persons in each mess:
The watch, a compleat third, is -to be on deck, changing
with the watches of the ship during the night, and. an
half watch during the day, except in cases when the
weather will not admit of it.
1. This of course would not take place on board an unarmed troopship.
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The -troops are to be on deck from 8 to 10 in the
morning, during which time -the births are to be
cleaned out, and. every thing between deck made as
clean as possible, and. in order more easily to effect
it, -the women, servants, and every person sleeping in
the soldiers department are to be upon deck, -taking
with them not only their bedding, but every other
thing which belong to them; after cleaning between
the decks -they are to be inspected. by the Captain
before the men are permitted to re—enter;
During the time allotted for the troops to be on deck
one hour is to be employed by the soldiers and women
in having their hands and faces washed, their hairs
combed and tied, their shoes cleaned, and. their clothes
brushed: They are afterwards to fall in, and to be
regularly inspected. by their officers and. looked over
by the officer commanding in the Ship; Should. the
weather permit the arms and. accoutrements are to be
inspected. on Thursday and. Sunday mornings • The arms
should be kept well flinted. and -the ammunition4rea&y
to be delivered on the shortest notice, should. there
be an arm chest a proportion of arms and accoutrements
with ammunition should. be constantly deposited in it,
and examined every evening:
Every person is to be on the deck at dinner time,
also one hour at Sunset, at which time the sweeping
the floor between decks, will very much conduce to
the comfort of the troops.
It must be understood. that in the arrangements for the
troops occupying the decks, it is to be with the con-
ourrence, and. suiting the convenience of the captain of
the ship, and that in rainy weather, the less the troops
are exposed to wet the better.
The centries usual are to be furnished by the watch on
deck, and relieved. regularly every two hours, each
centry should. either have his bayonet drawn, or some
mark to distinguish him as such.
An officer at least to be constantly on deck during the
day, and. when there are sufficient numbers a Captain and
two Subalterns during the night.
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An officer to attend constantly the delivery of
provisions from the ship steward, when it is
delivered to the cooks, and. when after cooking it
is to be delivered to -the mess man,
The Captain of the watch is to see the messes
equally divided before they are distributed to the
soldiers.
The rum is to be mixed with the usual proportion of
three of water to one of spirit, in the presence of
the officer.
In -the issue of provision, or on any other occasion,
when there may appear a deficiency or irregularity,
the soldier is to complain to the officer, who will,
if he sees occasion, report the circumstance to the
Captain of the watoh, who is to examine into the
matter of complaint, and, if it cnnot be arranged
by him, to make the report to the military officer
commanding in the ship, who will of course endeavour
to have it adjusted with the Captain.
The Subaltern officers attending the deliveries of
provisions to report each delivery to the Captain
of the watch, who, at being relieved, will make a
general one to the military commanding officer.
Such soldiers who have been accustomed to a sear-
faring life may, at the request of the Captain, be
employed in the navigation, the rest of the soldiers
should not be encouraged in going up the shrouds, nor
should they be permitted to swim unless boats are
lowered down.1
Similar orders were given by Lieutenant Colonel Grey,
commander of the 12th regiment of foot which sailed from the Isle of
Wight to India in June 1796. A few more insights into t1te activities
of a soldier on board a transport were revealed by these orders.
The men were ordered to parade every morning at ten o'clock,
and every evening at half past six; they were on no account whatever
1. NLS, Melville MS. 3597, ff. 196-99.
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to go between decks but at the times of breakfast or dinner unless
ordered, the sick excepted; it was expected that the officers, non
commissioned officers and. soldiers of the watch, would. be  ready and
alert in performing any duty required of them, by the officers of
the ship, as they were stationed on decks for that purpose; the men
had. to put on clean shirts every Sunday and. Wednesday; the dirty
ones were washed on Monday's and Thursday's; the men always paraded
the evening before the day appointed for their changing their linen,
with their clean shirts in their hands; they had to wash at the
head of the ship; each company by squads, and the shirts or trousers
had to be hung by companies in the shrouds to dry under the inspection
of a non-commissioned officer who would give them in charge to a
sentry until they were taken down; any man found guilty of selling
his food, or buying another soldier's would have his allowance stopped
during the passage; winter clothing was given up and summer clothing
received as the ships entered tropical waters; the arms and accoutre-
ments were taken out, cleaned, oiled and inspected by companies on
appointed days; the men and officers including their servants attended
divine service on Sunday mornings.
Every Saturday evening was usually a time for entertainment;
General William Dyott in his diary speaks of dancing as a kind of
amusement on board one of the transports in the Abercromby—Christian
fleet destined for the West Indies in January 1796. Dyott was the
1. GP, 2249, ff. 1-42; 2248.
- I U4-J
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commander of the troops on board the vessel and. on 25 January he
states: "I set the people to dance in the evening, all the officers
assisted at the ball and. it put everybody in good spirits. Ii was
the first day since our departure that was at all calculated for
this kind. of amusement," 1 Later Dyott refers -to dancing as the
usual form of Saturday evening amusement for officers on -that voyage.
The rank and. file provided their own kind, of entertainment below
deck on Saturday evening.
Having established a mental picture of the life of a soldier
on board a transport during the war against revolutionary France we
can now undertake to see how efficiently the troops were transported
around. the world, to the far distant West and East Indies, -to the
Cape of Good Hope, to the Continent and to the Mediterranean and
Egypt.
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CHAPTER VI
THE TRANSPORTING OF THE KING' S FORCES:
THE LONG HAUL ¶1 THE WEST INDIES, THE
EAST INDIES AND THE CAPE OF GOOD HOPE
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The West Indies played a very essential part in the military
policy of Pitt and Dundas. If France could be stripped of her rich
West Indian colonies it would do serious harm to her already weakened
financial structure and might hasten her surrender; the captured
islands would bring to Britain additional wealth, security and.
strength.
There were two major offensive campaigns in the Caribbean
during the war against revolutionary France, the campaign of 1794
conducted by Sir Charles Grey and Sir John Jervis and the campaign
of 1796 under the joint command of Sir Ralph Aberoromby and Admiral
Hugh Christian. Two minor campaigns were fought in 1795 and 1797.
In 1795 the garrisons in the West Indies concentrated on retaining
the islands already captured and on subduing the negroes who were
in revolt; in the early months of 1797 a minor offensive campaign
was conducted by Sir Ralph Abercromby, after which the ministry sought
no more colonial territories in the West Indies.
The Navy Board. and. later the Transport Board were in charge
of preparing troopships, viotuallers and storeships to carry to the
West Indies the various detachments and the two expeditions that con-
ducted these campaigns. These boards were successful in appropriat-.
ing ships for the West Indian service and in getting the troops,
provisions and stores to the islands. They were not successful,
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however, in getting them out of port in time to reach the West Indies
during the most advantageous season. Since November began the best
period for acting in the West Indies each expedition should have left
no later than the end of September. Each expedition was held up,
however, because of a shortage of men and. equipment; and the Abercromby-
Christian expedition was also delayed because of the persistent violent
weather which made it impossible to get the ships out to sea. As a
result the expeditions left England at least two months too late and
by the time the troops were disembarked and made ready to begin fight-.
ing there was little time left before the deadly summer season set in.
For the first year of the war Britain relied to a great ertent
on her forces already in the West Indies, on small detachments sent
out to reinforce them, and. on the Royalist troops levied there.
Though the Navy Board was responsible for transporting these reinforce-
ments to the West Indies and provisioning the army stationed in the
islands its real work in conveying troops, provisions and supplies
began with the preparations for the Grey-Jervis expedition in August
1793, which was to begin the offensive campaign of 1794. However,
it is necessary to look at the military situation in the West Indies
in 1793 to understand the campaign of 1794.
Before war began Britain had nineteen battalions either in
the West Indies or on the way, not for purposes of aggression, but
for purposes of security. White refugees from the French islands
had. appealed. to Britain for protection against the black insurrectionis-ts
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who had been encouraged to revolt by commissioners from the National
Convention at Paris. In January 1793 Dundas also accepted the offer
of three St. Domingo plantation owners for British protection of the
island until a conclusion of peace. As soon as war began Dundas
issued orders for the capture of Tobago in the lesser antilles and. on
28 February he sent instructions to Brigadier General Cuyler, the
army commander in the West Indies, to capture the windward and leeward
islands of Guadeloupe, Martinique, St. Lucia and Marigalante. At
the same time the 32nd regiment and an attachment of Royal Artillery
was ordered to be brought from Gibraltar to the West Indies in two
44 gun warships which were fitted out at Portsmouth for that purpose.1
By the time these troops arrived at Barbados during the second week
of May,2 Cuyler had captured Tobago, St. Pierre and Miquelon. The
two 44 gun warships that brought the men from Gibraltar remained in
the West Indies to be of service to Cuyler. 3 After an abortive
attack upon the island of Martinique on 16 June, and, also, since it
was apparent at this time that the situation was ripe for a general
insurrection among the negroes, the ministry began to think seriously
of sending more troops to the West Indies in order to conduct a cam-
paign of considerable strength. Preparations were made to send Major
General Prescott and Lieutenant Colonel Dundas with five regiments
in the autumn of 1793. They sailed from England on 23 September;
1. PRO, ADM/1/4157, 28 Feb. 1793.
2. PRO, ADM/1/4158, 13 May 1793.
3. Ibid.
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Prescott and Dund.as and their servants were accommodated on board
one of the warships that composed part of the convoy. 1 But the pre-.
liminaries for a much larger expedition under the commnd of Grey and
Jervis were also begun by the Navy Board in August. On the 23rd of
that month Grey was given orders to prepare for service in the West
2
Indies.
Since the Navy Board minutes that deal with the transport
service are very limited, it is difficult to give a detailed descrip-
tion of the preparations for the transportation of various expedi-
tions to the West Indies as well as to the Continent; this includes
the Grey—Jervis expedition which was conducted when the transport
service was under the auspices of the Navy Board. It becomes easier
to trace the transporting of troops after the Transport Board is
established in July 1794. Then, frequent lists and charts appear
which show the embarkations of transports and. their destinations.
The transport service is more efficiently run and the Transport Board
minutes become a more valuable source. This evidence of a more
efficiently run transport system as revealed by the Transport Board
minutes in itself was a justification for the Board's existence.3
It took about three months to hire, fit, prepare and collect
tonnage required by the different departments for a great expedition
including the time the troops took in getting ready even after the
1. PRO, ADM/1/4158, 23 Sept. 1793.
2. Fortescue, op. oiL, 75-140.
3. see below, footnote 4, p. 179.
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tonnage was allotted, to them. Therefore, preparations for the
Grey-Jervis expedition should have begun in early July instead of
in August in order to get the fleet out to sea. by the end, of September.
Another cause of delay was that the Navy Board had not prepared an
expedition since the Amerioan war and, like other departments during
the early stages of the war against revolutionary France, the Board
was slow in getting organized. A hospital ship for the Grey expedi-
tion was ordered to be fitted as late as 15 October; 1 as late as
21 October storeships were appropriated.
It was originally intended that Grey take over 20,000 troops
.2
with him; but only 10,760 men could be mustered from the military
resources of Britain. Then, eight of Grey's battalions numbering
4,642 men were taken away in October for Moira's expedition to La
Vende. Therefore, the troops which sailed from Cork and Portsmouth
on Grey's expedition to the West Indies amounted to 6,118 men inolud-
ing 400 artillery or about one third of the force that was originally
contemplated. 3
 This might have been sufficient to conduct an
offensive campaign but it was not sufficient also to garrison and
retain the islands once they were conquered. This was to lead to
the loss of some of the islands by the end of 1794. The final
arrangements for Grey's expedition were made in October; by 24 October
five Irish regiments, the flank companies of fourteen other Irish
1. It was the Atlantic transport of 400 tons. PRO, ADM/106/2648,
15 Oot. 1793.
2. GP, 190, 31 Aug. 1793.
3. Parliamentary Papers, 1795-6, op. cit., vol. 100, no. 840, pp . 3, 5.
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regiments and a company of Irish artillery were at Cork ready to
proceed to the West Indies. The troops were accommodated at two
tons per man, the usual allotment given to soldiers on a long passage,
and. they were provisioned at two thirds of a seaman's whole allowance.
The transports for this service were fitted at Spithead. then they
sailed under convoy to Cork to receive the troops and then to Barbados.1
In early November Grey joined Sir John Jervis at Portsmouth
to hasten preparations and. at last they sailed. away on 26 November,
two months too late. The troops were disembarked in January 1194
and by the time they were made fit to begin the campaign it was
February with the deadly summer season just three months aIay.
Grey and. Jervis reached Barbados the 6th of January while
the troops from Ireland did. not all arrive until 10 January. 2 Six
months had passed since the time preparations for the expedition had
first begun. In evaluating the Navy Board's slowness in getting
the expedition out to sea one cannot overlook the demands made of
the Navy Board by Dundas' ambitious policy as well as his habit
occasioned. by a shortage of troops of appropriating regiments for
one service and soon after switching their destination. The fact
that early in October, at very short notice, Grey was sent on an
expedition to Ostend certainly must have slowed up arrangements for
his West Indian expedition. Nevertheless it is most probable that
1. PRO, &DM/1/4159, 24 Oct. 1793.
2. GP, 2243, Grey to Dundas, 21 Jan. 1794.
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he was sent on the expedition because the transports for the West
Indies were not complete.
Since two transports containing most of the medical stores
for the expedition were left behind Grey had to purchase medical
supplies of an indifferent quality at an exorbitant price in the West
Indies. The Roebuck transport containing medicine and. hospital
stores was left at Portsmouth because he was not ready; she was not
to arrive in the West Indies until March 1794. The Peggy transport
was left behind at Cork because she had been d.ismasted. The Peggy
also had on board Lieutenant Colonel Blundell with two Light Companies,
thus diminishing further Grey's forces.1
This was indeed unfortunate since nearly 900 of the men
from Cork arrived in the West Indies sick with fever, a result of
orders and regulations not being properly attended to on board. many
of the troopships, and. of the failure to provide hospital ships so
that the fevers on board the transports would not spread. One
hospital ship the Atlantic did sail with the fleet from Portsmouth.
Soon after his arrival in the West Indies Grey complained to Dundas
about the sickness among the troops from Ireland and requested
hospital ships in order to prevent future outbreaks. 2 Fortunately,
the troops recovered their health quickly and by February were fit
for duty.
Grey had a force of little more than 6,000 men for the purpose
1. GP, 2243, Grey to Dundas, 21 Jan. 1794.
2. Ibid.
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of conquering the French islands of Guadeloupe, St. Lucia and
Martinique. On 18 January he learned that Dundas had ordered the
22nd. and. 41st regiments to sail from Cork to the West Indies to help
garrison Jamaica. Thus, the army commander began his operations in
the West Indies with a spirit of optimism. He felt that this re-
inforcement might prove so sufficient "that no further aid. Loui7
be required from the part of the West Indian army now here - which
would prove a most fortunate event, as being the only one that could
bring it within the bounds of possibility to obtain all our West
Indian objects in the course of this campaign." 1 However by the
middle of March during the siege of Martinique his optimism wained
for the 22nd and 41st regiments had not arrived. Should the British
succeed. in capturing the French islands they would have to be
garrisoned. and he did. not want to deplete his forces if he could help
it. Thus, Grey wrote to Dundas on 16 March informing the Secretary
of State of the necessity of sending more troops together with ordnance
and ordnance stores. The 22nd and 41st regiments were not to arrive
until the first week of
On 22 February Grey embarked. a force of 6,000 men against
Martinique and. by 25 March the island had been captured. 3 Grey then
left sufficient troops with an officer of experience and ability to
command to garrison it. This became his procedure throughout the
1. GP, 2243, Grey to Dundas, 21 Jan. 1794.
2. Ibid., Grey to Dundas, 16 March 1794.
3. Ibid., 25 March 1794.
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campaign. Next he attempted to capture St. Lucia and. landed. a
force there on 1 April. A day later it capitulated.; two regiments
under St. Charles Gordon remained to hold it. On 12 April after the
capture of Point Petre at Guad.eloupe Grey left a garrison under the
command of Major General Dundas and then still with no reinforcements
in sight proceeded without delay to take other important posts on the
is land. 1 By 22 April Guadeloupe and its domains were annexed. to
Britain.
Troops were taken from island to island. generally in sohooners,
transports, and sometimes in warships when transports were not avail-
able. Transports hired. on tonnage usually stayed in the West Indies
to be at the service of the army and. sometimes were sent back to
England with prisoners. The service of transports on freight was
concluded as soon as the troops were disembarked. unless the commanders
in chief judged. it necessary to retain them. Then, of course, de-
murrage would. have to be paid.. Grey and Jervis like all army and
navy commanders had been instructed to take up vessels as transports
when they judged it necessary and. expedient.2
When the reinforcements which Grey urged Dundas to send had
not arrived. by the end of April, not even the 22nd. and. 41st regiments
which were ordered in January, Grey authorized the formation of a
corps from among the plantation owners called the Island Rangers
and gave them provincial rank.3
1. GP, 2243, Grey to Dundas, 12 April 1794.
2. GP, 175B , Instructions to Sir Charles Grey.
3. GP, 2243, 29 April 1794.
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By 6 May, however, the Cork fleet, under the direction of
transport agents Captain Lecky and Lieutenant Whittaker, arrived
bringing the 22nd and. 41st regiments as well as the 23rd and 35th.
It took 14 transports with axi average tonnage of 326 tons to convey
these four regiments to the West Indies. This convoy was delayed
most probably because of a lack of tonnage. The government's attempt
to deal with too mazy problems at once, its reluctance to raise the
freight rate in 1794, and the increasing commercial prosperity of
Britain all contributed. to a decline in the amount of merchant tonnage
available. In early 1794 the Navy Board had ordered home from Ostend.
all the unemployed. British transports in order to be able to reinforce
the army on the Continent and at the same time the Board was finding
it difficult to obtain enough tonnage to send an expedition under Lord
Moira to Ostend in June. Grey left the 35th regiment at Martinique
to strengthen the garrison there which had been weakened by death
and. sickness due to the hard service it had already undergone. He
ordered the 22nd, 23rd. and. 41st regiments and the flank companies of
the 35th regiment, in all 2,201 men, under the command of Brigadier
General Whyte to leeward to Jamaica to be at the disposal of Major
General Williamson, the governor of that island. They were then
sent to St. Domingo.1
The few reinforcements that were sent to Grey were still not
enough to garrison the conquered. islands properly especially since
1. Fortescue, op. cit., 366.
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the garrisons that were already there were continually being reduced
by siokness. Thus by 7 June Point Petre was retaken by the French.
On 13 June Grey wrote to Dundas. "Unless a considerable reinforce-
ment of troops be speedily sent to these islands there will be great
risk of losing them." 1 A month later he urged that "seasoned regi-
ments only should be sent out and not recruits to fill up regiments
that Ler7 already 5herØ. The latter er27 usually the first to
be swept away by sickness." He thought "ideally 6000 men should be
sent to the West Indies as soon as possible," but he knew how diffi-
cult it would be to collect them and therefore he recommended "that
from 1200 to 2000 be sent to reinforce those islands with all possible
expedition."2 By the end of 1794, after a deadly summer of yellow
fever and attacks by hostile negroes in the windward and leeward
islands, a minimum of 10,000 troops was needed.
Previous expeditions had shown that after a summer in the
West Indies an army was reduced by at least half; but Dund.as did
not have the reinforcements or the ships to send supplies. Through
the neglect of the War department sufficient clothing had never been
provided for the British army, for two months after their arrival in
the West Indies they were short of shoes, flannel waistcoats and
drawers; at the time Grey mentioned this to Thinclas. 3 By July no
clothing had arrived and there did not seem to be the prospect of a
1. GP, 2243, Grey to Dundas, 13 June 1794.
2. Ibid., 8 July 1794.
3. Ibid., 25 March 1794.
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supply. This aggravated the already dangerous condition of the
toops, many of whom were almost skeletons after six months service
in the West Indies. Tharing the summer and. autumn of 1794 six regi-
merits were drafted in the islands due to the loss of troops. In the
third week of July Dundas decided to do something to combat the spread
of sickness among Grey's forces. On 16 July he instructed Grey as
well as Brigadier General Whyte at St. Domingo to send to Halifax or
Quebec those troops who either from wounds or diseaje were unfit for
duty; the numbers to be sent were left up to the discretion of the
commanders • 1 About 1,000 from Martinique and. 500 from St. Domingo,
along with medical and surgical supplies and some artillery and
ordnance stores captured at Martinique, were transported to Canada
on board the transports already in the West Indies. Only those
soldiers who were debilitated and weak but could still bear arms
were sent.
Because of the prevalence of disease due to the tropical
climate the consumption of medicines in the Caribbean throughout this
war was very great indeed. There were not many hospital stores,
medicines or utensils upon Grey's arrival in the islands but efforts
were being made by the Navy Board to send out a sufficient supply.
In May 1794 the Navy Board sent five ships containing hospital stores,
such as, dishes, mops, platters, bed pans, lamps, kettles, saucepans,
1. PB0, ADM/1/4161, 16 July 1794.
2. Ibid., 19 July 1794.
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basins, lamp oil, soap, vinegar etc., to Martinique. 1 (Soon after
its capture Martinique became the depot for medicines and. hospital
stores as it did. for provisions.) Another suppiy of hospital stores
plus hospital tents and. bedding were laden on the Winery-a transport
in August 1794 and. sent to Jamaica, St. Domingo and. Barbados. 2 Six
transports and. three packets carried just medicines to the West Indies
in 1794. One of them, the Phillipa Harben which sailed on 7 May with
fourteen tons and twenty eight packages of medicines for the hospital
at Martinique was taken by the French and carried into Guadeloupe.3
However the other ships carrying medicines reached the West Indies.
By the end of the year the transport service had sent 9O tons and.
178 packages of medicines alone to the West Indies. 4 Most of these
medical supplies did not begin to arrive in the islands until the
autumn of 1794 and some came in 1795.
Throughout the summer and. autumn of 1794 Grey continued to
look for more transports with reinforcements and supplies. He
suggested that troops might reach the West Indies faster if they were
conveyed in frigates and warships since they would not have to wait
for a convoy and. would arrive earlier than the French reinforcements.
Even Spencer thought warships made better transports but there were
not enough warships to accommodate the navy as well as the army.5
1. Parliamentary Papers, 1795-6, op. cit., vol. 100, no. 840, p. 14.
2. Ibid., pp . 15, 20.
3. Ibid., p. 40.
4. Ibid., p. 18.
5. See above, p. 152.
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During the summer of 1794 while Grey's men were dying by the
hund.reds the ministry after much effort collected a force for the
West Indies. The Duke of York's army, whioh was meeting defeat at
the hands of the French in Flanders, was to be denied the assistance
of these troops. Captain Hollaniby with seventeen transports destined
for Gibraltar and. the West Indies sailed from Spithead on 13 September1
with the 100th regiment and the first battalion of the 82nd. Because
of bad. weather they had to put into Plymouth and did not sail again
until the end of the month. After disembarking the regiments at
Gibraltar he received the 46th, 61st and 68th from the Gibraltar
garrison and. conveyed them to the West Indies. 2 It was considered
preferable to send the Gibraltar regiments to the Caribbean rather
than the 100th and. the first battalion of the 82nd because the former
regiments had been for some time in a climate approaching the tropics.
These troops which should have arrived in the Caribbean by the end of
November, did not reach the islands until 21 December.3
At the same time as the ships under Captain Hoflamby's charge
were bein& prepared, arrangements were also being made to send the
17th , 31st and 34th, 81st and 96th regiments from England to the West
Indies. The first three would join the army under Sir Charles Grey
and. the last two would go to St. Domingo. The bad luck of British
transports with stormy weather and contrary winds during this war is
1. PRO, ADX/108/31, 15 Sept. 1794.
2. PRO, ADJ/1/4162, 25 Aug. 1794; .ADM/108/31, 6 Sept. 1794;
ADN/1/3730, 30 Aug. 1794.
3. PRO, W.O./1/83, 21 Dec. 1794.
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astounding and. this particular convoy was to experience it greatly.
Of the five regiments that made up the convoy two were to eventually
reach the West Indies. The five regiments consisting of 3,430 men
and 180 women were embarked on board 24 ships with a total tonnage
of 7800 tons. 1 They were at Spithead ready to sail on 26 September;
two days later their convoy the Trusty arrived. but hostile winds
2kept them at their anchorage.	 They attempted. to sail again on 21
October3 but from a variety of adverse circumstances particularly
intemperate weather nearly the whole of the transports on which troops
had embarked so long ago as September had to put back to Plymouth.
One transport with one hundred of the 17th regiment on board separated
from the rest in their attempt to clear the channel and that one
transport arrived. in the West Indies on 1 December. 4 The other
transports destined for the Caribbean attempted. to sail again on
23 December. 5 This time, the sailing of the Brest fleet made it
unsafe for the warships, transports and merchant ships composing the
West India fleet to put to sea and they returned to port. They tried.
to sail again the third week of January 1795. The troops had been on
board. since September 1794.6 The only regiments of this convoy
eventually to reach the West Indies were the 81st which entered St.
Domingo harbour on 12 May 1795 and. the 34th which arrived. at Martinique
on 30 March 1795.
1. Parliamentary Papers, 1795-6, op. cit., vol. 100, no. 840, p. 71.
2. PRO, .&D14/108/31, 26; 28 Sept. 1794.
3. PRO, W.O./1/82, 21 Oct. 1794.
4. PRO, W.O.1/59, 8 Dec. 1794.
5. PRO, W.O.1/60, 23 Dec. 1794.
6. PRO, W.O.1/83, 9 Jan. 1795; see also, V.0.1/62.
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The newly created Transport Board not only had to contend with
contrary winds and enemy fleets in their attempts to get the transports
to their destination but also with terrified crews who deserted their
transports when they learned their destination was the West Indies.
Desertion was not restricted to home ports; it was prevalent in the
West Indies as well. On 26 October 1794, transport agent, Lieutenant
Hibbe, wrote from the Caribbean "that desertion and sickness had sadly
reduced the crews of the transports and the masters strove in vain to
recruit."2
 Since merchantmen gave 50 guineas a. man for the run home
from Jamaica transport crews deserted to gain these high wages. They
could not do as well serving on board ships that were so much employed
by the army. 3
 Death and desertion among transport crews were problems
that plagued the transport agents stationed in the West Indies for as
long as the British had forces there.4
The reinforcements ordered to the West Indies were few and only
part of these actually arrived. This fact plus the sickness which
prevailed among the troops left the English islands in a very precarious
state. In November Guade].oupe was retaken because of sickness and
mortality among the men stationed there, particularly at Bervi].le
Camp; 5
 they had been in the island since May 1794. By the end of
1. E. g., PRO, .ADM/108/32, 3 Oct. 1794.
2. PRO, ADM/108/34, 20 Dec. 1794; see also &DM/108/36, 3 Aug. 1795.
3. PRO, ADM/108/39, 5 Sept. 1796; ADM/108/37, 26 July 1796.
4. E. g., PRO, ADM/1/3730, 24 Sept. 1795; &DM,1108/39, 5 Sept. 1796;
22 Sept. 1796.
5. PRO, W.O.1/82, Vaughan to Portland, 24 Nov. 1794.
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November, when Major-General Vaughan took over the command from Grey,
who sailed home with Jervis in the Boyne, the total number of British
troops fit for duty in the islands was 1500 with 150 artillery. Of
Grey's original 7000 men at least 5000 perished. Casualties among
the transports' crews in 1794 were 46 masters and. 1100 men dead chiefly
of yellow fever. 1 The four regiments that arrived in May from Cork
came just in time to succumb to yellow fever; and only 2,369 other
troops reached the West Indies that year. As has been stated before,
one hundred of the 17th regiment from England and the three regiments
numbering 2,269 men from Gibraltar all of which arrived in December.2
The only troops St. Domingo received throughout 1794 were the three
regiments (22nd, 23rd, 41st) under the command of General Whyte sent
by Grey in May. The 81st and 96th were still at Plymouth waiting for
an opportunity to sail. The garrison in St. Domingo was also weakened
by the deadly climate and by the autumn of 1794 it had to contend with
the blaoks in full revolt. By December two of its most important
posts, Leogane and Tibuii were lost. 3 Until the end of 1794 the
government's West India policy consisted of sending recru.its for the
garrisons stationed there plus small reinforcements. Even the Grey-
Jervis expedition was not as large a foroe as was needed or as had
been expected by the army already in the West Indies. As a result
Grey's expedition was initially a success but without adequate
1. Fortescue, op. cit., 384-5.
2. See above, pp . 174, 175.
3. NRS, Spencer, vol. I, 133.
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reinforcements the islands were not retained. In 1795 the French
were able to make a partial recovery in the islands. Also in 1795
the government adopted a different policy, that of sending to the
Caribbean large reinforcements, particularly the expedition under the
joint command of Abercromby and Christian. Though the policy decisions
and. arrangements for the expedition were made in 1795 the reinforcements
did not arrive until 1796 to begin the second major offensive.
Many of the transports sent to the West Indies during the first
campaign were back in England in early 1795. During the summer of
1794 there were forty three transports, victuallere and atoreships
or 12,625 tons at the disposal of Grey and Jervis. These transports
were needed to send reinforcements to the West Indies as well as to
transport recruits and supplies to the army on the Continent and were
costing the government a considerable amount in demurrage while being
detained in the Caribbean. In July 1794 the Admiralty at the
direction of Dundas ordered Jervis to send. home any transports,
victuallers and storeshipa that were not absolutely necessary and
at the same time to make up a list of all the vessels that would be
retained and show in that list "the particular service to which each
ship or vessel respectively asJ or igh7 be appropriate4,and the
probable time of her being released from the further execution of
such service." 1
 Three weeks later seven transports sailed from
ICingston, 2
 and. transports continued to sail home throughout the autumn
1. GP, 4161, 3 July 1794.
2. PRO, LDN/1/3730, 8 Oct. 1794.
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and. winter. 21 ships returned between November 15 and December 20
alone.1
The transports sent home first, were of course, those with-
out copper sheathing since their resistance to climate, worms, etc.
was not nearly as great as the coppered ships. But many of the
coppered. ships that were in the West Indies at the beginning of 1795
had been South Sea whalers before they were transports and some of
them had been ooppered. over five years ago. Since ooppered sheath-
ing was supposed to last no more than six years these ships were
approaching a dangerous state. The fact that there was no material
in the West Indies with which to sheathe ships added to the anxiety
of the transport agents who looked each day for the arrival of new
transports in order that they might send home the old.2
By February 1795 the total tonnage of transports including
army and navy viotuallers in the West Indies was 5,582 tons as coin-
pared to 12,625 tons the previous July. 3 This was the transport
situation as the second campaign began in the Caribbean. 4 No large
scale reinforcements reached. the West Indies during this campaign
and. the resultant lack of success was to be evident half-way through
1. PRO, ADM/108/34, 20 Dec. 1794.
2. PRO, ADIiI/1/3730, 28 Feb. 1795.
3. PRO, 30/8/252, 4 Feb. 1795.
. it is impossible to trace with the detail I would. like the prepara-
tions for the 1795 campaign in the West Indies because unfortunately
the Transport Board minutes for that year consist of a very small part
of the months of January, February, July and. August. The other eight
months are totally missing, as are the first six months of 1796. I
have tried. to fill in the picture by using ADN/1/3730-33 and the
W.O.1 'a.
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the year. This caused the ministry to change its policy and begin
preparations for the largest West Indian expedition of the war, that
of Sir Ralph Aberoromby and. Admiral Christian which were to arrive in
the West Indies in the Spring of '96 to begin the third. campaign.
In the windward and leeward. islands at the beginning of '95
there were less than 2,000 men to defend eleven different islands;
the security of these islands needed. a force of at least 10,000 men.1
In September 1794, Dundas had. despatched six battalions and. in December
seven more together with 3,500 drafts to help meet this need. How-
ever, this was the expedition which was not rea&y to sail when the
wind was fair and. then met with difficulty from September to January
in trying to clear the channel and in trying to avoid. the Brest fleet.
Of the three most important French islands in this sphere Guad.eloupe
had been retaken in November but Martinique and St. Lucia remained.
in the hands of the British.
By 30 March 1795, Dundas' promised reinforcements which
sailed from England the middle of February reached Barbados. However,
it consisted of no more than five battalions numbering together 2,700
men instead of eleven battalions and. a large body of drafts which had
been promised. The regiments were the 2nd., 25th, and 29th, 34th,
and 45th. The 34th was the only regiment of the original convoy that
had. been prepared. as far back as last September. Dund.as' explanation
for the decreased reinforcements was that five of the battalions had
1. PRO, V.0.1/31, Vaughan to Portland, 19 Nov. 1794, see above p.171.
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been so many months on board the transports that sickness broke out
(presumably Typhoid fever), and not being in a fit state to proceed
to the West Indies they were left in England to recuperate. 1 The
2nd. and 45th regiments joined the expedition at a rather late date
and did not embark on board. transports for this service till after
the 24th of December. 2 Most of the recruits were raw and. young,
not capable of withstanding the fatigues of battle and climate, and
their clothing was unsuited for the tropics. 3 Two hundred of them
were on the sick list before they had been two weeks in the West
Indies. There was still a force of under 5,000 men in the lesser
antilles even with the reinforcements. Matters were made worse by
the fact that 6,000 Frenchmen had. got into Point Petre on 6 January.4
In addition to the difficulties of a shortage of troops the British
army in 1795 was confronted with the greater part of the negroes in
the West Indies in open revolt, the storm having begun in Guadeloupe
during the first week of March. Therefore the object of the campaign
of 1795 was to drive the brigands, who were spurred on by the French,
into the jungle where the prospect of starvation might make them
surrender. To achieve this object the new reinforcements were dis.-
patched to Grenada, Martinique, St. Lucia and St. Vincent.5
1. PRO, W.o.1/83, 19 Feb. 1795; see also, 16 April 1795.
2. PRO, ADM/108/34, 24 Dec. 1794.
3. Fortesoue, op. cit., 430.
4. PRO, W.o.1/83, 11 Jan. 1795.
5. Portescue, op. cit., 432; see also, PRO, W.O.1/31.
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The regiments sent to St. Lucia and Grenada proved too small
a reinforcement to garrison the islands, fight the brigands and. com-
bat the peril of yellow fever which returned with the month of May.
Thus, St. Lucia was lost by the 18th of June and by the end of '95
only the town of St. George's in Grenada was in the hands of the British.1
Vaughan like his predecessor Grey had pleaded with Dundas in
April 1795 for more troops. In June preparations were begun in
England to send 4,000 troops to the islands. Four battalions (40,
54, 59, 79) totalling 2,000 men under Major General Hunter enbarked
on 10 July and, convoyed by the Scipio, arried. in perfect health at
Martinique on 24 September. 2 The other four battalions which were
under orders to follow a few days later were windbound in Cawsand
Bay and then their destination was changed. The 40th, 54th and
59th were immediately sent to St. Vincent under the command of Major
General Irving; they arrived there on 2 October. These three
battalions had. served on the Continent in the later part of 1794 and
took part in the disastrous retreat to the Ens. They returned to
England from Germany only in May when they were soon ordered to embark
for the West Indies. The three battalions were supplemented by a
battalion of the 60th regiment which was sent to St. Vincent, soon
after its arrival at Barbados in June from Demerara, where the Dutch
government refused it permission to land. The four battalions were
1. Fortescue, op. cit., 439.
2. PRO, W.0.1/31, Mimes to Portland, 4 Oct. 1795; W.0.1/83, Dundas
to Williamson, 11 July 1795.
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not capable of containing the brigands and. by the beginning of '96
the British possessed only a small portion of the island of St.
Vincent.1
The summer of '95 had been as disastrous to the British troops
as the summer of '94. Within a two week period in July, 450 soldiers
died of yellow fever in the windward and leeward islands including
Vaughan the Commander-in-chief. The new Commander-in-chief General
Irving had. written to Dundas on 23 July. "If you want full possession
of these islands 20,000 men will be necessary. By the end of the
campaign there will not be above 10,000 left." 2
 By the end of '95
the British just barely managed to hold on to Martinique and the
commanders were in the process of raising black regiments, the only
soldiers capable of surviving while fighting in the tropical West
Indian climate. It is not surprising that there was very little
success in the windward and leeward islands in the campaign of '95.
The few reinforcements that were sent were hastily gathered and badly
equipped without proper clothing or comforts of any kind. The
Transport department under pressure from the ministry to get expedi-
tions out quickly allowed them to sail poorly equipped and improperly
prepared.
The campaign in St. Domingo during 1795 was as unsuccessful
as it was in the lesser antilles. By the end of '94 Britain suffered
the loss of Tiburn and Leogane and retained a precarious hold on the
1. Fortescue, op. cit., 439-49.
2. Ibid., p. 451.
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rest of the island. By 1 January 1795 its troops numbered only
1,100 fit for duty. The first reinforcements to reach St. Domingo
in '95 came on 12 May. They consisted of the 81st regiment and. five
companies of Murray's regiment. The 81st regiment had originally
embarked for the Caribbean in September 1794 and was part of that
fateful convoy that had started out for the West Indies many times
between September and January. The 81st were probably disembarked
and re-embarked in March for St. Domingo. They and. the five com-
panies of Murray's regiment arrived at the worst possible time for one
month later, even with the new troops, only 1,300 men were fit for
duty in St. Domingo. The second reinforcements to be sent to St.
Domingo in 1795 were the 83rd foot and detachments of the 13th, 14th,
17th and 18th light dragoons (400 men in all) which embarked in
England for St. Domingo in May and reached Jamaica 18 July. Three
of the transports containing part of the 17th and 18th light dragoons
were missing when the fleet was dispersed off St. Helens. It was
almost certain two of them were taken by the enemy. 1 When they
arrived at Jamaica (They were conveyed in West Indian ships hired on.
freight whose charter party did not compel them to take them farther
than Jamaica.) the Maroons, a wild tribe descended from slaves, were in
full revolt. Therefore these troops remained in Jamaica to suppress
the revolt and were not sent to St. Domingo until the end of July;
2then, only some of them were sent.	 It can be presumed that the
1. PRO, W.O.1/31, R. Milnes to Portland, 7 July 1795; see also,
W.0.1/92 , Balcarres to Dundas, 20 July 1795.
2. Foriescue, op. cii., 462.
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1,000 sets of cavalry clothing and. 2,000 sets of clothing for the
infantry which were put on board. the ships in this convoy reached
the army in the Caribbean, since no complaints of their absence were
sent to Dundas during that year. However, this supply was not
sufficient and. requests for more clothing were made in September.1
On 9 August another small reinforcement, the 82nd regiment
under command of Major General Forbes from Gibraltar, came to St.
Domingo. 2 These small reinforcements, however, were not large
enough to be of help and were just sent to die in the West Indies;
in August and. September 900 soldiers died in St. Domingo alone. By
1 October the force had. sunk again to 1,300 soldiers fit for duty
and 1,000 sick.
More hospital stores and. medicines were sent to the West
Indies in this war than in any previous one and still there were not
enough to meet the needs of the British army. The Transport Board
shipped 354 tons and 775 packages of medicines to the Caribbean in
1795 bringing the total amount of medicines sent to the West Indies
in '94 and '95 to 444k tons and 953 packages. 3 In July 1795 the Board
also sent four transports with seven hundred sets of hospital bedding
to the leeward. islands; and. in September nineteen more transports
were laden with hospital tents, bedding and stores and shipped to the
leeward. islands and St. Domingo. One month later another ship, the
1. PRo, w.o.1/62, 4 June 1795; 9 Sept. 1795.
2. PRO, W.O.1/62, Williamson to Dundas, 11 August 1795.
3. parliamentary Papers, 1795-6, op. cit., vol. 100, no. 840, p. 19.
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Ulysses, sailed for the West Indies with the same cargo.1
Near the end. of November 1795 the commanders learned of the
government's new West Indian policy which was to enable Britain to
take the offensive with considerable strength in St. Domingo and in
the windward and leeward islands • Because it was becoming increas-
ingly difficult to hold on to the conquered West Indian islands and
at the same time conduct an offensive campaign and because of the
extent of the negro insurrection in the islands the ministry in early
1795 abandoned. its policy of sending small reinforcements and. adopted.
the plan of sending to the Caribbean the largest expedition to date.
Preparations for this expedition, which was commanded by Sir Ralph
Abercromby and Admiral Christian and. which included. British troops
as well as a large contingent of foreign infantry and cavalry, were
under way- by the summer of 1795. Between August and November eighty
two ships were hired. at a considerable expense, by Sir Home Popham
in Hamburg, to convey the foreign infantry and cavalry from the Con-
tinent to England and the West Indies. None of the Hamburg ships
went further than the British Isles. Therefore, all the infantry
and cavalry, both British and. foreign, had to be conveyed from Britain
1. Parliamentary Papers, 1795-6, op. cit., vol. 100, no. 840, pp. 26,
30, 33.
The expense incurred. at the Navy Office and Transport Office for the
West Indian expeditions between 1 Jan. 1794 and. 31 Dec. 1795 was
£859, 634.4.7 1205,161.1.0 was spent by the Navy Office between
1 Jan. 1794 and. 31 Aug. 1794. £654,473.3.7 was spent by the Transport
Board from 1 Sept. 1794 to 31 Dec. 1795. These expenses included:
freight of transports and other vessels for the conveyance of troops,
provisions and stores. Value of ships captured by the enemy, bedding
for the troops, building cabins, and making other preparations on
board transports for the troops, medical stores and. various articles
of refreshment for the troops and pay to officers employed as agents
of transports. Ibid., p. 41.
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to the West Indies in British vessels. This caused considerable
delay since tonnage to replace the Hamburg ships had to be hired in
British ports. The Hamburg ships arrived in England throughout the
autwnn and winter of 1795 and. during the early months of 1796. Many
of them did not reach England in time for the first sailing of the
expedition but were there for the second and some arrived in time for
the third. Still other troops brought to England by the Hamburg
ships were to sail after the expedition; the laBt of the foreign
corps were to arrive in the West Indies during the early months of
1797.
The Abercromby-Christian expedition like the Grey-Jerv-is
which preceded it, left from Portsmouth and from Cork. The fleet
that sailed from Portsmouth was destined for the windward and lee-
ward. islands; the Cork fleet was destined for St. Domingo. Since
it was difficult to procure tonnage at a reasonable rate in Ireland.
the board supplemented Irish tonnage with English transports in order
to fulfil the needs of the Cork expedition. Some were hired in the
western ports, particularly Bristol.
The maritime resources of Britain were drained for this
military operation and still there were not enough troopships for the
King's forces. Of the 7,000 infantry (5,000 British and 2,000 foreign)
that were originally to be embarked at Cork 38 troopships totalling
9,048 tons were taken up to accommodate 4,714 men, and warships were
appropriated to accommodate the remaining 2,200 men. The 2,000
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cavalry were brought over in cavalry ships. 1
 By 3 November less than
2,000 foreign corps, a combination of infantry and cavalry, had arrived.
at Cork. Two transports containing Irvines Hussars sank because too
great a proportion of horses had. been embarked. 2
 Thus in the November
sailing from Cork there were about 5,000 British infantry and 2,000
foreign corps.
Scarcity of troopships also effected. the embarkation at
Portsmouth. The 20,000 troops that were to leave from Portsmouth were
accommodated on board. troopships, East and. West India ships,
victuallers, navy store ships and hospital ships and on board the
warship the Commerce de Marseilles. 16 East India ships, totalling
12,883 tons, were hired. on freight to carry 6,558 men. Each East
India ship was contracted. to carry out 400 troops, and. as many more
as she could. conveniently stow at £20 per head for passage and. victual-
ling. Her tonnage was to be at the disposal of government, and con-
fined in her voyage to the leeward islands; if the urgency of the
case required her being sent on further service it was to be at the
risk of government. 3
 51 West India ships with a total tonnage of
1. PRO, W.O.1/798 , 31 Aug. 1795.
2. PRO, W.O.1/84, 3 Nov. 1795.
3. PRO, W.O.1/798, 20 Oct. 1795; see also, NRS, Spencer, vol. I, 155-7.
The other terms on which the East India ships were hired are as
follows: The Victualling of the troops beyond. two months either
in or out of Port, was to be furnished by government, or the owners
were to be paid. i/-6. per day for each man. The passage money was
to be paid two months after the ship left Portsmouth. Demurrage was
to be paid. at the rate of 20/- per ton per month from the 15th day of
November, until the ship's arrival back at Gravesend in the River
Thames. But if the ships were detained by government on any other
service; than that for which they were particularly engaged, then the
demurrage was to be at the rate of 40/- per ton per month, from 1 Dec.
until the ship's arrival back in the river Thames. The payment for
d.emurrage or extra victualling of the troops was to be made one month
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15,683 were taken up to accommodate 8,295 men. 4,240 men were oon-
veyed on 30 troopships, 1 995 men were accommodated on board the warship
the Commerce de Marseilles, and. soldiers were given passage on board
victuallers, navy store ships and. hospital ships.2
Since all previous expeditions to the West Indies failed to
start on time more strict instructions than ever before were laid on
the Transport Board to keep Duncias informed of their progress. Daily
reports of the progress of the ordnance transports at Woolwioh were
sent to Dund.as and. about once a week the Board submitted. a report
which showed the state and condition of all transports fitting in the
river; they also sent in reports which listed the ships in England
and Cork ready to sail.
In spite of these efforts the Aberoromby—Christian expedition,
which the ministry had hoped would sail by the first of October, did
not sail until the middle of November. The sailing of the fleet
was delayed by waiting for the foreign corps to arrive at Cork and. by
the slowness in lading and completing the ordnance vessels. The
Board had. been receiving requests for tonnage to convey ordnance
stores since 12 August and tonnage was appropriated for this service
within two or three days of each request. However, many of the ships
that were appropriated had gone so long without being examined that
after the arrival of all or any of the ships at Gravesend in the
River Thames; or if any of them were lost or captured, the pay-
ments were to be made within one month from the time such loss or
capture was ascertained.
1. PRO, W.0.1/798, 15; 20 Oct. 1795.
2. Ibid.
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they could not be immediately fitted; 1
 once fitted, the ordnance
wharf at Woolwich could not lade more than two ships at one time.2
4
Time was also lost in lading the ships because of the absence of small
craft to bring stores down the river to be placed on ordnance vessels,
a task which was the responsibility of the Ordnance Board. No fault
lay with the Transport Board which had supplied the ships in good time.3
Thus, the ordnance ships were appropriated rather q3lickly but time
was lost in preparing them for service. By 4 November only half the
ordnance vessels (13 ships or 4,078 tons) were completely laden and.
ready to sail. 4 Since Abercromby refused to sail till everything
was complete the inconvenience and delay in shipping the stores for
the West Indies held up the entire expedition. And by this detention
the fair wind for sailing was lost.
In a letter of 3 November Dundas urged Aberoromby to sail
with everything that was ready as soon as the wind was right. If
he was "to wait for every transport or boat that might receive a
hurt, or for every article that any department might be negligent in
sending," Dund.as wrote, he did not see any reason to hope that
Aberoromby would be more ready to go a month later than he was then.
He felt it was a "disgrace to the executive government of the country,
and every branch, acting under it, that an expedition determined upon
1. PRO, W.O.1/798, Transport Office to Crew, 8 Sept. 1795.
2. Ibid., 16 Sept. 1795.
3. PRO, W.0.1/798, 1 Oct. 1795.
4. PRO, .ADI4/1/373O, 4 Nov. 1795.
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six months ago, should not be in a state to sail seven weeks later
than its appointed time."1
Aberoromby was urged to sail with a deficiency of ordnance
stores and medicines and on 1 November, under convoy of a squadron
comnunded by Admiral Christian, the expedition sailed from Portsmouth.
After two days at sea the wind, rose to a hurricane force; several
transports were lost with all men on board, and. the rest returned
to port many with considerable damage. If the Ordnance Board had.
the ordnance vessels rea&y when the wind was fair the expedition
would. have been on its way to the West Indies. Thus, Dundas lost
patience with what he thought was the inefficient way of transport-
ing troops on distant service and he brought this to the attention
of the Admiralty on 24 November.
I have no objection to a board for the transport
service. I believe if proper men are appointed it
is a most excellent institution, but I am decidedly
of opinion that if they are not provided with a set
of shipping appropriated. to the special purpose of
transports and. of a size to accommodate a consider-
able number of troops at a time, it is impossible
that service can be carried. on with any degree of
propriety. Indeed., so much am I impressed with
that conviction, no consideration on earth would. in-
duce me to take charge of any expedition, if the
present system of providing transport in any chance
way you can was to be continued.. I am positive,
exclusive of every other advantage, the saving to the
public by such an arrangement would be immense.
Pwenty or twenty-five ships of the size of India ships
or 44 gun ships would be adequate to all the service
1. PRO, W.O.1/84, 3 Nov. 1795.
2. PRO, ADM/1/3730, 4 Nov. 1795.
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of the country, and. it would. take a volume to point
out all the advantages to the public service which
would result from it. Be so good. as to mention the
subject to Mr. Pitt, but in the meantime let me en-
treat you without delay to transfer to the transport
service all ships of the description I have mentioned.
that either are within your power or can be got.
I repeat it again that unless this measure is adopted
no man can act in the situation I am placed with the
smallest confidence that anything he does will ulti-
mately redound. to the success of the object for which
his exertions have been made. I do not mean to write
at length, for it is too long a subject to be detailed
in a letter. But I trust your lordship and. Lord. Hugh
will give a serious consideration to what I have said
and. search through your list of shipping for the pur-
pose of examining what ships you can spare to transfer
to the transport service, suited. to the double purpose
of being both transports and convoys.1
Dundas, like Spencer and. Grey before him, realized. the
practicability of employing armed ships as both transports and con-
voys in a great expedition. Warships were used to transport a part
of this exped.ition as they would be used in later military operations,
for example, the expedition to the Held.er in 1799. However, there
were not enough warships or armed vessles to answer the needs of
the navy as well as to transport the army during the war against
revolutionary France.
While the Cork expedition was waiting for a chance to sail
again more troops and ships were added; 1,904 dismounted. light
2dragoons had arrived. at Cork by 2 December, and. 13 ships totalling
4,011 tons were appropriated. to convey them and their baggage. By
1. NRS, Spencer, Dund.as to Spencer, 24 Nov. 1795, vol. I, 159-61.
2. Not less than 2,000 horses were to be purchased. in the U.S.A. and.
conveyed. to the West Indies in American ships for the British light
cavalry Bailing from Cork. W.O.1/162, 25 Sept. 1795.
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3 December the other tonnage at Cork consisted. of 53 troopships
(including two West India ships on freight), totalling 14,207 tons,
appropriated to carry 8,547 troops. Therefore the total strength
for the St. Domingo service by 3 December consisted of 66 transports
totalling 18,218 tons aocommodating 10,451 men. Room was found. for
troops also in the five warships accompanying the transports. 1 There-
fore, the December sailing from Cork consisted of over 10,000 men.
In November the sailing comprised only 7,000.
The men on board the troopships were being conveyed at slightly
less than two tons per man. When General Whyte, the commander of
the Cork expedition, wished to substitute hammocks for bed-places,
the Transport Board explained that if such an arrangement were generally
extended it "would occupy at least three tons per man, require 1/3
additional tonnage and. demand more shipping than could be provided by
the country, to say nothing of the vast additional expenoe." 2 The
tonnage for a West Indian expedition was calculated at two tons per
man and. was rarely exceeded. Though occasionally this ratio was
altered for the accommodation of extra troops or officers not included
in the original scheme.
In addition to the Portsmouth and Cork expeditions 2,000 men
and one company of artillery were sent under command of Major General
Bowyer from Gibraltar to Mole St. Niholas in St. Domingo. They
1. PRO, W.0.1/798, 3 Dec. 1795.
2. Ibid., 2 Dec. 1795; see also above, p. 103.
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sailed in December and arrived at the Mole the first week in January.1
The Portsmouth expedition, which now consisted of about 18,000
troops having lost many in the storm, sailed, again on 9 December; and
was compelled to return to port for a second time on 30 January, by
continuing stormy weather and contrary wind. One of the transports
was blown through the Straights of Gibraltar; and Beveral were captured
by Admiral Hugie's cruisers. The number of troops that returned with
Aberoromby and Christian, who had been trying for seven weeks -to clear
the channel, did not exceed 11,000. Therefore it was hoped that about
7,000 would have reached Barbados. Thus the ships began arriving at
Barbados by single vessels. According to Fortescue, of those that
actually reached the island but one regiment was complete and. the
remainder included fragments of 20 corps, varying in strength from
six men to 400.2 The same storms prevented the forces embarked at
Cork, under convoy of the Canada, from leaving that port, where they
continued ready to sail with the first favourable wind. 3 A favourable
wind allowed them to sail on 10 February; but they were again
scattered by a storm; such vessels that returned were not able to
start again until the 24th. "Never did any expedition pay more
dearly for its unreadiness than this to the West Indies in 1795."
1. PRO, W.0.1/162, 22 Sept. 1795; 5 Feb. 1796; see below, p.
Between 1 Jan. 1793 and 1 April 1796 5,668 men were brought from
Gibraltar to the West Indies by the transport service.
Parliamentary Papers, 1795-6, op. cit., vol. 100, no. 840, p. 5.
2. Fortescue, qp. cit., 482.
3. PRO, W.0.1/62, 5 Feb. 1796.
4. Fortescue, op. cit., 482.
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Abercromby received his fourth set of instructions in early
February in accordance with the latest news from the West Indies.
The expulsion of the enemy from Grenada and St. Vincent became the
first object; the capture of St. Lucia and. Demerara the second, and.
St. Domingo was relegated to the background. What was left of his
army gathered at Portsmouth amid much disorder for its third attempt
to reach the Caribbean. Brigadier John Moore in command of some of
the foreign corps who were to serve in the West Indies wrote from
Portsmouth on 26 February. "The confusion of this place is beyond.
anything that could. be believed; everything is in disorder, and the
expedition will sail in as bad. a state as ever expedition did sail
from this country."	 The reasons for the state of confusion at
Portsmouth are quite clear. A convoy of troopships, victuallers
and storeships were twice dispersed at sea; each time they had to
be re-victualled., and. many repaired and. re-equipped.. Regiments
had. to be collected, counted and. some reorganized. In addition the
foreign troops from Germany were continually arriving in the Hamburg
ships, all of which would not go out of Europe. The troops had to
be disembarked and. new tonnage hired for their conveyance. The
government had been eager to send out as many of the foreign corps
as possible, but ships could. not be got ready for the Royal Etrangers,
Hompesohe, and Dutch Artillery that made up Moore's brigade. Moore
and Colonel Nesbit2 were pleased that these forces were detained,
1. Moore, op. cit., vol. I, 193.
2. See above, p. 117.
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however, since "they had. been four or five months on board ship and
were in no state for service..., consequently they will join us in
six weeks or two months after our arrival in good. order." 1 Moore,
like most officers travelling to the Caribbean, had to seek passage
on board a victualler, another transport, or on a merchant ship going
to the West Indies. He did not find, this task very agreeable. "It
was not pleasant, when I was going upon the King's service, to be
obliged thus to solicit a passage and to allow myself to be forced.
upon people with whom I had no acquaintance, but I was determined to
make no difficulties and not to give a handle to any people whatever
to accuse me of backwardness. The West India service is not
popular..
Abercromby sailed independently in a frigate and arrived. at
Barbados with 6,477 troops on 10 March. 3 The main body of his forces
which were now reduced 'by half, sailed from Portsmouth at the end of
February, cleared the channel and. made their way to Barbados. The
convoy was dispersed at sea, however, and only half the troops arrived
during the month of March. 4 Abercrom'by immediately sent reinforce-
ments to Grenada. On 1 April the troops from Cork, bound for St.
1. Moore, op. cit., vol. I, 194.
2. Ibid., 193.
3. PRO, W.0.1/85, 10 March 1796.
4. The transport carrying Lowenstein' a Jagers was sunk, and above
100 soldiers were drowned. An equal number were saved.
Moore, op. cit., 195.
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Domingo, arrived under General Whyte. A part of this force was
sent to Demerara and Berbice which had offered to place themselves
under British protection, delaying for a few weeks the reinforcements
for St. Domingo. Two weeks after the Cork fleet reached the islands
two divisions of Cornwallis' convoy (part of the Portsmouth convoy)
arrived.. Abercromby, now with enough ships and 8,000 men fit for
duty, attacked St. Lucia and. on 25 May the island was recovered.
In the meantime two more regiments of the Portsmouth convoy (27th
and 57th) arrived. By 9 June the insurrection in St. Vinoent was
decisively broken and. by 18 June the insurrection ended. This
closed the offensive campaign of 1796 since Abercromby did not have
enough men to attack Guadeloupe the centre of the disturbance; the
General sailed home in August leaving Colonel Thomas Graham in charge.
As in '94 and '95 yellow fever raged furiously during the summer of
'96 and. Aberoromby's army like Grey's was diminished by half. So
ended the third campaign in the windward and leeward islands.1
In St. Domingo in January 1796 there were about 1,300 men fit
for duty when the 66th and 69th regiments under command of General
Bowyer arrived at the Mole. 2 At the same time treaties had been
signed with Titus and Gagnet, chiefs of the negro bands, by which
they joined the British in arms. On 1 March more troops were released
from Jamaica and another West Indian regiment was raised; but these
1. Fortescue, op. cit., 482-96.
2. PRO, W.O.1/82, 23 Jan. 1796; see above, p. 193.
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reinforcements were small. At last in May and. June 1796 the long
awaited. Cork fleet of the Aberoromby-hristian expedition arrived
at St. Domingo. The May contingent consisting of both British and.
foreign troops raised the forces in St. Domingo to 7,500 men.
However the troops from England were in poor condition and the
foreign cavalry was ready to desert. During the same month rein-
forcements for the French army arrived in the West Indies. The
British forces that came in June consisted of seven regiments of
British light dragoons, some Dutch artillery, Hompesok's Hussars,
and	 Legion, all under the command of Major General
Whyte. However, again the troops arrived at the beginning of the
summer season and. yellow fever began its decimating attack on the
British and foreign forces. After the outbreak of war with Spain
in October 1796 troops were sent to strengthen the garrisons of
the Bahamas and Barbados. This action plus yellow fever shrunk
the forces in St. Domingo to such an extent that all offensive opera-
tions were abandoned. By February 1797 the forces in St. Domingo
which in July had numbered 9,000 men shrunk to 1,400 sickly de-
moralized. men. No troops had arrived in St. Domingo during the
healthy season. Again, the eternal difficulty lay in the want of
troops.
The government was displeased with the way ships were hired
to convey troops, provisions and stores for the Abercromby-Christian
expedition, particularly with the terms offered to the Hamburg ships
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and. the East and West India ships. The Treasury seeking an explana-
tion for the unusually high prices paid to transport owners and the
liberal terms on which the transports were hired, sent several
memorials to the Transport Board. in the spring of 1796. The terms
on which the 82 ships were hired from Messrs. Parish & Co. in Hamburg
caused considerable disturbance in the ministry and the Transport
Board and have been discussed at length in chapter four.
On 12 April 1796 Captain George, the Transport Board chairman,
submitted an account of the terms on which the East and West India
ships were engaged to carry troops to the West Indies and at the
same time offered this explanation.
On this occasion allow me to recall to your mind,
that at the time Rear Admiral Christian was desired
to provide for the conveyance of her i7 such
armaments as were to assemble at Spithead and Cork,
several other services were then carrying on, and to
provide transports for so many troops with the addi-
tion of ordnance ships, viotuallers, hospital ships
and a long train of etceteras was not to be done by
the means before practised: Rear Admiral Christian
therefore availed himself of the arrival of the East
and West India fleets, and proposed to the persons
acting for their owners that they should receive a
certain part of the troops - as 11 out of 16 East India
ships were engaged to proceed to India in the Spring, -
their owners could not be prevailed upon to engage in
this service without encouragement in proportion to the
risk they run in losing their voyages, and the Rear
Admiral after much pains at last agreed as stated. in
the report - The double demurrage was strongly insisted
upon in behalf of the 11, to prevent detention in the
West Indies, and consequently the loss of their res-
pective voyages without having any claim upon government
for the double demurrage, and delay has operated pro-
portionably to the disadvantage of the West India ships.
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It may be necessary further to observe -that this
arrangement was not made by a man or a set of men
juat entered with office with improper precipitation,
as has been erroneously s-tated.
This may have pacified the Treasury in its quest for an
explanation for the unusually liberal terms offered to the owners
of the East and. West India ships, however, it did. not deter the
Treasury from its efforts to economize and. -the Transport Board was
directed to diminish expenses wherever possible. Since no large
scale expeditions were to take place until that sent to the Held.er
in the autumn of 1799 in an attempt to recapture Holland from the
French, the Transport Board for the next three years was able to
discharge transports that were not absolutely necessary for -the
service and to turn down innumerable tenders from ship owners.
The ministry was as displeased with the slowness of the
Transport Board in embarking the last and. smaller expedition of'
Abercromby to the West Indies in December 1796 as it had been with
the other West Indian expeditions.
The sailing of this fleet was delayed. because -the ships were
2	 -.
not properly equipped. on the owners part; because of the ministry' a
economizing efforts which necessitated. the transfer of ships appro-
priated. for the Portugal service -to that for St. Domingo; 3 and.
1. PRO, W.0.1/799, Captain George to W. Huskisson, 12 April 1796.
2. See PRO, W.O.1/799, 29 Dec. 1796.
3. Ibid.
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because of the impressment of the transport crews.1
The few troops (including the last of the foreign corps to
be sent to the West Indies) which the ministry could furnish Aberoromby
were still in the process of embarking when the General sailed again
for the Caribbean on 17 November 1796. About 3,200 men destined for
the lesser antilles were accommodated on board seven ships totalling
7,192 tons. (The Board used. 4 teak ships, two armed transports and
one ordnance ship for this service). The troops consisted of part
of Lowenstein's Corps, the 87th regiment and over 100 artilleinen.2
The 636 men destined for St. Domingo consisted of part of
Rohan's,York's and. the Prince of Wales Hussars, and Montalambert's
Corps. These soldiers were conveyed in 5 ships amounting in tonnage
to 1,511 -tons.3
The Transport Board drew up a conspectuB of the preparations
for this expedition upon one large sheet of paper, in which they
marked down the arrivals, destinations, embarkations, and allotments
of the West India and Portugal services to convince the ministry of
the care and. attention of the Transport Board and its agents to their
duty in these embarkations.
1. PRO, W.0.1/799. On 10 January 1797 the Admiralty gave directions
to the officers of the impress service "not on any account whatever
to impress the crews of any -transports, victuallers, or other ships
or vessels in the service of government upon their producing a pro-
tection from this office; stating the number and description of the
men employed to navigate such ship or vessel respectively." Neverthe-
less, the protection certificate was largely ignored by the impress
officers and transport crews continued to be impressed throughout the
war.
2. PRO, LO.1/99.
3. Ibid., see also, PRO, ADM/1/3732.
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Some of the foreign regiments arrived in the West Indies in
early February, after which Abercromby embarked a force for Trinidad.
Trinidad was captured by 7 February 1797 and. Aberoromby left Lieutenant
Colonel Picton with one thousand men to garrison it while he returned
to Martinique. Ir April, after the arrival of the rest of the re-
inforcements and. stores from England a fruitless attempt was made to
capture Puerto Rico, that island having become an object amos the
declaration of war by Spain on 5 October 1796. The campaign in the
windward, and leeward islands ended soon after and. in June an order
was issued by Dundas that there were to be no more offensive campaigns.
With most of the objects for which the army was sent to the West Indies
attained, though at considerable expense to the war effort elsewhere,
the ministry decided not to pour more men and resources into the
Caribbean. Instead it laid the foundations of a new policy by rais-
ing more negro regiments to garrison the islands. Aberoromby super-
intended the increase of the negro regiments to eight before returning
to England in August; he left as his successors Generals Cuyler and
Bowyer.
During the winter of 1797-98 the last of the brigands were
subdued or destroyed and. the lesser antilles returned to peace. Since
all offensive operations in the West Indies ceased for the remainder
of the war the government relied for the defence of the islands on
the West India regiments (twelve had been formed by 1799), on the 60th
regiment and on a strong naval squadron. Until the end of the war
the Transport Board was responsible for the transportation of
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reinforcements to the garrisons in the West Indies and for the con-
veyance of provisions and stores to the army and navy stationed
there.
The pressure of the government's economizing efforts d.etermineJ
its policy regarding St. Domingo. General Maitland. successfully con-
ciliated. the brigand chief Toussaint and St. Domingo was evacuated by
3 October 1798. Toussaint, who faithfully honoured the agreement
with the British and did. not take part in raids on the British colonial
forces, established his supremacy in the island by the end of 1800.1
Between January 1793 and April 1797 the transport service was success-
ful in bringing to the islands over 58,000 troops. Despite the
shipping shortage that was prevalent in Britain at this time the Navy and.
Transport Boards met their tonnage requirements for the West Indian
campaigns by utilizing merchant ships trading with the Caribbean.
Almost all officers went to the islands on merchant ships and. over one
half of the troops that sailed with Abeicromby and. Christian in November
1795 were accommodated on East and. West India ships hired on freight.
However, not one of the expeditions to the West Indies left on time
to enable the British troops to take advantage of the more favourable
season and this rightly disturbed Whitehall. But it is probably trne
that the ministry did not comprehend the problems that were involved.
The Board's efforts were vitiated by the failure of other departments
1. The Dutch West Indies were taken under British protection, Surinam
for the consideration of £100,000 in 1799 and Curacao upon request
in 1800. Fortescue, op. cit., 545.
Trinidad. was to be the only conquered. colonial possession in the
West Indies retained. after the Treaty of Amiens.
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to co-operate effectively. Because the Ordnance Board neglected
to act promptly the ships were not ready to sail when the wind was
favourable. Because of Dundas' ambitious policy there was a shortage
of men and equipment which held up the preparations of the expeditions
and their subsequent sailing. The war organization in general was at
fault; not the transport system. Other factors that contributed. to
the Navy and Transport Boards' failure to get the West Indian expedi-
tions to see on time were extraordinary bad luck with the winds; the
fact that convoys had to be waited for; that transport crews deserted
when they knew they were going to the West Indies; and. the frequent
impressment of those crews.
Besides the West Indian service, the Transport Board had to
provide accommodation for the long haul to the Cape of Good Hope and
the East Indies. The ships of the West India.Cpany were used to
supplement regular tonnage in the long haul to the West Indies in the
transportation of troops. However, the situation was not the same
in regard to the Cape and the East Indies. Soldiers going to these
stations were generally conveyed in East India ships and occasionally
in a troopship. Supplies and stores were also transported on board
East India ships.1 After East India ships chartered on freight dis-
embarked troops at the Cape and the East Indies they returned home
with a cargo of goods. Before convoy became compulsory the East
1. E. g., PRO, W.O.1/798, 22 Feb. 1797; PRo, ADM/1o8/28, 24 May
1796; PRO, LDM/1/3736, August 1798; NRS, Keith, Elphiristone
to Blankett, 26 June 1796, vol. I, 430.
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India ships were protected. to a safe distance sometimes by a West
India convoy for as long as their paths might lie together.
The Transport Board became involved in transporting the King' s
forces to the Cape of Good Hope and the East Indies in early 1795 when
it became clear that the change of government in the United Provinces
was turning that state into an enemy of Britain. It became an
object of British policy to secure the base at the Cape for the
Stadholder and prevent the French from seizing it. Since Holland
was lost to the French the ministry also hoped to safeguard the Dutch
colonies in Africa and the East Indies from French occupation. The
first British troops arrived at the Cape in the summer of 1795.
Admirals Keith and Blankett as well as Major Generals Alured Clark
and. Craig conducted this expedition. All the troops were transported
on board East India ships except 500 of the 78th regiment who were
taken on board the warships of Admiral Blankeit's' squadron. 1 For
reasons which are not clear many of the soldiers on board Blankett's
squadron were sick with the scurvy by the time they arrived at the
Cape, whereas the other troops were reported to have arrived in good
health.2
The Dutch at the Cape at first did not co—operate with the
British and refused to give supplies to the army. When provisions
began to run out the army had to rely on what they could obtain from
1. PRO, W.0.1/323, 4 May 1795; Fortesoue, op. cit., 394.
2. PRO, W.0.1/323, Craig to Dundas, 16 June 1795.
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the fleet and from foraging parties. Their discomfiture was not
lessened by the fact that the ships which brought the troops under
Craig had no provisions of bread or spirits on board. 1
 Since the
army, as in other campaigns, was hampered by a lack of artillery and
land transport it took until 16 September to force the colony and
castle of the Cape of Good Hope to capitulate. 2
 None of the troops
were sent on to India that year since the inhabitants were still
hostile to the British. At the insistence of Keith a depot was set
up at the Cape that would in time become a common rendezvous for ships
going to India.3
In early 1796 because of the designs of the enemy the ministry
decided to reinforce the troops in India and. strengthen the fleet at
the Cape.4
 Reinforcements left Spithead for the Cape on board East
India ships on 12 April 1796; they arrived on 28 May. 5 Another fleet
of East Ind.iamen reached the Cape on 21 July having lost one ship the
Taunton Castle with over 70 recruits of the 33rd. regiment on board.
She was believed to have been taken by four French cruisers sailing
off the Cape. 6
 On 17 August the Dutch Admiral surrendered to the
1. PRO, W.O.1/323, Craig to Clarke, 12 Sept. 1795; NRS, Keith,
Keith to D. Scott, 27 June 1795, vol. I, 297.
2. PRO, ADM/1/55, 23 Sept. 1795.
3. NI, Keith, Keith to Dund.as, 23 Sept. 1795, vol. I, 371.
4. Fortescue, op. cit., 506.
5. NRS, Keith, Keith to Blankett, 26 June 179 6 , vol. I, 430. Fortescue,
6	 op. cit., 507.
PRO, 30/11/235, J.C. Sherbrooke to Cornwallis, 25 July 1796.
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British in Saldanha Bay and the British hold on the Cape was secured.
More troops arrived in September. The Scotch Brigade sent from
Gibraltar on board a troopship came on 18 September; the 12th and.
86th regiments transported from Britain in East Ind.iamen arrived a
day later. 1 The arrival of these reinforcements enabled. the commander
to send. three regiments to India from the Cape; they were in India
at the start of the new year.2
To capture the overseas possessions of Britain's enemies had
been a part of Pitt's policy since 1793. In that year Pondicherry
capitulated to a force of native and British troops assisted by the
British navy. The Dutch possessions in Malacca were captured in 1795
and 1796. A force of about 1,100 Europeans and two battalions of
native infantry under the command of Colonel James Stuart of the
72nd regiment sailed from Madras on 30 July 1795 for this purpose.
On 26 August Trinooinalee surrendered to the British. In October
de Meuron's Swiss regiment stationed at Colombo in the service of the
Dutch East India Company passed into the hands of the British through
the diplomatic efforts of Mr. Hugh Cleghorn. 3 When Co].ombo capitu-
lated on 15 February 1796 Ceylon, important for the protection and
security of India, came under British control. These movements of
the troops in the-I 1a:.were conducted on board transports hired
from the maritime resources of India.4
1. PRO, W.O.1/325, Keith to Dundas, 21 Sept. 1796; 22 Sept. 1796.
2. PRO, W.O.1/357, 20 Jan. 1797; ADM/1/5513, 13 Nov. 1796.
3. PRO, W.O.1/361; Fortescue, op. cit., 402.
4. PRO, ADM/1/55, 29 Dec. 1795.
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In 1798 when the ministry was satisfied that Egypt was the
destination of Bonaparte's fleet and when the ministry received
intelligence that the French, Tippoo Saib and Zumaun Shah, the king
of the Afghans or Abdallies were leagued in a common cause for the
expulsion of the English from India, it decided to send reinforce-
ments to India. The 10th regiment was to be sent from England,
the 51st from Lisbon and three more battalions were to go from the
Cape. In August 1798 the 10th regiment of foot embarked on two
East India ships at Spithead and proceeded with a third East India
ship to Lisbon. There it received the 51st regiment and the whole
proceeded to India. A few days later the 61st and. 81st embarked
for the Cape in East India ships. These ships oonveyed the three
battalions from the Cape to India after landing the two regiments.1
Before reinforcements came the British in India secured a
victory over Tippoo Sultan in May 1798. When the new forces arrived
the army, under the command of Arthur Wellesley, was to concentrate
on the pacification of southern India. In 1801 Wellesley also had
the responsibility of providing transports for the ..rmy (4,000 to
5,000 troops) that would act on the coast of the Red Sea assisting
Abercromby's assault on Egypt.
It was difficult to procure tonnage for the transport of a
large force in India on any sudden emergency. The available tonnage
of the port of Bombay was not considerable; that of Madras was
1. PRO, £)M/1/3736, August 1798.
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extremely limited; that of Calcutta however at certain periods of
the season was of great extent, and no large armament could be pro-
vided with transports without aid. from that port. However, much
depended on the weather since no ship could leave the port of Calcutta
without difficulty from the middle of March to the commencement of
November, and. the port of Madras could. not be approached or quitted
with safety from the commencement of October to the close of December.
In addition to these circumstances, of the shipping available around
Calcutta by the end of the year, much of it was taken up for normal
trade by the end of January and. none was obtainable by March.1
Thus, for the Red Sea expedition Wellesley employed the whole
available tonnage at the port of Calcutta at the proper season. Major
General Baird, commander of the Red Sea operation, sailed from Calcutta
on 14 February 1801. Wellesley directed that agents be appointed to
see -that the several presidencies in India furnished a constant and.
regular supply of provisions, and of all necessary articles for the
troops going to the Red Sea. Wellesley thought a considerable
quantity of salt provisions might be procured from the American and
Danish ships, which frequented the ports of India, and which usually
2
imported salt provisions as an article of trade.	 Because there was
a deficiency of tonnage at Ceylon, a proportion of the troops going
from Ceylon to the Red Sea -to assist Abercromby's assault on Egypt
1. PRO, W.0.1/358, Wellesley to Abercromby, 28 Feb. 1801.
2. Ibid.
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were accommodated. on board warships. 1 The British force from
India was to arrive at Rosetta after a five months passage too late
to be of any assistance.2
1. PRO, W.0.1/358, Wellesley to Abercromby, 28 Feb. 1801.
2. See below, p. 273.
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CHAPTER VII
THE TRLNSPORTING OF THE KING' S PORCEZ:
THE SHORT HAUL TO THE CONTINENT AND THE
!4EDrI1ERRANELN
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The campaigns of 1793 and. 1794 on the Continent were attempts
to preserve the integrity of the Dutch Netherlands by driving the
French from Flanders; thus maintaining an effective barrier between
Holland. and. France. This traditional line of Britain's defence
policy became an essential feature of the military policy of Pitt
and. Dundas. The great emphasis the ministry placed. on the campaign
in the West Indies, however, drained the maritime and human resources
of Britain to the Caribbean greatly hindering the effort on the
Continent.
The responsibility for sending troops, provisions and. stores
on the short haul to the Continent during the two campaigns was for
the most part in the hands of the Navy Board, since the Transport
Board did not come into existence until the summer of 1794. Pre-
parations for sending troops to the Continent were going on at the
same time as those for conveying troops to the West Indies; this led.
to confusion and difficulty during embarkations and to a scarcity of
tonnage during the campaigns.
The optimism of the British Government about an early victory
over France and the unpreparedness of the British army, which had
long been reduced bypeacetime economy, resulted in Britain transport-
ing to the Continent during the first half of 1793 only 4,000 troops
and 3,000 cavalry. These numbers were to be supplemented. in August
1793 when gunners were transported to Dunkirk and in September when
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eight battalions were sent to reinforce 0stend.1
The campaign of 1793 began when the British government, in
answer to a threat made by the French General Dumoiez to the free
passage of the Hollandsd.iep, sent three battalions of horse guards
to Helvoetsluys. The three battalions numbering under 2,000 men
were under the command of Colonel Gerrard Lake of the First Guards
and. were accommodated on board thirteen hastily improvised transports
that had not more than fourteen days provisions with them. 2 Liter
a few narrow escapes from shipwreck they reached Helvoetsluys in
perfect health on 1 March, just eight days after Dwidas issued the
order for tonnage. Transport agent Lieutenant Naire at Helvoetsluys
retained the thirteen transports by hiring them for six months certain.3
It was lucky for the Navy Board and. for the three battalions that the
transports reached the shores of the Continent without encountering
stormy weather, otherwise the troops might not have been so fit upon
landing. The Board had been so anxious to get the ships ready and.
out to sea as soon as possible that most of them were in a very unfit
state for the reception of troops. "The tonnage of the ships was so
inadequate to the numbers embarked, that every bad consequence was to
be apprehended had. it been necessary to put on the hatches, which must
1. In 1793 about 14,000 Hanoverians and. 8,000 Hessians were placed on
the British payroll and became Continental auxiliaries to the British
w.
2. pRO, ADM/1o6/2645, 12; 26 March 1793.
3. Ibid., 12 March 1793.
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have been the case had we not made Helvoet before the gale of wind
came on. There was no small species of provisions on board.; no
vinegar (that most essential preservative); and lastly, neither
medicines nor surgical izistrwnents." 1 Soon after arrival, the King's
forces with the aid of 8,000 Prussians totally defeated the French at
2Neervinden and. by 5 April had driven them from the Austrian Netherlands.
At this early stage in the war it appeared as though the allies would
be easily successful.
The enthusiasm of the Dutch for an active campaign against the
French was so heightened by the arrival of the three battalions and
soon after by the arrival of the Duke of York, commander of the King's
forces on the Continent, that Dundas decided to send more troops to
Helvoetsluye. On 4 March the Navy Board was requested to supply
tonnage to accommodate three regiments of infantry, the 37th and
53rd. then serving in Scotland, and the 14th regiment at Dover; they
were to be sent under the command. of Sir Ralph Abercromby for the pro-
tection of Holland. only. 3 The 600 men of the 14th regiment were to
embark at Dover or Sheerness and a detachment of Royal Artillery and
a Company of the Royal Military Artificers were to embark at Woolwich
and be sent to Helvoetsluys wider the same convoy.4 The 1,000 men
1 • Sir Harry Calvert. The Journals and 	 e of General
In 1793-4. With an Appendix, Containing His plans for the Defence
of the Country in case of invasion (London, 1853), 22, 23.
2. Portesoue, op. cit., 67-8.
3. PRO, ADM/1/4157, 4 March 1793.
4. Ibid.,
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belonging to the regiments from Scotland. embarked at Leith where the
Navy Board was able to hire six -transports for six months certain
at 13/- per ton, enabling the Board. to keep the transports in Holland.
to be ready to remove the troops if necessary. 1 Since passage to the
Continent was a short haul the troops were accommodated. at one ton
and. a half per man and were provisioned. at the usual allowance, that
is, at 2/3 of a seaman's whole allowance. The transports with three
weeks provisions on board sailed from Leith on 21 March, arrived off
Yarmouth on the 25th and. sailed. a few days later for Holland.. 2 The
troops embarked and. sailed. less than three weeks after the order was
issued. for the appropriation of -transports. All of them were at
Helvoets].uys by 1 April. 3 There were now about 4,000 British soldiers
on the Continent to take part in the advance on Flanders.
Having decided. to spare no more infantry for the Continent
the ministry ordered. 11 detachments of cavalry to be taken up for
that service. Ten of the d.etachments consisted. of 262 men each and
300 horses with about 14 servan-te and 25 women. The detachment of
the first dragoon guards, however, consisted. of 393 men and. 450 horses.4
In response to orders for tonnage issued on 18, 27 March and 6 April
to accommodate -the cavalry the Navy Board took up enough vessels in
the Thames to transport one third of them at one time. Unlike the
infantry transports the cavalry transports returned to Deptford as
1. PRO, ADN/1o6/2645, 21 March 1793.
2. PRO, W.o.i/66, Aberoromby to Dundas, 27 March 1793.
3. Ibid., 1 April 1793.
4. PRO, ADM/1/4157, 18, 27 March; 6 April 1793.
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soon as possible in order to receive the second and third divisions
of cavalry destined for ostend. 1 (The twelve transports loaded with
hay which sailed for Ostend on 27 May also returned to England as
soon as their service was complete.) 2 The entire first division plus
ordnance stores and. Royal artillery were embarked by 10 May and on that
day their convoy was ordered; 3 they arrived at Ostend about the middle
of May. On 3 June the transports which accommodated the second division
were back in Deptford. Yard being fitted to receive the third division.4
When the third division arrived there were 3,000 British cavalry on
the Continent.
Besides the detachments of cavalry sent to Flanders the
allies were strengthened by successive contingents of Hanoverians,
At this time the allies decided to divide the army into two divisions.
The Austrians were to invest Quesnoy while the British besieged Dunkirk.
To aid the siege of Dunkirk gunners were sent to the Duke of York;
but when they arrived on 27 August, they had. very few guns for the
Duke's army. 5 This was a foretaste of things to come for an in-
sufficiency of ordnance stores was to impede the British campaign on
the Continent throughout 1794. The Admiralty sent a frigate and. a
1. PRO, ADIV1/4157, 19 May 1793.
2. pRo, ADN/1o6/2645, 28 May 1793.
3. PRO, ADM/1/4158, 10 May 1793.
4. PRO, ADM/ 106/2646, 3 June 1793.
5. PRO, ADW1/4158, 23 Aug. 1793.
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few armed cutters to the coast of Dunkirk as well as Admiral MacBride
without his fleet. The force, however, proved inadequate and. on 8
September the Duke was forced to retreat.1
The failure at Dunkirk emphasized the critical situation in
Flanders. Accordingly, on 11 September Dundas ordered eight
battalions to embark for Ostend as a temporary measure. At the same
time he informed Lord Hood of the importance of holding Toulon (Lyons,
Marseilles and. above all Toulon, the great naval arsenal of the
Mediterranean, had. been in revolt against the National Convention
since July; Corsica was also in revolt under the leadership of the
old patriot Paoli.); he framed a design for a desbent upon St. Malo
and for the occupation of the Isle D'Yeu off the coast of La Vendde;
and also overseered. the arrangements for the Grey-Jerv-is expedition
to the West Indies. Thus several foreign enterprises were being
planned and prepared by the ministry at the same time resulting in
confusion and difficulty for the Navy Board at home. The eight
battalions (3rd., 19th, 27th, 28th, 42nd, 54th, 57th and. 59th) destined
for Ostend were taken away from Grey's West Indian expedition. They
were fated to be transported back and. forth across the channel several
times, while embarked on board. transports for weeks on end. resulting
in Biokness and death for many of their number, while Dundaa decided
where they would best serve the ministry's policy. Shipping for most
1. Fortescue, op. cit., 124-29; see also, Alfred H. Burne. The Noble
Duke of York - The Military Life of Frederick Duke of York and
Albany (London & N.Y., 1949), 75.
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of them had been ordered as early as 15 August in response to Dnnag'
request to have a force assembled at Spithead by early September to
be ready to proceed to Ostend if the situation demanded it. 1 If the
situation on the Continent did not demand. their presence they were to
go with Grey and. Jervis.
The eight reinforcing battalions had. just joined the army in
Flanders when Dundas on 18 September ordered four of them to return
2
to England. at once and. the remainder as soon as possible. 	 He now
wanted them to join Lord Moira on an expedition to help the royalist
forces in La Vend.e. Dundas felt safe in recalling them because the
allies, after the failure of ])u.nkirk were meeting with success, caus-
ing the French to retreat to their former positions. The 63rd, 28th,
54th and 59th returned. to England immediately. This partial with-
drawal from Flanders however, was premature for news soon reached.
Britain that Niewport, held by a weak garrison, was being successfully
bombarded by the French. The ministry, fearful that they might lose
their base' at Ostend, ordered the four battalions to be sent back at
once to the Continent under the command. of Sir Charles Grey who had.
orders to use his judgement in either defending Ostend. or taking away
the entire eight battalions. 3 In the meantime Major General Stuart,
the commander at Ostend, disembarked the remaining four battalions
that were to sail for England. The situation at Ostend. soon improved
1. PRO, ADM/1/4158, 15 Aug. 1793.
2. PRO, ADM/1/4158, 11; 18 Sept. 1793. -
3. PRo, ADM/1/4257, 25; 27 Oct. 1793.
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however, when the French were forced to retreat and when they failed
to capture Niewport which was reinforced on October 27th by a battalion
of Hessians and. by a few gwmers from Ostend.. Grey arrived a day
later when his assistance was no longer needed; he and the eight
battalions returned to England Boon after. By the close of 1793
Ostend had been retained as a British base.
The eight battalions that returned with Grey were given to
Lord. Moira for the expedition to La Vende. These battalions were
to be joined by a Hessian force embarked at Ostend. The Royalists'
insurrection in La Vende had. begun as early as March 1793; and. met
with success until the end of June when it suffered its first defeat
in an attempt to capture Nantes. Dundas began preparations for an
expedition to help the Royalists in November. In the confusion
surrounding the sailing of Grey's expedition to the West Indies,
Moira's expedition was delayed as well as the collection and. departure
of the transports destined, for Ostend. for the accommodation of the
Hessians. Moira's fears that the Royalists would be beaten by the
time he arrived proved correct. He sailed. on 1 December and. on his
arrival a clay later there was no sign of a Royalist. The insurgents
had. won a victory at Antrainon 21 November but after an unsuccessful
attack upon Angers they began to retreat and were finally overthrown
at Savenay on 23 December. Had Moira sailed. on 22 November as
originally intended the situation might have been different. By
2 December he was too late; there was nothing he could do but retreat
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to Guernsey with his whole force.
Moira's eight battalions which crossed the channel several
times between October and December 1793 were kept on board ship to
deal with a possible French invasion. It was inevitable that men
crowded on board transports fitted for a short voyage would. become
sick; the fact that many died of typhus fever is a black mark on
the conduct of the transport service at the time.
The expedition to La Vende had been a failure and by the end
of 1793 Toul.on, which Dund.as had. said was so important to hold, was
also lost. The only British troops to arrive at Toulon, after those
disembarked by Admiral Hood who occupied Toulon on 28 August, were
two weak battalions and. a few gunners, or about 800 men in all.
They were sent from Gibraltar and arrived at Toulon on 27 October
under command. of General O'Hara and Major General David. Dundas.
This small contingent was not strong enough to counteract a rapidly
deteriorating situation where neither supplies nor stores had been
sent to the forces disembarked by Hood. As a result the British
suffered a defeat on 29 November during which O'Hara was captured;
and. by 18 December they made plans to retreat.1
A scarcity of troops was the reason for the failure to hold.
Toulon. Near the end of September Hood had been promised 5,000
Hessians but they were given to Moira instead for the descent on
Brittany. Hood was also promised the 12th regiment of light dragoons
1. Fortescue, op. cit., 157-77.
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and the 40th regiment of infantry from Cork. By 6 October the 12th
regiment was already embarked on board transports having been destined
originally for Ostend; they were waiting for transports to arrive
from England to accommodate the 40th regiment in order that they could
both sail under the same convoy to Toulon. 1 Since the 40th regiment
was not embarked by the end of October the 12th light dragoons was
ordered to proceed to Toulon without them; they were to sail with a
West India convoy as far as possible and. with a single frigate from
Sir John Jervis' squadron to go as far as Gibraltar and. there pick
up a convoy for Toulon. 2 On 1 December the 40th regiment which was
now embarked was ordered to wait for other -transports to be sent to
Cork to embark two other regiments destined for Toulon. 3 The
departure of the transports from Deptford was delayed and. by the time
they reached Cork the news from Tou.lon was so bad that Dundas decided
not to send the regiments there. The 40th regiment was still at
Cork in January 1794 when it was ordered to join Moira's second expedi-
tion to Ostend and. the 12th light dragoons which never reached Toulon
were to serve in Corsica in June 1794 after a long and hazardous journey.
After Hood failed -to hold Toulon he went to Corsica in order
to assist the National party, led by Paoli, to throw off the yoke of
the French. By now, the British land forces on board the fleet
including the soldiers doing duty as marines, consisted of 2,232 rank
1. PRO, .ADM/1/4159, 6 Oct. 1793.
2. Ibid., 31 Oct. 1793.
3. Ibid., 1 Dec. 1793; 23 Dec. 1793.
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and file. 1 The fleet arrived off Mortello fort on 7 February and
the troops were landed the same day. Mortello surrendered on the
17th and St. Fiorenzo on the 19th. While the soldiers were in
Corsica they were very deficient in ordnance stores and camp equip-
ment. However, Baa tia surrendered on 22 May as a result of a
successful blockade of that port by Hood. On 3 June the 12th light
dragoons, which were originally in-tended for •Tmlon arrived after a
long and troublesome voyage which included a disembarkation at
2Gibraltar in January 1794.
	
On 19 June though Calvi was still to
be taken Lord Hood and Sir Gilbert Elliot, charged with -the negotiation
of an agreement with the Corsican patriots, accepted the crown of
Corsica on behalf of George III. The reinforced army under command
of Lieutenant General Stuart invested Calvi on 20 June and it
surrendered on 10 August.3
The success in Corsica in 1794 was a ray of hope to the
British forces who had met failure at Dunkirk, in La Vende, and at
Toulon by the end of 1793. The failure of -the campaign of 1793 on
the Continent can be attributed for the most part to a genuine lack
of troops; to the indecision of the ministry as to where the -troops
could best serve; as a result -they were sent everywhere; and. to the
nationalist war aims of the allies. Other factors also contributed
to the failure of the campaign of 1793. The British never prepared
1. pio, w.o.1/3o2, f.735.
2. PRO, ADM/106/2649, 21 Jan. 1794.
3. PRO, W.O.1/302, f.735.
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for war and in 1793 every department was slow in getting organized
particularly the ordnance department which was negligent in collect-
ing and distributing supplies. The artillery had been allowed to
deteriorate after the American war and no attempt was made to aunent
it until the war against revolutionary France had begun. As a
result the troops sent to the Continent were never well supplied with
camp equipment or ordnance stores and the shortage of artillery waggons
and. horses to forward supplies greatly impeded the movement of the
Continental army. Alfred H. Burne in a review of the campaign of
1793 in his biography of the Duke of York stated: "A further charge
against the government is that they stinted the army of supplies in
all its branches, even sending out recruits to the front unarmed.
Dundas must not receive the sole blame for this. It must be shared
by the Ordnance Department which was at the outbreak of the war in
a shocking state of ir1efficiency.t 	 As far as the transport service
is concerned, the Navy Board appropriated transports rather quickly,
however, it met with confusion in getting a large expedition off to
the West Indies and in transporting troops to the Continent at the
same time. Since so much tonnage was on the way to the Caribbean
the Navy Board prematurely recalled transports from the Continent
toward the end of 1793; as a result transports had to be sent back
to Ostend delaying the embarkation of the foreign troops in British
pay for England and the embarkation for the Vende. It should also
be mentioned that on the short haul to the Continent the troops always
1. Burne, op. cit., 103-4.
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arrived in good. health. The unfortunate eight battalions, that
were sent back and forth to the Continent with Grey and then with
Moira and. then were allowed to stay on board their crowded transports
for weeks on end to deal with a possible French invasion, came down
with typhus fever from which many died. Everyone connected with
that situation, the ministry, transport service, and. War department,
must share in the responsibility for that unfortunate affair.
The campaign of 1794 to drive the French from Flanders had.
as its immediate objective the mastering of every fortress on the
French frontier from the Meuse to the sea. By the treaty of Hague,
19 April, about 62,000 Prussian troops entered. into the pay of the
British and. Dutch to be employed wherever Great Britain and. Holland
felt fit. By the opening of the campaign the two contestants in
Flanders were approximately equal, the French being very slightly
superior in nuznbers.
Most of the troops sent to the Continent from England for
the '93 campaign were still there to take part in the '94 campaign.
They were supplemented in April by the 8th light dragoons and the 38th
and. 55th regiments of foot; in June by 10,000 troops under command.
of Lord Moira; and. in August by five battalions wider command of Lord
Mulgrave. The tonnage needed for the two last expeditions was
collected. with great difficulty since so many transports were in the
West Indies with Grey and. Jervis.
1. Fortescue, op. cit., 226, 229.
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Recruits for the British infantry already on the Continent
as well as for the British cavalry and Hessian cavalry and. infantry
had been arriving at Ostend. during the first four months of 1794.
Many of the troops were ill—equipped and badly clothed. The recruits
for General Aberoromby's brigade "much resembled Falstaff's men, and.
were as lightly clad as any Carmaiinole battalion." 1 This was not a
failure of the transport system but of the war organization in general.
British transports at Ostend. were ordered home to bring over the British
and foreign recruits. 2 A considerable number of the Hessian troops
had. to be left in England because of sickness. They had been stationed
on the Isle of Wight; some of them in bad. quarters and. the greater part
of them on board the transport ships in which they were brought from
the Continent. Due to their confined situation sickness was inevit-
able.3
While the fortunes of the combatants swayed back and forth
in the renewed fighting in Flanders during April, it was not until
the end. of that month that substantial reinforcements could be brought
across. On 30 April the 8th light dragoons and. the 38th and. 55th
regiments of foot arrived at Ostend. Dundas had aimed to get them
there by the middle of March. 4 As early as 16 February he had
ordered. tonnage to bring them from Ireland. His design was frustrated
1. Calvert, op. cit., 187.
2. E. g., PRO, ADM/1/416o, 23 Jan. 1794; 14 Feb.
6 March 1794; W.o.i/i68, 26; 28 March 1794;
4 April 1794.
3. PRO, W.O.1/175, 24; 29 Feb. 1794.
1794; ADM/106/2649,
.&rm/1o6/265o, 1;
4. PRO, .ADM/1/4160, 16 Feb. 1794; W.0.1/169, 2 May 1794.
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by -the difficulties of procuring ships in Ireland and. by the scarcity
of -tonnage in English ports as a result of the exceptional demand for
transports for the expedition to the West Indies. It became
necessary to obtain 4,000 tons of shipping from Ostend; British
transports were hurriedly called back. 1
 Movement of the regiments
was also d.el&yed. by contrary winds, which forced the transports to
put in at Bristol on their way from Cork; and. so ten weeks elapsed
between Dundas's original order for tonnage and the troops' arrival
in the Low Countries. Such a delay contrasted markedly with the
more usual time-limit of three weeks between the ordering of transports-
for service to the Continent and their arrival at their destination,
no more than a week being required to carry over troops from an
English port.
The main British force under Moira destined for the Low
Countries was still in England, when during May the allied forces
suffered a series of reverses and the beginning of the Polish crisis
disunited and reduced the will to fight of the continental allies.
On 17 June, after the government received news -that Ostend was in
danger, Dund.as ordered Moira to sail at once with his force of 10,000
men. This force included the 14th light dragoons and the 33rd
regiment of foot which were to sail for Ostend from Ireland., as well
as the following fourteen regiments destined to sail from England,
(3rd, 8th, 19th, 27th, 28th, 40th, 42nd, 44th, 54th, 57th, 59th, 63rd,
87th and. the 89th).
1. PRO, ADX/1/4160, 16 Feb. 1794; see also, ADM/106/2649, 17; 18
Feb. 1794.
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Preparations had begun for Moira's expedition to Ostend as
early as January. On the 18th of that month transport agent, Captain
Rowell was ordered to send a weekly return of transports employed in
the expedition giving the names and tonnage of the ships, their
I
masters, the agent, and. how employed.	 On the same day the 40th
regiment of foot, originally intended for Toulon, and two companies
of Irish artillery sailed from Cork to join the expedition. Other
regiments were added throughout the next five months. Despite the
fact that the Navy Board in February 1794 ordered to England all the
unemployed transports at Ostend it still found it difficult to provide
tonnage for this military operation. Most of the merchant ships
available for the transport service had been employed in the Grey-
Jervis expedition and were still in the Caribbean. The scarcity
of shipping definitely delayed Moira's departure to the Continent.
On 18 June Moira wrote to Nepean from Nettley Camp "according to
Browell we are hard put to it for transports. The worst is that
we have horse ships for no more than fifty horses. So that we will
not have horses to draw even our battalion guns much less our other
artillery." 2
 By 19 June after five months of preparation there were
enough transports for the 19th, 27th, 28th, 40th (8 cos. of), 42nd., 54th,
57th, 59th, 87th, 89th at Portsmouth and on 20 June these regiments
were ordered to embark. On the same day the 8th and 44th regiments
embarked and one day later they sailed for Ostend. Moira did not
1. PRO, ADM/106/2649, 18 Jan. 1794.
2. PRO, W.O.1/175, 18 June 1794.
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have a single transport to spare for the 3rd and 63rd regiments.
On 20 June he wrote to the Earl of Balcarres that as soon as -there
were enough transports at Jersey the 3rd. and 63rd regiments should
be embarked. 1 In the meantime he and the ten regiments sailed to
Os-tend arriving on 26 Jwie.2 There they met the 8th and 44th
regiments of foot who, along with some recruits, had arrived five
clays earlier. One squadron of the 14th light dragoons and the 33rd
regiment of foot had. come in on 25 June, having sailed from Cork
nineteen days before. 3 On 30 June the Navy Board was able to send.
five transports to Jersey to convey the 3rd and 63rd regiments to the
Continent.4 However, since Ostend was evacuated on -the same day the
regiments were sent to England instead.5
When Moira arrived at Ostend, the situation of the allies
had. been rapidly deteriorating. The-British and. Austrian armies
were forced to retreat northward. first from Ostend on 20 June, then
from Niewport on 16 July and from Antwerp four days later. 6 Through-
out -these reverses the Navy Board continued to send at intervals
single transports with detachments of regiments already on the
Continent. 7 When news of the evacuation of Ostend. came through
the destination of all convoys going there was altered. 8 Captain
1. PRO, W.O.1/175, 19; 20 June 1794.
2. PRO, W.O.1/169, 26 June 1794.
3. Ibid., 6; 25 June 1794.
4. PRO, LDM/106/2650, 30 June 1794.
5. PRO, .ADM/1/4161, 20 July 1794.
6. Fortescue, op. cit., 283-90.
7. E. g., PRO, *DW1/4161, 6 June 1794; 5 July 1794.
8. Ibid., 1 July 1794.
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Craven, the principal transport agent at Ostend., moved with the
garrison to Antwerp, where he carried on in the same manner the
duty and management of the transports. 1 Near the end of July when
Antwerp was abandoned recruits for the regiments already on the
Continent were sent to Bergen op Zoom, 2 and Captain Craven, instructed
to follow any orders the Duke of York might give him, 3 moved first to
Flushing and then in the middle of August to Helvoetsluys.4
Throughout the summer of 1794 the transport service was still
finding it difficult to supply ships to send recruits and. stores to
the Continent. It was at this time that a circular was sent to -the
transport agents in the West Indies to send home all transports that
could be spared. In fact, in order to accommodate troops, the Navy
Board on 5 July asked the Ordnance Board for the use of the ordnance
transports that had returned to Spithead.. 5 All transports returning
from the Continent were quickly fitted out, provisioned and sent back
again. In August the situation was slightly alleviated when the
Navy Board was able to hire on freight several ships to carry army
stores 'to the Continent.6
1. PRO, ADN/106/2645, 7 July 1794.
2. E. ., PRO, .ADM/1/4161, 30 July 1794;
ADM/1/3730, 15 Sept. 1794.
3. PRO, ADM/106/2651, 30 July 1794.
4. Ibid., 15 Aug. 1794.
5. Ibid., 5 July 1794.
6. Ibid., 12; 13 Aug. 1794.
£DM/106/2651, 25 July 1794;
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On hearing of the capture of Niewport and the French advance
northward Du.ndas decided to seth five battalions under Lord Mulgrave
to Flushing. 1 They were the 31st and. 34th with a total of 1,000
men; and the 79th, 84th, and 85th with 800 men each; these regi-
ments were the first to be employed. in the province of Zealand. To
transport them tonnage for 3,400 men was needed; 2 at a time when
shipping was difficult to procure. By the time the Transport Board
appropriated ships, embarked the troops and sent them off to the
Continent several weeks had elapsed. Dundas requested tonnage on
6 August and. the five battalions arrived at Flushing twenty days
later; their commander, Lord Muigrave, having preceded them by nine
days. Under normal circumstances the entire operation could have
been done in one week. Muigrave's troops came too late, Sluys having
surrendered. to the French on the very da1y of their arrival. No
more regiments were to be sent to the Continent during the remainder
of the campaign. During the second half of 1794 the French captured
one post after another until the allies were forced. to retreat to the
western bank of the Ens; there they halted on 5 February 1795. The
Transport Board continued to send officers and recruits for the regi-
ments on the Continent as well as provisions and. supplies until the
British evacuation in the early spring.
The want of troops plus division among the allies resulted
in victory for the French in Flanders in 1794. (In October of '94
1. Lord. Moira had returned to England at the end of July.
2. PRO, &DM/1/4162, 6 Aug. 1794.
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the British cabinet cut off financial aid to Austria and Prussia
because of their disheartened way of conducting the Continental cain-
paign. In fact, Prussia had not assisted at all.) The 6,500 troops
the Navy Board was successful in bringing to the Continent in 1794
were not enough to stem the tide leading to a French victory. It is
probably true that the scarcity of transports hastened the French
success. If Noira's troops and. Muigrave's five battalions had
arrived earlier the French victory would most likely have occurred
several weeks later; and if more transports were available adequately
to supply the troops with provisions and forage the allied evacuation
would probably have been delayed. But the British army in Flanders
suffered in 1794 as it had. in 1793 because the Ordnance department
was still disorganized and inefficient. There was a shortage of
artillery, artillery men and artillery drivers throughout the campaign.
Military operations were impeded also by a need of recruits, officers
and waggons; many of the troops that were sent to the Continent were
ill-equipped, ill-disciplined and ill-clothed. The armies were con-
stantly on the move and. supplies could not keep up due to the depleted
waggon supply. These disadvantages were not the result of transport
failure but again were the result of inferior war organization in
general.
Transports had been returning from the West Indies throughout
the second half of 1794 so there was enough tonnage in England in
early 1795 to bring away the British army and. cavalry from the Continent.
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Many of the vessels were back in England when Civil War erupted in
Brittany at the end. of May 1795. Therefore, the Transport Board
had. no difficulty in accominod.ating two Royalist expeditions (3,500
men and 1,500 men respectively) and one combined British and. Royalist
expedition (3,300 infantry and. 750 cavalry) to Brittany during the
summer of 1795. However, these military operations which were
hastily planned and. not adequately supplied with provisions and.
forage were a failure. The two Royalist expeditions were in a
short time defeated. by a superior French force.
The combined British and. Foreign contingent was sent to the
barren island of Hed.ic with no assured. way of receiving provisions
and supplies. Inclement weather (it was the hurricane season)
prevented the victuallers from coming near the island. till the second.
week in November; in the meantime several hundred. horses died. of
starvation. Finally in December in accordance with Dund.as' instruc-
tions the troops embarked. on board. the warships of Admiral Harvey's
squadron and returned to England.. 1 The transports which brought
the men to the island had returned to England soon after disembark-
ing them. By December 1795 all the available tonnage of the transport
service was employed in the Abercromby—Christian expedition to the
West IndiQs and in taking away the last of the British cavalry from
2the Continent.
1. PRO, W.O.1/176, 14 Nov.; 13 Dec. 1795.
2. An account of the expenses of the -transport office in 1795,
£1,979, 835. 8.11, PRO, 30/8/252, 7 Dec. 1796 , f.155.
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In 1796 when hostilities on the Continent virtually ceased
Britain's Eu.ropean policy became for the most part one of defence
which, except for the skirmish of the Brages Canal and the conquest
of Minorca, lasted until the end of 1798. By not having to prepare
for a Continental offensive campaign the Transport Board was able to
make a genuine effort at reducing expenditure in answer to the
ministry's request for economy. As the war had progressed the
government became more and more distressed over the expenses involved;
and their concern was aggravated by the inflation that swept Britain
in 1795-1796. The Transport Board answered the ministry's request
for economy by discharging transport agents who were no longer con-
sidered necessary and. by reducing tonnage. As early as March 1796
an order was issued to transport agent Lieutenant Woodriffe at Lynn
to avail himself of every opportunity to discharge all foreign ships
and transports engaged for three or four months; 1 by 15 April
Woodriffe was reducing his numbers at a fast pace. 2 Between 3
September 1795 and April 1796 twenty four agents had. been discharged
the transport service.3
In May 1796 there were 45,000 tons of transports in the
West Indies, and. in the Mediterranean, together with a great number
1. PRO, ADM/108/28, 21 March 1796.
2. Ibid., 15 April 1796.
3. PRO, ADN/1/3731, 6 April 1796. When agents were discharged from
the transport service they were put on the half pay list.
ADM/i/3738, 26 Nov. 1799.
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of agents, at a very considerable expense to the public. Orders
were issued to the different commanders—in—chief of the King's ships
on the West Indies and Mediterranean stations to order to England all
transports and agents as were not absolutely necessary for carrying
on the different services in those countries. 1 The following July
the Transport Board issued a circular to its principal agents in the
West Indies and Mediterranean to reduce the -tonnage to 7,500 tons at
the leeward and windward, islands; to the same at St. Domingo and.
Jamaica, and to the same in the Mediterranean, retaining only those
vessels best calculated for the conveyance of troops. The others
were to be discharged on the usual allowance of one month's pay or
sent to England with the first convoy, together with a proportionate
number of agents; one agent for every 3,000 tons of transports was
to be retained. Transports were not to be used as prison ships or
store ships; 2 ships were to be unloaded as quickly as possible in
order that there would be little claim for demurrage, still less for
breach of charter parties. 3 The Transport Board. discharged agents
at home and in Ireland and. continued discharging them through 1797.
In order to reduce expenses still further instriotions were sent to
the remaining transport agents telling them how to economize; any
1. PRO, ADM/1/3731, 3 May 1796.
2. PRO, .ADM/108/37, 22 July 1796.
3. PRO, ADM/1/3732, 25 July 1796.
4. E. g., PRO, ADM/108/38, 10 Aug.
ADM/108/47, 14 July 1797.
1796; &DM/i/3735, 29 Dec. 1797;
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charges inconsistent with those instructions were disallowed..1
In 1797 the Transport Board continued to make a genuine effort
to keep costs down by sending another circular to its agents which
required from them a general return of all persons of every descrip-
tion employed under them, with a list of all boats or other small
vessels in pay of the Board, at their respective ports, and the names
of the crews, with the amount of each person's wages, per month, year,
or day, specified. The Board also wanted to know the standing charge
for rent of storehouse, or offices, with the detail of every cost
attending the establishment at each agent's station, and asked for
the agent's opinion, whether any, and what, reduction could be effected
2in the several expenses the Board mentioned. 	 Two days after the
circular was sent, answers to it were received from the agents. The
answers contained the particulars of the weekly expenses and notes
of any reductions that could be made.3
During the second half of 1796 and the first half of '97
Britain's allies made separate treaties with France and Pitt deepatched
Malmesbury to Paris for possible peace negotiations. At the same
time the explosive situation in Ireland necessitated sending troops
there. For these reasons and because of the ministry's anxiety
over the costs of the war, Corsica, Elba, and the Mediterranean at
large were evacuated; for the next two years Britain stood alone.
Her peace overtures had not been successful.
1. PRO, ADM/108/38, 17 Aug. 1796.
2. PRO, ADWIO8/43, 10 Jan. 1797.
3. Ibid., 12 Jan. 1797.
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During this period of defence the British navy remained
active winning two of its greatest victories at St. Vincent and. at
Caznperdown in 1797. Ii entered the Mediterranean again in the
spring of 1798 for the double purpose of discovering the destination
of the Toulon armament and of keeping a constant check on the Spanish
fleet at Cadiz. St. Vincent, who was given a free hand in the
Mediterranean, divided his fleet in order to secure the double object.
Nelson, in command of the Mediterranean detachment, pursued Bonaparte
to Egypt and. won a decisive victory over the French fleet at the Nile.
By the end of 1798 St. Vincent had snatched Minorea from the Spaniards
and. had given the British the base they needed in the western
Mediterranean.1
In December 1796 the British government's efforts to
economize delved an expedition to Lisbon as it had the West Indian
service at this time. Soon after Spain declared war against Britain
in October 1796 she threatened Portugal with invasion in order to
compel her to close her ports to the British. When the Portuguese
appealed to Britain for help the ministry decided to send 5,000 men
to Lisbon wider General Charles Stuart. The Transport Board started
up preliminaries to send this force during the first week of November,2
and then met with difficulty in collecting tonnage. A conversation
between Rupert George, chairman of the Transport Board, Pitt and.
Dwidas about reducing the tonnage held in British ports, which took
1. NRS, Spencer, vol. II, 427.
2. PRO, ADM/1/3732, 3 Nov. 1796.
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place on 5 November 1796 , resulted. in the Board limiting its tonnage
to 6,000 tons. 1 However, Rupert George acted beyond the intentions
of the government. There had been a muddle as a result of the
meeting. When Pitt and Dundas wished the reduction of the transport
tonnage they had in view merely the accommodation of the military
branch, without any reference to that of the Navy or Victualling
Offices, "of which they would not form any accurate opinion." In
January 1797 they were to advise the Transport Board to concert with
those two Boards on the best way economy as well as efficiency could
be procured.2 In the meantime most of the 6,000 tons was swallowed
up very shortly by the Victualling department; and the Transport
Board, when collecting more tonnage, gave precedence to the West
Indian service (Abercromby's second expedition to the Caribbean)
which had already been delayed and put off still further the exped.i-
tion to Lisbon. By the middle of December the Board was able to
supply eleven ships with a total tonnage of 3,655 tons to accommodate
the 2,000 foreign troops who were to leave from England. 3 It was
the first week in January, however, before the Transport Board was
able to appropriate fifteen transports for the 11th light dragoons
accompanying them. 4 Also, officers found. it difficult to get
passage even though transport agents made liberal offers to ships on
1. PRO, AD}!/108/19, 29 Dec. 1796.
2. PRO, ADM/108/43, 4 Jan. 1797.
3. PRO, ADM/i/3732, 13 Dec. 1796.
4. Ibid., 3 Jan. 1797.
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freight.1
The contingent that embarked in England. arrived at the Tagu.s
on 11 February and. 9 March respectively. 2 The 2,000 British troops
wider General Charles Stuart, who were to join them in the Tagus on
27 June 1797, were already in the Mediterranean and. had transports
at their disposal. They were the second battalion of the Royal
Scots, plus the original Corsica garrison (the 50th and. 51st regiments)
which moved. to Elba and then to Gibraltar when the Mediterranean was
evacuated..4
The troops disembarked. on 27 and. 28 June; and. as many
transports as could. be spared. sailed. to England. in August. This
force of 5,000 remained around. Lisbon for little more than a year
during which time there were frequent alarms of a French and. Spanish
invasion. In September 1798, the 51st regiment was sent to the East
Indies and. the others joined General Stuart in an attack on Minorca.
The attack on Minorca was launched in October from Gibraltar
where Stuart's force was supplemented. by four Gibraltar regiments.
When the Mediterranean had been evacuated. Gibraltar remained a British
stronghold at the entrance to that sea and. accommodated. the garrisons
from Corsica and. Elba. From the beginning of the war the transport
1. PRO, ADM/108/42, 26 Dec. 1796; PRO, ADW1O8/43, 4 Jan. 1797.
2. PRO, ADM/108/44, 11'Feb. 1797; 5 April 1797.
3. PRO, ADW1O8/47, 20 July 1797.
4. PRO, ADMJ1/4330, 22 Feb; 29 Sept. 1793; ADM/1/3734, 3 May 1797;
ADM/108/47, 26 June 1797.
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and.service was conveying regiments and. recruits to that station; 1
on several occasions transported Gibraltar regiments to the West
Indies. 2 Armed transports of 44 guns fitted. in the same manner as
a warship and. commanded. by officers of the same rank in the navy
were often used to transport troops to and. from Gibraltar. The 44
gun ships were under orders of the Transport Board; and the seamen
on board them received £4.O.O per month as board. whereas a naval
seaman received only £1.1O.O per month. 3 Once Spain became an
enemy there was no safety in conveying troops to Gibraltar except
in armed. ships on account of the Spanish row and gun boats at
A].geoiraa. Therefore, of the six armed transports in the transport
service in 1797 and 1798 at least three were appropriated to the
task of bringing troops to Gibraltar.4
There were enough vessels at Gibraltar to accommodate three
of the four Gibraltar regiments that were to go with Stuart. The
fourth was accommodated on board. four transports which had been
employed as watering vessels and. which had no cabins. As the station
at Gibraltar had the stores and. facilities available, the work of
fitting cabins into the ships was done there.5
1. E. g., ADM/1/3730, 21 Nov. 1795; ADN/1/415 8, 12 May, 6 July 1793.
2. K. g., ADM/1/4162, 25 Aug. 1794; w.o./1/268, 2 Aug. 1794;
18 March 1795.
3. SRO, GD51/7 69/1, Huskisson to Dundas, 11 Sept. 1798.
4. Ibid.
5. NIRS, Spencer, St. Vincent to Spencer, 26 Oct. 1798, vol. II, 485.
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Stuart and. his army sailed from Gibraltar on 21 October 1798.
In order to mask the object of the expedition "from the gossiping
inquisitive turn of every person in the garrison, without one single
exception," St. Vincent ordered sixteen months provisions to go with
the transports. 1 The object of the expedition was attained with the
aid. of St. Vincent's fleet when Minoroa was taken on 15 November 1798.
Earlier in May 1798 1,400 men of all ranks taken from the
Guards, several regiments and the artillery were sent to Ostend. inder
the command of Major General Coote to blow up the canal from Bruges
to Ostend. The purpose of this expedition was to interrupt the
internal navigation between Holland, Flanders and. France. Home
Popham, the naval commander on the expedition, had advised that
"transports oul7 not answer for so active a service which experience
adJ often proved." and. suggested that frigates be used instead.
About twelve frigates were employed each with its own flatboat for
disembarkation. 2 They left England on 14 May and anchored near
Ostend. five days later. After a BUCCeSsfUl bombardment on the 20th
the troops were not able to embark because of the shallowness of the
water. By the next morning the army was surrounded by the enemy
and Coote had. to capitulate. 3 The expedition was successful but the
ministry wondered whether the object gained was worth the loss of
1. NRZ, Spencer, St. Vincent to Spencer, 26 Oct. 1798, vol. II, 484.
2. GP, 1382 a-b; 1458, Popham to Grey; 1476 ; 1471.
3. PRO, W.O.1/177, Coote to Dundas, 20 May 1798; GP, 1476.
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so many troops.1
The diplomatic triumphs of the British government in the
second half of 1798 perhaps made up for the humiliation of Coote's
surrender. During the summer a military convention was signed with
Austria whereby Britain guaranteed to Austria 60,000 soldiers in
return for a promise of renewed operations against the French. Near
the end. of 1798 Russia signed a formal alliance with Britain promising
45, 000 men in return for an advance of £225,000 and. monthly subsidies
of £75,000. French aggressions in Rome and Switzerland as well as
Bonaparte's Erptian expedition had. aroused the fear of Austria and.
Russia and. contributed to the formation of the second coalition.
After 1798 with English naval supremacy firmly established a period
of offense is substituted for one of defense.
The British army returned to the Continent in considerable
strength when the expedition to North Holland was executed in the
autumn of 1799.
The expedition to the Held.er was stated by Dundas in the
House of Commons to have had. three definite objects. It was to act
as a diversion in favour of the Austrians and Russians in Switzerland
and. Suabia; to expel the French from the United Provinces and restore
the Stadtholder; and. to disarm the Dutch by the confiscation of their
Navy, thus preventing them from continuing to give assistance to the
2
French at sea.
1. Fortescue, op. cit., 589.
2, N1, Spencer, vol. II, 133.
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It was a combined British and. Russian military operation
with Britain supplying about 30,000 men and Russia about 16,000.
Sufficient transports had to be obtained for both (since the Russian
contingent could. not be moved without British troopships) at a time
when increasing commercial prosperity in Britain made it difficult for
the Transport Board to hire tonnage. The scarcity of shipping was
to delay the embarkation of the second and. third divisions of British
troops since they had to await the return of transports from the
Held.er. It also was to complicate the withdrawal of the forces from
Holland..
Preparations for the expedition to the Helder began in Britain
/
in June 1799. Earlier, Captain Home Pophazn had. been sent to Russia
to arrange about troops and. if possible to obtain ships to transport
some of these soldiers. By 13 June Tsar Paul had agreed to furnish
17 battalions. 1 A week later Popham was able to inform Spencer that
he also obtained from the Tsar 6 battleships, 3 large frigates and two
smaller ones and. two storeships as transports. He then undertook
to have them fitted at Cronstadt and. aimed to have the troops embarked.
by 20 Ju].y. 2,/ On 1 July Spencer informed. Popham that he was pleased.
with the progress that Popham had made so far and he added. "You are so
well aware of our difficulties here in respect of transports, that I
have no doubt of your continuing to use every possible exertion to
find a sufficient tonnage where you are; in the meantime we shall
1. NRS, Spencer, Pophain to Spencer, 13 June 1799, vol. III, 138.
2. Ibid., 20 June 1799, 139-40.
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send you some of our troopships which can best be spared both as a
part of the supply necessary for your purpose, and as a specimen of
the mode of fitting, which I hope will be imitated. by the Russian
government and if it is, the whole supply will be completed without
difficulty."1
Between 25 June and. 10 August Popham hired 11 ships with a
total tonnage of 4,203 tons in the Baltic to be used as -transports.2
In the autumn he hired four more neutral ships in the Baltic to
transport provisions to the Russian army, 3 though experience showed
that the hiring of neutral ships did. not prove economical for the
purposes of an expedition. The Hamburg ships hired by Popham to
send. foreign troops to the West Indies had involved the government in
immense expense and led to disappointment. Not one of those ships
went further than Portsmouth though many were hired. by the month and
according to their charter parties could have been sent anywhere.
The Baltic ships also proved a disappointment. They were procured
at a high price and there is evidence that at least four of them
would not go further than Yarmouth. William Huskisson, Under-Secretary-
of-State, writing of transporting troops from the Baltic, said:
1. NilS, Spencer, Spencer to Popham, 1 July 1799, 142. L*l.221,
2. PRO, 30/8/252, 3 Dec. 1799. T.1/831.
Six were hired for 4 months certain; five for 6 months certain.
3. PRO, P.1/825, 8 Feb. 1800.
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The Enpire of Russia does not possess a single transport
or merchant vessel. The Ships to be procured in the
Ports of Baltic go from England or other countries on
freight. To direct them from their commercial object
they must be given in addition to the price of transports
here, a premium calculated upon the probable loss of their
commercial speculation and if you succeed in this you
derange the general operations of a trade most essential
to the supplies and interests of this country.
He then wrote specifically - the Hamburg and Baltic ships that were
used in expeditions.
such ships (werg navigated and commanded by neutrals
(most of them enemies at bottom) who a7 no idea of
the service er7 under no subordination, and a7
nothing of the necessary activity, exertion or seaman-
ship for services of this description; These qualities
might perhaps be found in the Americans, but they am
not disposed or at liberty to engage in any such
services • 1
Huskisson noted that these observations about neutral ships
also applied to ships that might be hired and sent from the ports
of the Crimea and from the ports of Italy.
The Russian troops were embarked at Revel on board British
transports sent there in July and on board the ships Popham was able
to obtain in the Baltic. 2 The first division of Russians sailed
from Revel on 26 July and the second division followed eight days
later. Cruisers had been d.espatched to wait for them at the mouth
1. GP, 2252, Huskisson to Dundas, 30 Nov. 1799; see also, ADM/108/20,
30 Oct. 1799. The government paid the pilotage of the ships hired
by Popham in the Baltic. This was usually not paid to the owners
of British transports. ADM/108/66, 27 Feb. 1800. The freight
of the ships hired in Russia was also paid without the usual vouchers
required in cases of the hire of regular transports • Ibid.,
1 March 1800.
'a'
2. PRO/30/252, 3 Dec. 1799; LDM/1/3738, 29 July 1798.
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of the Baltic.1
The fact that Britaiu had to furnish tonnage to transport
many of the Russian forces from the Baltic greatly hindered, her
arrangements for conveying her own troops to the Helder. Du.nd.as
first applied to the Transport Board for tonnage for the expedition
on 28 June when he requested 20,000 tons of infantry transports to
be hired at 4 months certain, with a power reserved to the Board to
discharge them at the end of two, if it should be thought necessary.2
On 1 July Dundas asked for 400 tons for a hospital ship and 9 days
later a request was made for 16,000 tons for the cavalry. Later
he asked for 8,137 tons more for the conveyance of the infantry.
Dundas requested 44,537 tons in all for the expedition. However
subsequent applications for tonnage were made to the Transport Board
throughout July, August, September and October from the Ordnance
(25,071 tons), and victualling (4,830 tons) departments, as well as
from the Commissary (10,490 tons), the Quarter Master General
(669 tons) and the Inspector General of Hospitals (250 tons).
Altogether applications for a total of 85,847 tons were made to the
Transport Board in preparation for the expedition to the Helder.3
The first troopships were hired on 1 July and as soon as they
were ready they were sent to the Baltic for the conveyance of Russian
1. w.o.i/i82, f.245.
2. W.O.1/181, 28 June 1799.
3. W.o.i/182, f.303.
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soldiers.	 Smaller warships fitted for troops were also appropriated
for that service. By 4 July the Transport Board had at its disposal
10,984 tons of transports, 3,223 tons having just come from the West
Indies	 On 16 July the Transport Board requested the chairman of
the East India Company to lend. to the transport service for the
remainder of July, all of August and. September their ships on the
understanding that they would. not be sent on any service to the north-
ward. of the Firth of Forth or to the westward of the Kingdom of
Ireland. and that they would be discharged from the public service on
1 October. 3 To hire East India ships for a short haul to the
Continent was an unprecedented step in the history of the transport
service during this war; it showed. the lengths to which the Transport
Board went to obtain tonnage during the great commercial prosperity
of 1799.
The East India Company complied. with the Board's request and
by 23 July the transport service had 42,400 tons of transports at
its disposal.4 The Board wrote to Dund.ae three days earlier that
they "never saw more exertion and good conduct then is now used. at
Deptford by Captain Rains and Mr. Boyce." 5
 1,000 tons of shipping
was ordered home from Lisbon at this time aththe Transport Office
was making use of warships and. revenue vessels. 6 26 warships
1. W.o.i/i8i, 2 July 1799.
2. Ibid., 4 July 1799.
3. Ibid., f.151.
4. Ibid., 23 July 1799.
5. Ibid., 20 July 1799.
6. Ibid., f.200.
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accommodating 10,950 men were employed by the Transport Board. On
no previous expedition had so many warships been used.. 1
Among the War Office papers is found. this exposition of the
meticulous preparation that went into the expedition of 1799.
The smallest circumstance of delay beyond. the time
appointed, even in a single transport, or in any
other branch, was constantly and. minutely enquired
into, so that every executive department was left
constantly upon the Q.ui Vivre - and. it is but justice
to them to declare they were able as often as called.
upon to account2 for any such event in the most satis-
factory manner.
And. on 20 August 1799 commissioner George communicated to
the Board particulars of a conversation he had with Dundas on the
subject of the Helcier expedition in which conversation the secretary
of state, in the presence of Lord. Spencer, expressed. his full satis-
faction at the conduct of the Transport Board, on the occasion and
said. "that everything, which depended. upon this Board., had been
accomplished."3
Abercromby went to Woolwich in June to observe at first hand.
the preparations being made by the Board of Ordnance for the expedi-
tion. Having commanded. many expeditions in this war he knew only
too well the failure of the Ordnance Board. to supply sufficient
ordnance stores and. artillery to the field. of battle. He also knew
the reputation of the Ordnance Board for failing to keep to time
1. PRO, 30/8/252, 5 Dec. 1799.
2. PRO, W.o.1/182, f.40-1.
3. PRO, .LD}1/1o8/62, 20 Aug. 1799.
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schedules • 1
Aberoroinby was also aware of the difficulty there would be
in landing the troops. The island. of Waicheren was small and flat
and. at that season of the year every movement was easily observed.
Therefore, the disembarkation could only be effected with support
from the fleet. Aberoromby made sure that Admiral Mitchell who was
to command the squadron co-operating with the army was given explicit
instructions on this head,2
Near the end of July Abercromby's troops assembled at Barham
Downs and then marched in different columns towards Deal, Rains gate
and. Margate for the embarkation on board transports and warships.
There were 59 infantry ships fitted at a ton and a half per man
and victualled for one month, (However according to Treasury records
the period for which provisions had. been provided was five weeks.)
18 cavalry ships, 26 ordnance ships, 2 ships belonging to the Quarter
Master General and one hospital ship. 3 With warships, some of which
carried, infantry, the entire fleet consisted of 175 sail. 4 The
troops were embarked by 9 August and. when the wind was favourable on
the 13th the whole fleet put to sea. The sailing had been delayed
1. NRS, Spencer, Abercromby to Dunclas, 21 June 1799, vol. III, 140-1.
The greater part of the ordnance stores were prepared at the tower
and at Woolwich.
2. For these instructions see: NBS, Spencer, Admiralty to Mitchell,
August 1799, vol. III, 145-6, 148.
3. PRO/30/8/252, 3 Dec. 1799.
4. GP, 2250a; PRO, W.O.1/182, F.227.
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by a shortage of troops (on 1 August Abercromby's force had. still
been slx)rt of its estimated strength of 20,000);1 and by a scarcity
of tonnage for viotuallers and. commissary stores; no victuallers
sailed with this first division. Sir John Moore who sailed with the
first division to the Helder has this note in his diary. "The
expedition has undoubtedly been hurried beyond reason, but the
country having been put -to the expense of assembling it, it is
necessary that we should be sent to attempt something. We are
now upon a voyage of adventure."2 By 18 August the fleet was off
the Texel and. was waiting for a change of wind. before it could do
anything. The troops had been on board twelve days and. nearly half
their supplies had been consumed. 3 It was not until the 27th that
the army was able to disembark about 6 miles auth of the Held.er.
The disembarkation was performed. with difficulty and confusion
because enough flatboats had not been provided. The army had to be
rowed ashore in the boats of the warships which could not carry more
than 3., 000 troops in one wave. 4 Battalions were intermixed. and. had
to be rearranged. when on shore. In February 1800 the Transport Board
questioned Captain Patton (the transport agent at Portsmouth) about
this negligence.5
1. PRO, w.o.i/18i, f. 285.
2. Moore, op. cit., 340.
3. PRO, 1.1/825, 24 Jan. 1800.
4. GP, 2250a; see also; Fortescue, op. cit., 651.
5. PRO, .ADI4/108/66, 12 Feb. 1800.
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The boisterous weather which affected the arrival of the
British and. the Russian troops gave the enemy an opportunity to
collect a force sufficient to impede the advance of Abercromby'e
first division and by that means also gave the French time to bring
up powerful reinforcements which ultimately were able to defeat the
Anglo—Russian army. 1 The fleet was blown off the Texel on 21
August by a storm and the lack of its support immediately destroyed
any change of the army obtaining control of North Holland.
The army was immediately attacked upon landing but neverthe-
less took possession of the Helder on the evening of the 28th. 2 On
the 30th warships pursued -the Dutch fleet up the Zuyder Sea and. by
evening -the Dutch Admiral Story had surrendered to the British.3
Thus, the first phase of the expedition was a great and speedy
success. Meanwhile part of the second division, about 5,000 men,
under command of General Don arrived on 28 August. They sailed
from England. three days before on board 12 infantry and 3 cavalry
ships. On 2 September the army moved forward and were reinforced
on the 4th by the arrival of the rest of the second division, the 11th
light dragoons, on board 20 cavalry ships. 4 With these reinforcements
the army was successful in repulsing three separate attacks of the
enemy; but the commanders would not begin the offensive until the
third division arrived. The third division which consisted of most
1. PRO, w.o.1/182, f.64.
2. PRO, W.O.1/179, Aberoromby to Dundas, 28 Aug. 1799.
3. GP, 2250a.
4. PRO/30/8/252, 3 Dec. 1799; GP, 2250a.
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of the cavalry on board 29 ships, as well as more infantry on board
11 ships sailed with -the Duke of York from England on the 11th and.
13th September; and. arrived in Holland between the 12th and 15th.
They had waited at Barhan Downs for the transports of the first
division to return from Holland to take them to the Helder, On
11 September Abercromby, anxious for the third division to arrive,
had written to Dundas. "What a saving would. it make! If you
had. twenty 44 gun ships to act as transports. They would carry
10,000 men with their artillery and baggage." 1 So many army
commanders would have been pleased if the navy had an excess of war-.
ships to be used as transports during the war against revolutionary
France. On the 14th part of the first division of Russians number--
ing about 7,000 men arrived, 2 and. two days later more Russian'troops
came bringing their contingent to 12,000 men.3
The Zype afforded not the smallest shelter for the troops
whose camp equipage had been left behind. for want of means of con-
veyance. In fact many necessary articles had. been left behind
because of the scarcity of tonnage and in the haste to despatch
troops from England.4 The army could. not rely on the Dutch who
offered very little assistance in providing horses and waggons.5
There was difficulty also in sending provisions and. supplies forward
1. GP, 201o, Abercromby to Dundas, 11 Sept. 1799.
2. GP, 22051; PRO, 11.0.1/180, 13 Sept. 1799.
3. PRO, 11.0.1/180, 16 Sept. 1799.
4. PRO, W.0.1/182, f.243.
5. Ibid., f.249.
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due to the interrupted navigation of the Zuyder Sea. This impeded
the offensive campaign of the Anglo-Russian army which began on 19
September. On that day Aberoromby met with success at Hoorn; but
the Russians retreated miserably from Bergen and the moral success
of the day went to the French.1
On 24 September Abercromby's invading forces received assist-
ance when more troops arrived including 3,000 to 4,000 Russians.2
The army was again in a situation to move at the end of September
and they moved toward Bergen. However the Russians were soon
surrounded and lost about 3,000 men. 3 During the next week the British
tried unsuccessfully to drive in the French outposts. The uncommon
bad weather, roads, canals, and bridges made it impossible -to proceed.
This plus the "bad conduct of the Russians on every occasion" as well
as the lack of assistance offered by the people of Holland themselves,
decided the British to abandon the campaign.4 On 18 October a capitu-
lation was agreed upon between Britain and France whereby 8,000 French
and Dutch prisoners in England were yielded up to the French but the
Dutch fleet was left in the hands of the British. Abercromby was
given to the 30th of November to remove his army.5
1. Fortescue, op. cit., 676-681; PRO, W.o.1/182, f.267, 280.
2. Fortescue, op. cit., 682; PRO, W.o.i/i80, 25 Sept. 1799.
3. GP, 2250a.
4. Ibid.; PRO, W.O.i/180, Duke of York to Dundas, 20 Oct. 1799;
see also, E. Walsh. A Narrative of the Expedition to Holland in
the Autumn of the year 1799 (London, 1800), 93-4.
5. Fortescue, op. cit., 700; GP, 2250a.
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The evacuation of the allied army from Holland. presented
a new set of problems to the Transport Board for there was a deficiency
of tonnage at the Texel. On 12 October Pophazn informed Huskisson
that there were 126 sail of transports at the Helder; that he was
then embarking the wounded which would take up all 28 infantry ships
and. that no other ship was unappropriated. 1 By 17 October it was
decided to accommodate about 8,000 soldiers on board cavalry ships
that had. between decks. By 21 October about 11,000 more were
accommodated on board the warships under the command of Vice Admiral
Mitchell, the Russian squadron under Admiral Breyer, the Dortrechi,
Trusty, Brakel and Roebuck troopships, and 24 ordnance store ships.
1,500 horses were able to be transported on board the cavalry ships
that had no between decks. Independent of these means at least
1,500 British and Russian wounded. and sick together with all -the
Dutch under the Prince of Orange had been accommodated. By 21
October there were no ships available at the Texel for transporting
the remainder of the British and Russian forces, about 25,000 soldiers
2
and. 1,000 horses.	 Using every exertion at home, the Transport
Board was able to send 51 sail of transports. They arrived at the
Helder on 29 October and the whole force was embarked by the appointed
day. 3 The captured Dutch fleet was the one gain from the expedition
1. NRS, Spencer, Popham to Spencer, 17 Oct. 1799, vol. III, 205-6.
2. PRO, W.o.i/18o, Duke of York to Dund.as, 21 Oct. 1799.
3. Ibid., 30 Oct. 1799.
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of 1799 which had been projected on a great scale and from which
great results had been anticipated. 1
 Though the Helder enterprise
was not a success militarily it was a tremendous transport achieve-
ment. 46,000 troops were successfully brought from England and the
Baltic to the shores of North Holland.. Warships accommodated more
than 10,000 men and. transports adeptly made three successive trips
to the Continent with troops. It is impressive that the Transport,
Board in less than three months collected and equipped over 90,000
tons of shipping for the transport, ordnance and victualling services
of this extensive military operation. This could not have been done
without the services of the East India Company and without the Board's
refusal to allow the ships already in the employ of the transport
service to leave.
In December 1799, when the Helder operation was over and when
preparations for the next campaign were being discussed and put under
way, Dundas asked to be relieved of his position. In his opinion
there was little use of a separate War department for several reasons.
A commander in chief had been established at the head of the army,
with authority and confidence adequate to the situation; 2 all the
foreign possessions of Britain's enemies were subdued; and England's
distant and colonial possessions were in a state of safety and tran-
quility; the internal defence of the kingdom was amply provided for
and a large and efficient army was in the process of being collected
1. The cost of the transport service for the expedition to Holland
was £465,335.19. PRO, W.o.1/182, 30 Nov. 1799.
2. Since the evacuation of the Continent in 1795 the quality of the
army had been much improved by the Duke of York's administration.
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adequate to every exigency. 1 Pitt did. not acquiesce, however,
and Dund.as remained as Secretary of State for War until February
1801 when he resigned with Pitt on the Catholic question.
While the Helder expedition was in progress Pitt was already
discussing with Spencer the tonnage requirements for the next cam-
paign, an invasion of France with the intention of attacking Brest
and. finally destroying the naval power of the Republic. 2
 Again it
would be a combined operation of British and. Russian forces with over
70,000 troops taking part. The Brest project continued to be dis-
cussed between Pitt, Spencer and Dundas and. in December preparations
were begun. It was soon discovered however that the maritime
resources of Britain were not adequate for transporting such a large
body of men, (the maritime resources of Britain had been stretched
to the limit for the Helder operation) and. in January 1800 the pro-
ject was dropped. An investigation into the plans for this abortive
project revealed the difficulties of obtaining transports in Britain
in 1799 and early 1800 and of procuring shipping in foreign ports.
For this military operation the ministry had to be assured
that the means were available for transporting at once from Britain
and Ireland. a British army of between 50,000 and. 60,000 men with a
proportionate corps of cavalry, officers, horses, draught horses for
artillery, commissariat etc., together with the necessary supply of
1. Add. )ISS., 40,100, Dundas to George III, f. 241-2, printed Aspinall,
George III, vol. III, 303-4. (no. 2087).
2. NIB, Spencer, Dundas to Spencer, 5 Sept. 1799, vol. III, 126.
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ordnance, and every other requirement for active operations by an
army of this size.
The Transport Board had at its disposal enough armed trans-
ports to accommodate 16,000 men. This could. be easily increased
to accommodate 25,000 men. 1 To transport the remainder of the army
100,000 tons of British shipping would have to be diverted from normal
commercial activity. The ordinary services of the Victualling Board
and other departments would require at least 60,000 tons more; and
for carrying on the service of such an army, and for the other opera-
tions in contemplation, this would. have to be increased to 100,000
tons at least.2
The Russian forces would also have to be transported.
Experience showed that Britain could not supplement her transport
tonnage with neutral vessels; they were expensive, difficult to
procure and. only led to disappointment. Even with part of the
captured Dutch fleet which was in the process of being fitted out
as transports the ministry found the difficulties of obtaining
tonnage insurmountable and the proposal to attack Brest had to be
abandoned.3
It should be noted that Sir Charles Grey had a very unfavour-.
able opinion of the project even if the tonnage was available. It
1. GP, 2252, Huskisson to Dundas, 30 Nov. 1799.
2. Ibid.
3. NRS, Spencer, Spencer to Dundas, 26 Dec. 1799, vol. III, 209-10.
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was his opinion that the strength of the post was underestimated
and that the French Chouans, who were to assist the invaders, could
not be relied on.1
With the Brest project abandoned the remaining major under -
taking was Abercromby's expedition to Egypt in 1801. In the meazitimethe
Transport Board was engaged in conveying to the Baltic the Russian
forces stationed on the Channel Islands ever since the disappointing
Helder expedition; in sending in May, June and July 1800 reinforce-
ments to the army stationed in the Med.iterranean 2 (This is the army
that would go with Abercromby to Egypt.); and. in transporting a small
expedition (about 6,000 men) to Bellisle in May and June 1800 to
assist the Royalist insurgents. The maritime resources of Britain
were equal to these services. Tonnage difficulties arose only when
a large expedition was in operation. At no time during 1800 was
there a scarcity of shipping. In fact in the spring of 1800 trans-
ports in the Mediterranean were discharged, from service provided they
loaded, with cargoes of wheat for England.3
The Russian soldiers who fought with the British in the
caznpaign in North Holland had been stationed in the Channel Islands
ever since the evacuation of that country. After the proposal to
1. NRS, Spencer, Pitt to Dundas, 11 Jan. 1800, 130.
	
/.J2l'
2. E. g., PRO, ADM/108/67, 10; 20; 26; 30 May 1800; 30 June;
17 July 1800.
3. N!4N, Keiith/I/24, 29 April 1800; see also Keith 9281/1,
Transport Office to Keith, 8 March 1800, f.143-4.
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attack Brest was abandoned Britain had to begin operations to
transport the Russians home.
In May and June 1800 preparations were made to embark the
Russian troops on board British transports and. on board Russian
warships. 1 The Russians who sailed home on board their own war-
ships were brought from the Channel Islands to England in small
British transports in order to be re—embarked. 2 The British
transports on this service were fitted at the rate of three men to
four tons and victualled for three weeks full allowance of provisions
and. water; since it was a very short passage a blanket and pillow
instead of a bed was put on board for each soldier.3 All of them
were trans—shipped by their own boats from the transports to their
own warships.4
On the other haM the Russians who were accommodated on
board English transports for their journey home were embarked at
the Channel Is lands on board these ships which then proceeded under
convoy of a Russian frigate directly to their destination. They
were fitted also at the rate of three men to four tons, but were
victualled for one month at whole allowance; 5 a bed was fitted in
for each soldier. The first division of Russians (6,000 men) were
1. E. g., PRO, .ADM/108/67, 10 May; 13 June 1800; PRO, ADM/1/3739,
21 May; 10; 20 June 1800.
2. E. g., PRO, .ADM/108/67, 5; 13 June 1800; PRO, ADW1/3739,
14; 28 June 1800.
3. PRO, ADM/108/67, 5 June 1800.
4. Ibid., 13 June 1800.
5. Ibid., 20 June 1800.
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embarked at Guernsey and Jersey on board British transports under
the command of transport agent, Lieutenant Norris and sailed on
18 July under convoy of the Riga and. Constantine Russian frigates.1
An odd. episode followed their disembarkation at Cronstadt on 17
August.2
Because of the reports of ill—treatment of Russian soldiers
while in the service of Britain, the British transports were seized
on 5 September and their masters and crew imprisoned by the Tsar's
order. Lieutenant Norris informed the Transport Office that the
ships' hatches were all sealed up, a guard put on board, and their
colours struck. Four rooms were prepared. for the masters of
transports, about forty in number. On 12 September the ships and
seamen were liberated when the Tsar was satisfied that the reports
of ill—treatment were only rumours. After fitting out the regular
transports for the homeward voyage, Lieutenant Norris returned to
Deptford by the first convoy.3
The British army in the Mediterranean in April 1800 totalled.
over 10,900 men. There were over 3,500 at Gibraltar, over 6,000 at
Minorca (Charles Stuart's army that took the island in 1798), and
about 1,360 at Malta.4 The force at Minorca was soon increased when
5,000 troops under Major General Pigot arrived in May. 5 Abercromby,
1 • pRO, ADM/1 08/67, 18 July 1800.
2. PRO, ADM/1/3740, 22 Oct. 1800.
3. PRO, ADM/1/3740, Lieutenant Norris to the Transport Board, 19 Oct.
1800.
4. Pao, w.o./1/289, 21 April 1800, f.65.
5. see Nt, Melville }$. 3601, McNair to Graham, 18 May 1800, f.216.
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who shortly before had become commander in chief of all the forces
in the Mediterranean, arrived at Gibraltar in June and sailed to
Miriorca and. Malta during that month and. in July. In late July the
garrison at Minorca was increased once more by six battalions
(6,000 men) taken from under the command of General Maitland, the
commander of the expedition to Bellisle. That expedition was
launched in May and. June and abandoned before a landing ever took
place, Dundas having decided the troops could be better employed
elsewhere,
In August Abercromby's new set of instructions directed him
to dissuade the Russian commanders from landing on Malta and. impress
on the inhabitants of Malta the advantage of a British connection.
He was also instructed to attack Ferrol, Vigo and. Cadiz and destroy
the Spanish naval forces and. arsenals, To assist Aberoromby's
attack upon the Spanish ports, reinforcements amounting to about
11,000 men were sent under command of Sir James Pu.lteney.
	 The
Transport Board had no difficulty obtaining tonnage for this service.
Pulteney and his forces assisted by a naval squadron under Sir John
Warren, detached from St. Vincent's fleet, appeared before Ferrol
on 25 August. The next day after a landing and a skirmish they
were re-embarked and the attack upon Ferrol abandoned. The
garrison had. proved too strong; Pulteney was to receive much abuse
at home because of this withdrawal. After re-embarking his troops
he sailed to Gibraltar where he met Aberoromby with a force of 10,000
1. PRO, ADM/1/3740, 30 July 1800.
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men from Minorca. The combined forces of Abercromby and. Pulteney
joined by Lord Keith's fleet sailed for Cadiz the first week of
October. The attack upon this Spanish port also was soon abandoned;
but this time because of plague which swept the city and because of
the violent weather which made it almost impossible for the fleet
to be of any assistance. Meanwhile Malta had fallen on 5 September1
after a blockade of 12 months. This was the one substantial gain
of the British campaign in the Mediterranean in 1800.2
The force that Aberoromby took with him to Erpt in 1801
was already in the Mediterranean on transports in 1800. He brought
with him 15,000 of the 20,000 troops then on foreign service. 3 All
the troopships that the Transport Board had. at the time were
accommodating these men. 4
 The expedition, when it was finally
assembled. in the eastern Mediterranean, consisted of 14,144 infantry,
1,063 cavalry and. 630 artillery in 138 ships of all types. It was
ill-equipped without wagons, lathing craft, interpreters or even a
good map. And it was in a very poor state of morale due to the
1. PRo, w.o.1/292, 5 Sept. 1800.
2. Fortescue, op. cit., 769-798. In June 1798 the Knights of St. John
had. surrendered the island of Malta to Bonaparte on his way to Egypt.
3. In October 1800 the other 5,000 were first ordered. to Lisbon with
Pulteney; then all but one battalion was ordered. home to preserve
order in igland and Ireland, where the failure of the harvest for
the second year in succession was causing a disturbance. The one
battalion was sent on to Minorca. Fortescue, op. cit., 806;
Add.. 1153., 40102 3 Oct. 1800, f. 87.
4. NL., Melville 1155. 1075, Sept. 1800, f. 110.
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successive failures in Holland, at Ferrol and. Cadiz, 1 not to mention
the fact that most of the troops had been serving in the Mediterranean
for at least one year and. part of that time on board transports. On
16 February 1801 Abercromby was to write from Marmaras Bay, on the
coast of Asia Minor: "I never went on any service entertaining
graver doubts of success, at the same time with more determination
to encounter difficulties. The Dutch expedition was walking on
velvet in comparison with this."2
The plans for sending a British force to expel the French
from E&ypt were finally formulated in September 1800 and. the joint
commanders in chief, Sir Ralph Abercromby and. Admiral	 Keith
were given their instructions in October. 3 Keith, who also acted
as principal agent for transports on this expedition, was to concert
with Abercromby on the best mode of conveying the army to Ezypt.
They were to select those troopships and. coppered. transports that
would be best adopted. to the service, keeping in mind the advanced.
season of the year and the prospect of boisterous weather particularly
on their reaching the coast of Egypt. Those ships selected were to
be supplied. with as much stores and. provisions as they could possibly
contain. The warships were to assist in the conveyance of troops and.
1. NRS, Keith, vol. II, 228.
2. James Lord Dunfermline. Lieutenant-General Sir Ralph Abercromby K.B.
1793-1801, A Memoir by his Son.(Edinburgh, iB6i), 267; see also,
N1S, Keith, vol. II, 229.
3. For extracts from the instruction from Dundas to Abercromby and. from
the Admiralty to Keith see: NRS, Keith, vol. II, 6 Oct. 1800,
240-3. For instructions to Aberoromby see also: GD51/774/20,
6 Oct. 1800.
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stores as far as might be in their power. 1
 The commanders were to
receive from Sir Sydney Smith, commanding in the Levant, 2
 any informa-.
tion conceruing the enemy or for adjusting with the officer commanding
the Turkish troops the plan of operations.3
A short time before Keith and. Abercromby received their
instructions Captain Popham was appointed to H.LS. Romney, in
command. of a small squadron which was to carry troops from the
Cape of Good Hope and. from India up the Red Sea, to co—operate with
the army in Egypt.4
 A force of 4,000 to 5,000 men under Major
General Baird was to be sent from India, to take possession of all
the ports and. coast of the Red Sea which were then occupied by the
French army. 5
 In October 1800, the Admiralty was requested to fit
out a warship and three armed troopships for the conveyance of 800
men of the 65th regiment to go on the service with Pophaxn. Popham
went to the Cape of Good Hope, there disembarked the 65th regiment,
received on board. the 61st and then proceeded to the Red Sea.6
Keith, as transport agent for the expedition, chose the
principal agent for transports at Gibraltar, Captain Young, to be
assistant captain of the fleet because Young was so familiar with the
1. SRO, GD51/774/19, Dundas to Abercromby, 6 Oct. 1800.
2. On 3 March 1799 Captain Sydney Smith had taken over the small squadron
which had remained. after the Nile in Egyptian waters.
3. NBS, Keith, Admiralty to Keith, 6 Oct. 1800, vol. II, 241.
4. NRS, Spencer, Spencer to Dund.as, 28 Sept. 1800, vol. IV, 128-31. For
a more detailed descriDtion of Popham's instructions see:
NRS, Keith, vol. II, 248-9.
5. NRS, Keith, Dundas to Abercromby, 6 Oct. 1800, vol. II, 243.
6. Thid., Ldmiralty to Popham, 1 Nov. 1800, 248.
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transport service and. had been so much accustomed to embark and.
disembark troops. 1
 Abercromby informed Keith that he expected
him to feed. the army and. supply them while on board, and. even after-
wards, eventually to furnish small vessels for attending on the
different departments, and landing or embarking men and. stores and
many other objects Keith was totally unprovid.ed for. Keith was
surprised the responsibility for transports fell on him but en-
deavoured to accomplish all that Abercromby asked.2
Many of the troopships having been in the Mediterranean
since 1799 and others since 1800 were unfit for service and needed
overhauling. Some of them went to Minorca and others to Malta in
order that repairs could be done faster; while the ships were under
repair the troops were landed and. refreshed. 3
 The troops on board
these transports were ill—clothed and some did not receive new
clothing until the expedition was over. For example, General McNair
at Minorca and later at La Villelle waited for clothing for his troops
from May 1800 to January 1802.
	 The men also were so long embarked
1. On 12 Feb. 1801 the Admiralty informed. Keith that the appointment
of Captain Young from the transport service to be assistant captain
of the fleet was irregular and. could not be confirmed; but that if
Keith thought fit to employ Young in the capacity of agent for
transports he would be paid accordingly. NRS, Keith, Keith to
Admiralty, 10 June 1801, vol. II, 317.
2. NRS, Keith, Keith to Admiralty, 11 Nov. 1800, vol. II, 252.
3. PRO, W.O.1/344, Abercromby to Dundas, 10 Dec. 1800; SRO, GD51/774/30,
Abercromby to Dundas, 13 Dec. 1800.
4. NLS, )IZ. 3601, MoNair to Graham, 26 May 1800, f. 276-7;
MS. 3604, McNair to Graham, 14 Jan. 1802, f. 116.
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on transports fitted out for a short haul, that is, at one and. one
half tons per man that sickness prevailed among them though there
was no consi&erable mortality.1
During preparations in October and. November Keith conjured
up a supply system from the meagre resources of the Mediterranean
and looked forward. to further supplies being received from England
2
and from the Turkish magazines.
Aberoromby and Keith were supposed to rendezvous first at
Mahon, then at Malta, and afterwards at Rhodes, at which port they
were to find Sir Sydney Smith with whom their future operations were
to be concerted. 3
 Smith was the officer most knowledgeable about the
coast of Egypt, about the countries in the Levant, about whom to
trust, where to get supplies, transports, small vessels etc. The
navy was short of small vessels having only four cutters at Gibraltar;
in October Keith requested some from the Admiralty because the
shallowness of the water near Erpt would prevent the large ships
from approaching in winter nearer than six miles. 4 On 19 November
1800 Sydney Smith answered several queries of Abercromby about these
topics and the General abided by Smith's advice throughout the expedi-
tion. Abercromby was particularly interested in procuring 10,000
tons of shipping for the transport of horses, stores and provisions
1. PRO, W.0.1/344, Abercromby to Dundas, 2 Nov. 1800.
2. See below, pp. 304-5.
3. NRS, Keith, Keith to Admiralty, 27 Oct. 1800, vol. II, 244-5.
4. Ibid.
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and for assisting in the debarkation of the troops. Smith
answered that the captain Pasha could alone furnish the necessary
number of transports as Governor General of the Coasts and. island
of the archipelago. Smyrna, Rhodes and Constantinople were the best
places where they could be fitted with the least delay; Hydros would
furnish the best transport to hire. It is interesting that for de-
barkation purposes Smith said that the small vessels of Egypt, such
as germs, kirlangitches, and. kaike, should be seized for they were
absolutely necessary. It was also necessary that they have a port
on the coast secured. to them in the first instant or the first gale
of wind would drive them all on shore.1
At the end of November Keith's fleet and Abercromby's force
were collected at Malta. Repairing transports and collecting
provisions and stores delayed the sailing of the expedition; then
it was held up because of unfavourable winds. 2
 It finally put to
sea on 20 December and anchored in Marmaras Bay on the coast of Asia
Minor on 29 and 30 December. 3
 At Marmaras Bay Aberoromby hoped to
procure horses for the service of his artillery, as well as for the
remounting of the dragoons who were expected from Lisbon (the 12th
and 26th regiments of dragoons arrived from Lisbon by 24 January
1801); and. hire vessels for their conveyance to the coast of Egypt.
With much difficulty he mounted 400 cavalry and procured. for the
artillery about 150 horses. 180 were purchased in the neighbourhood
1. NRS, Keith, Queries proposed to Smith at the request of Sir R.
Abercromby, 19 Nov. 1800, vol. II, 249-50.
2. Add.. 1153. 40102, 21 Nov. 1800, f. 92; SRO, GD5I/774/3 2 , Abercromby
to Dundas, 20 Dec. 1800.
3. The senior Naval officer left in charge of the western Mediterranean
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of Marmaras Bay and were "tolerable;" the rest were bought by Lord
Elgin1
 by contract at Constantinople and were "generally of the worst
kind." 500 mules were contracted for at Smyrna as well as transports
2for the horses.	 The transports and mules hired at Smyrna did. not
arrive until the middle of February and. without -them the army could
not move.3
Much to Abercromby's and Keith's disappointment the Turks
were very backward in giving assistance whether from the intrigues
of -the Russians, or because it was their religious season, the period
of Ramadan. The Turkish gunboats at Rhodes were not manned or fit
for sea and provisions had not been procured. Keith sent agents
to ports in Asia Minor to procure provisions and. to Cyprus to bring
back such small vessels as could be found. there. By 11 February
Keith was well provided with small vessels for the navigation of the
coast but he still lacked germs which would be required for the
navigation of the Nile when that river was open to the British troops.
Since the Grand Vizir had promised Keith twelve germs, the Admiral
informed him on 11 February that he was depending on his assistance
on that important point. 4
 The Grand Vizir, however, never fulfilled
his promise and germs had to be confiscated from the Egyptians.5
when Keith sailed east was Sir John Borlase Warren in command of
3 line of battle ships and 2 frigates off Cadiz. •NRS, Keith,
vol. II, 361.
1 • Lord Elgin was Ambassador to Constantinople at the -time.
2. GD51/774/37, Abercromby -to Dundas, 16 Jan. i8oi.
3. Fortescue, op. cit., 811.
4. NRS, Keith, Keith to Admiralty, 21 Jan. 1801, vol. II, 259-60;
Ibid., Keith to Abercromby, 11 Feb. 1801, 262-3.
5. Ibid., Cochrane to Keith, 10 March 1801, 273.
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At Marmaras Bay Abercromby informed Keith that he would
relr on him for the army's supplies of provisions, artillery, aznmuni-
tion and. stores of all descriptions when the army debarked. at Aboukir
Bay.
With your aid. everything will go on well; without it,
-the business must stand. still. I ask for no stipulated.
assistance: let the necessity of the service determine
it; such has been the nile in all combined expeditions
during the war, even to the extent of half of each ship's
company. At Martinique Lord St. Vincent carried up and.
supplied. with ammunition seventy heavy pieces of ordnance,
and. where I have been concerned myself I have only had. to
say what I wanted. I do asure your lordship -that I shall
make no unnecessary demands.
Keith replied that he would. comply with Abercromby's wishes
to -the greatest possible extent, while it can be consist-
ent with the safety of the ships committed to my care.
I am unacquainted with -the proceedings at Martinique;
but they can beare no analogy to what can be done in this
country, where the ships must anchor on a dangerous coast
till the port of Alexandria is opened for their reception.
No dependence is to be placed. on men except from the ships
of war; and I enclose a state of their strength, to show
your Excellency how low they will be reduced by the
necessary employment of that part of their complements
intended to co-operate with the army. The crews of the
troopships are so short, and. their anchors and cables so
heavy in proportion to their strength, that Your Excellency
must be sensible, when their boats are employed. in trans-
porting provisions, water etc. few, or no men, can be
drawn from them; and. from the transports and viotuallers,
nothing more can be expected. than crews for their long
boats, and others to tow them after which many of them will
not have four men left on board. Any greater supply of
seamen than the number specified cannot with certainty be
depended. upon; but Your Excellency may rest perfectly
assured that it shall be considerable as circumstances will
warrant, for I never was employed on any service which more
anxiously occupied. my mind, or which2 I more ardently wished
to see brought to a desirable issue.
1. NRS, Keith, Aberoromby to Keith, 4 Feb. 1801, vol. II, 262.
2. Ibid., Keith to Abercromby, 262-3.
269
After a stay of 53 days in Marmaras Bay the expedition
sailed for Alexandria on 22 and 23 February and reached Aboukir Bay
on 2 March. Because of the prevalence of strong westerly gales
the Turkish gunboats and caiques went to Macri and. Cyprus. A
succession of northerly gales, attended by a heavy swell made it
impossible for Abercromby's forces to disembark before the 8th.
There were only enough small boats to land 6,000 men at one time;
they were debarked from flatboats, cutters arid. launches under
heavy enemy fire. 1
 After the first landing was made the boats
returned without delay for the second division; and. before the
evening of the 8th the whole army with few exceptions, was landed
together with the most urgent articles of provisions and other stores.2
During and after the debarkation 6,000 men from the ships were em-
ployed night and day in the service of the army; they underwent
great fatigue especially since some of the ships were seven miles
from the shore because of the shallowness of the water. Uncommonly
bad weather followed the debarkation and it was the 11th before horses
and supplies could be landed. "If we are successful" Keith wrote,
"it has been owing to our nation; we have not a Turkish flag in the
Bay and have been disappointed in every request we made and every
promise made by that government."3
1. NRS, Keith, vol. II, 231.
2. Ibid., leith to Admiralty, 10 March 1801, 274..5.
The seamen and marines who were landed with the troops in Erpt
became part of the army. NES, Keith, Keith to Coote, 22 June
1801, vol. II, 322.
3. NRS, Spencer, Keith to Spencer, 11 March 1801, vol. IV, 148-9.
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Abercromby praised the navy's assistance in the landing of
the troops and supplies when he wrote to Dundas saying, "The Honor-
able Captain Cochrane, those other captains and. officers of the Royal
Navy who were entrusted with the disembarkation, not only of the
troops, but of the artillery, ammunition, provisions and. stores of
all kinds, have exerted themselves in such a manner as to claim the
warmest acknowledgements of the whole army."1 Nevertheless,
Abercromby's troops, whose strength was weakened after being on
board transports for several months, had. to drag up artillery,
supplies and provisions since there was no means of land transport.
In January Abercromby had requested that reinforcements be sent
from England since he knew the strength of his troops would not hold
up to a long star in Egypt.2
The French army in Egypt were about 25,000 men in contrast
to Abercromby's invading force of 15,000 British soldiers and a few
foreign regiments, altogether numbering under 20,000. The French
troops, however, after three years in Egypt, were scattered, lacked
provisions and were home sick. This gave success to the British
expeditionary force in Egypt in 1801. Aboukir castle surrendered
to the invading forces on 18 March and a decisive action against
the French was won on 21 March during which Abercromby was mortally
wounded. He was succeeded by Major General Hutchinson. After the
1. PRO, W.O.1/345, Abercromby to Dundas, 16 March 1801.
2. Ibid.., Aberoromby to Dundas, 15 Jan. 1801.
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action of 21 Maroh, it was jist a matter of time before the British
became masters of Egypt. They had. to seek out the French in their
scattered positions and. force them to surrender. Throughout the
campaign, however, the British army laboured under a shortage of
provisions and were prevented from disaster only by the exertions
of Admiral Keith in conjuring up a supply system in the Mediterranean.
On 25 March Captain Pasha arrived with about 4,000 Turkish
troops; 1 less than one month later Rear Admiral Blankett, who
sailed from Bombay at the end of December, after having taken on
300 troops under Colonel Lloyd, reached Suez on 21 April. 2 Blankett
had been stationed off the east coast of Africa for nearly three
years to counter the French threat to India. At the end of April
the British army was reinforced by the arrival of 3,000 men from
England.3
From the nature of the country it was necessary for the
British to become masters of the Nile in order to seek out the French
and. command Egypt. The army advanced along the Nile in germs, yawls,
cutters, flatboats, armed launches and. long boats and. British and
Turkish gunboats (each about 50 tons). 4 Troops, provisions and
supplies were also transported across lakes Maadieh and Mareotis by
these means.5
1. PRO, W.O.1/345, Hutchinson to DuMas, 3 April 1801.
2. NBS, Keith, Hutchinson to Keith, 13 May 1801, vol. II, 300.
3. Sir John M. Burgoyne. A Short History of the Naval and Military
Operations In Egypt from 1798 to 1802 (London, 1885), 121.
4. N1, Keith, Keith to Hutchinson, 29 April 1801, vol. II, 228.
5. Ibid., Keith to Hutchinson, 31 July 1801, 340-1.
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On 27 June Cairo surrendered. The terms agreed upon were
almost exactly the same as those embodied in the convention of El
Arish; 1 the French with their arms and artillery were to be shipped
to France in British ships. Keith soon began measures to carry out
those terms and the embarkation of the Cairo garrison was completed
by 8 August. The warships and transports on which the French were
embarked proceeded to sea by divisions. The Braekel with the first
division sailed on the 4th; the Inflexible, Dolphin and Ulysses
with the second on the 6th; and the Experiment and Pallas with the
last on the 10th, carrying with them between 13,000 and 14,000 of
the enemy. 2 Meanwhile reinforcements from England and the
Mediterranean were sent to Egypt in July and. August.3
On 17 August the siege of Alexandria began. During the
siege 5,000 men under Major General Coote were transported by the
Mareotis to the westward of Alexandria in order to divide the
enemy's force and attention. The men were accommodated on board
all the boats of the warships and transports with as many germs as
could be collected from the Nile.4 On 2 September the French at
Alexandria capitulated on the same terms as the French garrison at
1. A convention signed between the French General Kieber and Sir
Sydney Smith in 1800 by which the French were to leave Erpt
provided they were transported back to France in English ships.
The convention, which was never authorized, by the British govern-
ment, was broken when K],eber was assassinated by a Muslim fanatic
on 15 June 1800.
2. NBS, Keith, Keith to Admiralty, 27 Aug. 1801, vol. II, 346-7.
3. E. g., W.O.1/345, 19 Aug. 1801; NMM, Keith/1122, 21 July 1801;
5 Aug. 1801.
4. NRS, Keith, Keith to Admiralty, 27 Aug. 1801, vol. II, 346-7.
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Cairo. 1 Two days earlier General Baird arrived at Rosetta with
his troops from India having marched his army across the desert
from Kosseir on the Red Sea to Keneh on the Nile and. then having
passed them from Keneh by divisions in germs. 2 He arrived after a
five months journey too late to be of any assistance.3 The garrison
of Alexandria had now to be transported back to France. It consisted
of 10,528 soldiers and 685 members of the Institute and other
civilians. 4 Keith needed all the troopships to accommodate the
British and French soldiers; but the empty victuallers and store
ships and any transports that were not absolutely necessary he urged
the Admiralty to recall to England. 5 After acting as principal
agent for transports for several months Keith was well aware of the
great expense of transports; earlier, he had given positive orders
at }lahon for all transports not needed for the public service to be
sent home. 6 In the ensuing weeks many English and French troops
left Egypt.
On 1 October, the day before the news of the.final surrender
reached London, the preliminaries of the Treaty of Ainiens were signed
between Lord. Hawkesbury and M. Otto, the French Commissioner for
1. NMM, Keith/1J22, 2 Sept. 1801.
2. Wilson, op. cit., 129, 159.
3. PRO, W.O.1/345, 19 Aug. 1801; Fortescue, op. cit., 863.
4. N1, Keith, vol. II, 238.
5. N, St. Vincent, Keith to St. Vincent, 4 Sept. 1801, vol. I, 223.
6. NMM, Keith/I/22, 8 Oct. 1801.
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Prisoners. One month earlier Keith had praised the men of the
transport service for their efforts during the expedition to Egypt
in a letter to the Admiralty.
The nature of this expedition has demanded from most
of the officers and. seamen of the fleet, and. parti-
cularly from those of the troopships, bomb vessels,
and transports, the endurance of labour, fatigue and
privation far beyond. what I have witnessed before and.
which I verily believe to have exceeded all former
example; and it has been encountered and surmounted
with a degree of resolution and. perseverance which
merits my highest praise, and gives both officers
and men a just claim to the protection of their Lord-
ships, and. the approbation of their country. The
number of the officers to whom I owe this tribute of
approbation, does not admit of my mentioning them by
name; but most of the captains of the troops ships,
have been employed. in the superintendence of these
duties, and. I have had repeated and urgent offers of
voluntary service from all. - The agents for trans-
ports have conducted themselves with laudable diligence
and activity in the service of the several departments
to which they are attached, and displayed the greatest
exertion and ability in overcoming the numerous
difficulties with which they had to contend.1
1 NMM, Keith/L/22, 2 Sept. 1801.
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CHANR VIII
THE PROVISIONING OP THE KING'S PORCES
DURING THE WAR AGAINST REVOLUTIONARY
FRkNCE
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Throughout the war against revolutionary France the Treasury
was responsible for provisioning the King's forces and. that depart-
ment hired the army victuallers, as the ships that carried provisions
to the army were called, for the first seven months of the war. In
August 1793 the duty of hiring army victuallers together with the
duty of contracting for army provisions was delegated. by the Treasury
to the commissioners for victualling the navy. (The Navy Board who
had. acquired the duty of hiring navy victuallers during the American war
very often assisted. the Treasury and. then the commissioners of
victualling by hiring ships to be used as army victuallers.) The
Victualling Board hired army victuallers until the establishment
of the Transport Board when that duty together with the hiring of
troopships and ordnance vessels was transferred to the transport
commissioners. Then, the Transport Board was responsible only
for hiring the tonnage for the provisions; how much and. what kind.
of provisions was laden on the ships was still the responsibility
of the Victualling Board.
Army victuallers were hired through brokers in the same
manner as troopships and ordnance vessels and were fitted out as
victuallers by the method described in chapter three. Regular
victuallers hired for six months certain with capture and sea risk
at the expense of the government were always used to victual the
navy since they could serve as depots for the stores, till the ships
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could clear them; following the fleet under such orders as the
commander in chief might give. Regular victuallere, however, were
not generally used to victual the army when there were storehouses
on the station and particularly when a British merchant fleet traded
with the area. Thus, regular victuallers were not generally sent
to the West Indies though several accompanied Grey and Abercromby.
The government found it more convenient and. less expensive to hire
West India ships at a certain rate per ton with the risk of capture
and the danger of the sea falling wholly upon the owners than to
send regular transports with ladings only to return empty. After
delivering the stores they were discharged from the transport
service. 1 The same method was employed in provisioning the
garrison at the Cape of Good Hope. Since that station was on the
trade route of the East India Company, regular army victuallers
were never sent to the Cape. Enploying viotuallers by the run was
thought to be the best way of transporting army provisions on the
short haul to the Continent during the campaigns of 1793 and 1794;
and the garrison at Gibraltar, which had plenty of storehouse room,
was generally provisioned by viotuallers on freight. On the other
hand it was necessary to send regular victuallers to Lisbon since
there were no storehouses there. Regular victuallers also
accompanied expeditions, such as the Grey and Abercromby expeditions
1. E. ., PRO, T/27/44, 31 Dec. 1793; T.1/790, 12 Aug. 1797;
T.1f812, 20 Nov. 1798.
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to the West Indies, the expedition to the Helder in 1799 and.
Aberoromby's expedition to Erpt in 1801. Thus, provisions were
transported mainly by freight to the Continent, Mediterranean, West
Indies and Cape of Good Hope during the war against revolutionary
France.
The practice of sending provisions by freight to the army
abroad, though convenient and less expensive to the Transport Board,
met with criticism from the commissary department which preferred
to have regular victuallers at their disposal. The Commissary
General in the West Indies, Valentine Jones, was severely critical
of the usual custom of sending provisions to the West Indies on
West India ships hired on freight. Food supplies sent to the forces
stationed in the West Indies were consigned to Jones on the island of
Martinique, where a central depot was established from which the
provisions were distributed to the other islands. Because there
was a central depot small ships had to be hired for the purposes of
distribution. In a letter to the Treasury of 5 May 1797 Jones
proposed the mode of apportioning the provisions to distinct islands,
by which method the new freights in small vessels would. be for the
most part if not wholly avoided..
In the present instance, the ships and. cargoes are
thrown upon me at once in this island, to be unladen
with great delay and trouble and. again shipped in
smaller vessels for general distribution and specula-
tion for homeward. freights on the part of the Masters
put their moving further out of the question. The
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expense of new freights necessarily follows; and. is
effected so tediously, that several garrisons at once
	 -
may be in want, ihilst the greatest plenty prevails
at headquarters.
Jones did not prefer transport vessels for the victualling
service but recommended taking up particular West India men whose
ultimate destination would admit their being engaged. to deliver
provisions at different islands; although the general rendezvous
for them could still be known to him officially at Martinique.2
The Treasury investigating the subject asked the Transport
Board. commissioners why they forwarded provisions to the West Indies
by merchant ships instead of by victuallers upon monthly pay. On
12 August 1797 the Transport Board gave this explanation. "If we
employed regular transports for this duty, we must not only greatly
increase our stated and constant tonnage, and especially for the
West Indies, but also be under the necessity of engaging them, with
the risque of capture, for four or six months certain, to carry out
the Stores, and have them to return crippled. and empty."
The Board. thought it would not have been beneficial to the
service,
if the chartered transports er7 used as depots
for provisions under the direction of the commissaries,
instead of the commanders in chief of His Majesty's
Ships, and Ler7 sent from Island to Island, or
remain7 in Port; because no expence of small
1. PRO, T. 1/790, 5 May 1797 as enclosed. in 29 Aug. 1797.
2. Ibid..
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vessels ou]47 be equal to the charge of heavy
victuallers; to say nothing of the ruinous state
of the vessels themselves from long detention; and
the complaints Lhic7 always (aros7 from such
delays.
As to the destination of the several ships to particular
islands, this, the Transport Board conceived was "fully in the power
of the Victualling Board without having recourse to more difficult
or expensive measures;" for the Transport Board hired, examined and
appropriated the tonnage for victuallers but left the method of lading,
the qualities of the stores to be laden, and the consignment of the
whole and every part to the direction of the Victualling Board. The
transport commissioners then instanced the station in question, stat-.
ing that the Victualling Board required of them at that time 2,700
tons for the leeward islands generally. The Board engaged "the
vessels, with that unconfined expression, to proceed to any of the
islands under that denomination not to the Leeward of Martinique,
but including that Island." It appeared to the Transport Board
extremely easy for the Victualling Board to apportion the provisions,
according to Mr. Jones' plan, to distinct islands, to consign them
accordingly, "by which method, the new freights in small vessels,
concerning the expence and delay of which Mr. Jones complained would
be for the most part if not wholly avoided." The Transport Board
then proposed that the Victualling Board confer with them on the
subject.1
1. PRO, T.1/790, 12 Aug. 1797.
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In March 1800 the Victualling Board tried to put a clause
into the bills of lading of victuallers which would have empowered
the West Indian commissaries to order the vessels where they might
have thought best. However, this clause never went into effect
because the owners of the ships hired to convey provisions to the
West Indies refused to sign the bill of lading which put them under
the command of the commissaries. The ships in the West India. trade
were usually bound to one port only and the ports to which they were
bound were those where the King's victualling stores were situated,1
The minutes of the Transport Board reveal no change in the charter
parties of victuallers and reveal no change in the method of the
Transport Board in forwarding provisions to the anny in the West
Indies for the remainder of the war.
After a ship was hired and. fitted out as a victualler the
contractor who provided the provisions loaded the vessel under the
supervision of a victualling agent and at the same time ordered the
master of the victualler to take a receipt for its cargo. After
the establishment of the Transport Board, when a victualler was laden
the master signed a bill of lading at the Victualling Office. Preight
was not paid by the Transport Board until this certificate was pro-
duced from the commissioners of victualling showing that the masters
had duly accounted for the provisions put on board their respective
ships. 2
 The Transport Board had no direct control over the victuallers
1. PRO, P.1/838, 29 March 1800.
2. PRO, P.1/790, 30 Aug. 1797; T.1/789
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until they were laden and ready to sail anithen they gave the
necessary orders to their agents to take them in charge. 1
 Upon
reaching their destination the victuallers were unloaded under the
supervision of the commissary general or one of his deputies who
took charge of the cargo and gave the proper receipts for it; pro-
visions once delivered were regularly charged to the commissaries in
the books of the Victualling Office.2
Generally the kinds of provisions laden on viotuallers
were flour, beef, pork, butter, rice, pease and oatmeal, since the
field ration of a British soldier consisted of one pound of bread
or flour and twelve ounces of pork, or in lieu thereof twelve ounces
of beef per man per day plus a half a pint of oatmeal per week and.
a ration of pease and rice. 3
 The army in the West Indies received
during the campaign half a pound of bread extra per day.4
It was not necessary to lade rice or much butter on
victuallers going to the West Indies because rice could be procured
on reasonable terms in the islands as could sugar and cocoa oil, a
substitute for butter. 5
 The substitution of oil for butter as pro-
posed by the commissioners of victualling was not acceptable to the
troops on the Continent and was never put in force.6
1. PRO, T.1/812, 20 Nov. 1798.
2. PRO, P.1/727, 27 Jan. 1794;
3. PRO, P127/44, 17 Dec. 1793.
4. PRO, T/29/67, 4 Nov. 1794.
5. PRO, T/29/65, 28 March 1793;
6. T/29/67, 17 July 1794.
T.1/790, 30 Aug. 1797.
T/29/66, 14 Nov. 1793.
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A quantity of spirits was always issued to the King's forces
and rum was given to the troops in the West Indies for the first
year of the war. Soon after Grey arrived in the islands, he suggested
that the merchants employed at Teneriffe to supply wine for the navy
should send. an equal quantity to the West Indies for the use of the
army; experience had proved that wine served in place of spirits to
the seamen was better for their health. 1 The Treasury approved
Grey's suggestion in May 17942 and contracts were made with the
merchants at Teneriffe and Madeira. As a result the army was served
wine in lieu of spirits, in the same manner as the fleet. One pint
of wine was considered equal to half a pint of spirits. By 1801
it had become the practice to issue wine to the troops three days in
the week in lieu of rum. 3 Victuallers were sent to Portugal to
forward Madeira, Teneriffe and Porter to the army in the West Indies.
Later in the war the government had an agent at Lisbon for the pur-
pose of supplying the forces in the Mediterranean with Portuguese
wines, and the agent was generally provided with vessels for that
purpose.
It was necessary to get the victuallers to their destinations
as soon as possible since provisions for the use of the troops might'
be unfavourably affected by being so long on board. ship. However,
1. PRO, T.1/28, 13 Feb; 6 March 1794.
2. PRO, T./29/66, 20 May 1794.
3. PRO, T.1/854, 26 Jan. 1801.
4. NMM, Kei/L/26, 7 Nov. 1800.
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victuallers, like troopships, suffered from delays of contrary winds,
waiting for convoys and impressment. 1
 At the other end of the
journey the ships carrying provisions to the Caribbean were often
stopped and inconvenienced when entering the ports of the West Indies
by customs officials since transports and victuallers did. not clear
out at the customs houses in England. 2
 In 1798 one victualler,
the Intrepid., was seized by the customs at Martinique and resold
because the master had. not reported to the customs like other vessels.3
After several complaints concerning customs officials had. been referred
to the Treasury from the Transport Board, the Treasury gave directions
to the customs officers in England to forward monthly returns of the
arrival and sailing of transports at the several ports. To render
the returns useful the Transport Board notified several transport
agents in the British ports to instruct the commanders of all vessels
wider the control of the Transport Board to answer the questions of the
customs officials. Thus much interference from customs officials was
eliminated for the duration of the war.4
The Transport Board rarely lacked the tonnage necessary to
forward. provisions to the troops in the Caribbean since there was a
1. The delays resulting from the mutinies in the fleet in the spring
of 1797 were very destructive. In April and May mutiny delayed
the sailing of the convoys for the victuallers, PRO, ADN/108/45,
8; 10; 11; 13 May 1797; in June seamen at the Nore p].u.ndered all
ships of provisions and whatever else they chose detaining nearly
40 sail of merchantmen. PRO, ADM/108/46, 3; 6 June 1797.
2. PRO, P.1/34, 12 Aug. 1794.
3. PRO, P.1/809, 24 Aug. 1798.
4. PRO, LDM/108/52, 10 March 1798.
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merchant fleet sailing continuously between Britain and the West
Indies. The one exception was 1796, a year when a rise in cost,
provisions and. wages made it extremely difficult for the Transport
Board to provide shipping on aiiy terms. After the freight rate was
raised from 13/.- to 15/- per ton per month in the spring of 1796 the
Transport Board was able to hire enough vessels for this service.1
Provisions, however, were held up from reaching the West Indies for
other reasons. Besides the usual delays of prohibitive winds,
waiting for convoy and. impressment, there were: the occasional
capture of victuallers on freight to the West Indies; 2
 the poor
wheat, corn, and. pease crop in Britain in 1794-5 which resulted in
a shortage of provisions; the severe winter of 1795-6 which prevented
many ships from getting out to sea. 3
 The troops in the West Indies,
however, never suffered. from a scarcity of provisions even when the
supply was delayed far beyond what was expected. because the commissary
general would. either purchase food. supplies in the islands or open
ports to foreign vessels particularly those from America.
The war in the West Indies was only three months old. when
Lieutenant Governor Home of Grenada recommended. to Dund.aa opening
West Indian ports to American vessels for the importation of food.
1. PRO, T.1/773, 15 Oct. 1796; see above, p. 78.
2. E. ., PRO, T/29/66, 2 July 1793; T.1/803, 12 March 1798;
P.1/818, 28 March 1799; P.1/839, 4 April 1800.
3. Between October 1795 and. April 1796, nine victuallers, one half
of those that sailed., arrived in the West Indies.
PRO, ADM/1/3730-3731, Oct. 1795-May 1796.
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supplies and lumber from the United States; under such restrictions
as the government might suggest. At the time, however, the ministry
directed the governor to make up any deficiency in provisions by
purchasing them in the islands rather than importing them from America.
The Treasury soon found it necessary, however, to relax the navigation
laws by opening some West Indian ports to American vessels in order
to adequately supply the British army in the Caribbean. Grey was
instructed in October 1793 to permit provisionally the importation
of provisions, cattle, and. grain of all sorts into one of the con-
quered West Indian islands from the United States. The food supplies
could be transported in American vessels of one deck for so long as it
was "necessary for the re-establishment and subsistence of the said
Island, or until proper measures were taken for putting it upon the
same footing in that particular, and. in all others relating to
commerce," with other British islands in the West Indies. 	 By
December of the same year in order to insure a regular supply of
fresh meat to the forces on Grey's expedition, the ministry allowed
Spanish American vessels to carry cattle (oxen) to the islands.
Besides the oxen, the vessels were permitted to bring in lumber,
staves, hoops, flour and salted beef and. pork; they were allowed by
the commissioners of customs at the islands, to carry back mollasses,
rum, sugar and coffee in return for their cargoes to the amount of the
net proceeds of the articles of merchariize before enumerated. This
arrangement with the Spanish American vessels was made by Thornton
1. GP, 175b.
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and Company, contractors for furnishing the troops.1
There were instances when supplies were purchased in America
but brought to the islands in British ships. In March 1794 Thornton
and Company contracted for four shiploads of livestock and. other
provisions to be purchased in America for Grey's forces; 2 two months
later the Treasury approved, the purchase of flour in America for
Canada and the West Indies. 3 St. Domingo which also experienced
a scarcity of flour purchased a fresh supply in America that year.4
Flour and beef, when sent from Britain, could not remain long in the
Bahamas without being unfavourably affected by the climate; these
were the victuals most frequently purchased in America.
In 1795 and. 1796 the ministry was forced to widen the
suspension of the navigation laws by opening other West Indian ports
to American vessels when the scarcity of wheat in Britain and. the
delay in sending provisions to the troops occasioned by a want of
vessels made the situation at Martinique alarming. Governor Vaughan
at Martinique opened the ports to the Americans and allowed them,
as an inducement to enter, to take off a certain quantity of island
1. PRO, T/27/44, 21 Dec. 1793; T.1/7 25, 6 Dec. 1793.
John Thornton, the founder of the company, was the biggest English
merchant trading to Russia in the second half of the 18th century.
His three eons, Samuel, Robert and Henry, all entered the business
and also became members of parliament. Robert was a director of
the East India Company throughout most of the war against revolu-
tionary Prance.
2. PRO, T.1/29, 7 March 1794.
3. PRO, T/29/66, 3 May 1794.
4. PRO, T.1/771, 13 July 1794.
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produce in payment. 1 Flour could be had in the West Indies in
1795 but at not less than %16.00 per barrel. Therefore, it was
less expensive for government to purchase flour in America.2
If the system of plunder was not so prevalent in the West
Indies and the risk of capture not so great, more commercial inter-
course might have been carried on between the islands and the West
Indian ports would not have had to be opened to the Americans.
For a very considerable time no trade was carried on between the
island of Jamaica and the merchants from other islands. Con-
sequently the commanding officers were obliged to permit the landing
of goods from the Americans in order to supply the absolute wants
of the army. When circumstances altered and. the army was assured
British goods might easily be obtained from Jamaica an order was
issued prohibiting the importation of dry goods from America.3
The British army in the West Indies never suffered from a
shortage of provisions because of the availability of victuals in the
islands, from America or from England. Abercromby wrote home in
October 1796 "It is fair to say that the supplies have been regular
and there has scarcely been a complaint." 4 Abercromby's statement
sums up the provisioning of the icing's forces in the West Indies for
the duration of the war.
1. PRO, W.O.1/31, 13 Jan. 1795.
2. PRO, P.1/755, 7 Sept. 1795.
3. PRO, P.1/755, 8 Oct. 1796.
4. PRO, T.1/733, 19 Oct. 1796.
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The King's forces at the Cape of Good. Hope also were
adequately supplied with provisions since the Transport Board did.
not find it difficult to hire East India ships on freight to forward
food. supplies to them. The Transport Board tried to keep up a
supply of provisions for three months at the Cape as it had in the
West Indies. As with the garrisons in the Caribbean, the poor grain
harvest in Britain ffected the provisioning of the garrison at the
Cape; a quantity of flour had to be sent to the Cape from India.1
Viotuallers were not sent to the East Indies since the articles needed
to provision the army there were purchased in the East.
Unlike the forces in the West Indies and. the Cape of Good Hope
the British army on the Continent laboured. under the greatest diffi-.
culty for want of provisions. This resulted from a scarcity of
tonnage to serve as army victual].ers occasioned by the ambitious
military policy of the ministry; the failure of some provision
contractors for the Continent to fulfil their contracts and the
consequent difficulties of procuring provisions on the Continent;
and an insufficient supply of land transport to forward provisions
to the troops.
The vessels hired as army victuallers for the Continent were
generally taken up on freight at about 20/— a ton and were employed
for about twenty days running, after that they received demurrage.2
1. PRO, T.1/788, 26 July 1797.
2. E. g., PRO, £D14/108/158; ADM/1/3730, 3 Oct. 1794; 6 Nov. 1794.
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The transport service discovered that vessels of about 100 tons with
a draught of wider fourteen feet made the best bread and hay ships
since they would be able to go from Ostend. by the canal to Bruges)
By the end of 1794 the Victualling Board judged it necessary to have
at least eight vessels employed in receiving meal and bread for the
Continent.2 By these means the transport service was able to con-
vey only a partial and temporary supply of army provisions to the
Continent because of the exhaustion of the freight market by other
military contingencies.
The store of food supplies for the army in Flanders was
reduced further when some provision contractors for the Continent,
in particular Mr. Eckhardt, did. not fulfil their contracts and the
army had. to try and provide for themselves at any rate. Supplies
were ordered to be procured through magistrates of towns and. villages.
The orders not being understood, were little attended to, and. this
occasioned great expense, confusion and difficulties, especially since
a monopoly had been made of those articles. 3
 The frost of 1794-95,
which shut up the transport by water, by which those articles might
have been brought from distant parts, added to the difficulty of
keeping down the prices.4
 The procurement of provisions on the
Continent was also impeded by the "impolitick" and. "inimical" measures
1. PRO, P.64/204, 3 May 1793.
2. PRO, ADM/108/34, 19 Dec. 1794.
3. PRO, P.1/42, 6 Jan. 1795.
4. Ibid., 6 Jan. 1795.
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of the Prussian minister, who laid. a strict prohibition upon the
meal aM forage purchased for the army, which was only removed by -the
repeated instances of Lord Henry Spencer. 1 Nor was the situation
helped by the temporary embargo laid upon all provisions for the
British army in East Friesland. Fortunately the embargo was raised
to prevent disaster.2
The third factor that contributed to keeping the British
army on the Continent dangerously low in provisions was the in-
sufficiency of land transport throughout the two campaigns. At
the beginning of the campaign of 1793 the Commissary General at
Ostend, Mr. Duncan, with much difficulty had to buy waggons and
horses -to clear the victuallers since there was not enough land
transport sent by the Ordncn-ice. 3 Since waggons were also necessary
to convey provisions to the outposts, the difficulty of procuring
them on the Continent resulted in many soldiers in forward positions
being short of victuais. 4 On 6 January 1795 General Harcourt
wrote from Amerongen of the shortage of provisions and waggons.
Tho' we have never wanted bread none of the magazines
are in any state of forwardness. We are obliged to
forage from day to day and that in addition to all
these circumstances we are almost without the means
of transporting the sick, the ammunition, cloathing
and other supplies for the army.5
1. PRO, W.O.1/172, 11 Feb. 1795.
2. Ibid., 17 Feb. 1795.
3. PRO, P.1/72 1, 7 Aug. 1793.
4. PRO, W.O.1/172, 17 Feb. 1795.
5. Thid., 6 Jan. 1795.
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Three weeks later he wrote to General Walmoden. "It is impossible
to remain on the Yssel, as we have now neither bakeries, 1 meal,
forage or carriages to supply the wants of the army in that position."2
By March Harcourt found himself obliged to order the assistant
commissaries and even the commanding officers of regiments, to pay
ready money (without waiting for the usual official examinations of
receipts and papers) for meal and forage to prevent the men and. horses
from starving; 3 the subsistence which might have been drawn from the
rear was consumed by the corps of Hanoverians.4 The scarcity of
provision and forage made it impossible for the British army to remain
longer on the river Ems; the victuallere that were available were
sent to the city of Bremen to be of service to the retreating troops.5
The poor grain harvest in Britain in 1794 which resulted in
a scarcity of those products in 1795 and 1796 did. not affect the pro-
visioning of the British soldier on the Continent since the campaign
in Flanders was coming to an end. In December 1794 General David.
Dundas at Thil had complained of a scarcity of bread; 6 but this was
occasioned more by the shortage of land transport than by the poor
grain harvest. In fact in March 1795 when he moved his corps to
Emden, six vic-tuallers were sent there to relieve him.7
1. Portable baking ovens were used on the Continent.
PRO, T.1/764, 4 April 1796.
2. PRO, W.O.1/172, 28 Jan. 1795.
3. Ibid., 14 March 1795.
4. Ibid.., 12 March 1795.
5. Ibid.., 7 March 1795.
6. Ibid.., 31 Dec. 1794.
7. Ibid., 11 March 1795.
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Diplomatic and. military events determined the outcome of the
campaigns of 1793 and 1794; but if the army on the Continent had. been
more adequately provisioned the soldiers' existence would have been
more coinfortable, 	 retreat less hasty and the minds of the
commissaries more at ease.
Army victuallers generally taken up on freight were sent
to Gibraltar and. the Mediterranean in large fleets though there is
evidence of groups of two or three victuallers being sent from time
to time. About thirty army victuallers reached Gibraltar and. the
Mediterranean in 1796; all arrived. after April because of the
severe winter. Only twenty army victuaflers arrived in 1797, the
year in which the Mediterranean was evacuated by the British army
and navy and 6,000 men were detached from the Mediterranean force
and sent to Portugal with General Stuart, A mere twelve are recorded
as reaching Gibraltar in 1798. As a result of the re—entry of the
British fleet and. forces into the Mediterranean in 1798 and the
subsequent occupation of Minorca there is evidence of twenty five
army victuallers reaching their destination in the Mediterranean in
1799. At least half as many more were sent to the Mediterranean
in 1800 to victual the garrisons of Gibraltar, Minorca and Malta
and in preparation for the expedition to Egypt.1
Though the corn and wheat scarcity in Britain did. not effect
the provisioning of the troops on the Continent it did effect those
1. PRO, ADM/1/3730-.ADM/1/3742 , Oct. 1795 to Dec. 1801.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
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stationed in the Mediterranean. When the shortage of flour in
Britain raised the price the government tried to buy flour for the
troops elsewhere. Orders were given for the purchase of wheat and.
flour at ports in the Mediterranean particularly at Leghorn and on
the coast of Barbary. 1 Since there were no means at Gibraltar for
grinding or dressing wheat or barley the wheat was first brought to
2
England in transports and in warships; then flour was sent to that
station generally in ships taken up on freight. To assist in
bringing wheat to Britain the Transport Office in December 1795
recommended that transports in the Mediterranean be loaded with corn
or flour, by persons appointed by government and after rendezvousing
at Gibraltar for a general convoy homewards, to consign such cargoes
to the commissioners of the victualling, or their agents at the out-
ports. 3 The scarcity of flour was to effect the quality of wheat
sent to the troops for several years.4
The army in the Mediterranean suffered from a shortage of'
pease when there was a scarcity of that article arising from the
small quantity sown the year before occasioned by the high price of
the seed; 5 but the Treasury and transport service made sure that
PRO, T
.1/751, 20 July 1795;
T.1/754, 10 Oct. 1795.
PRO, T.1/759, 16 Jan. 1796.
PRO, T.1/759, 31 Dec. 1795.
PRO, T.1/780, 1 March 1797.
PRO, T.1/757, 28; 29 Dec.
T.1/755, 27 Oct. 1795;
1795.
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they did not suffer from a want of meat. (The poor corn crop
resulted in a scarcity of pork since pigs feed on corn.) Pork and
beef were purchased in Ireland to be shipped to the Mediterranean
garrisons. 1 Ireland had also supplied cattle and the-vessels in
which they were shipped for the expedition to Quiberon. 2
 For the
remainder of' the war Ireland and the Barbary Coast supplied meat for
the army in the Mediterranean.3
The force under General Stuart in Portugal was provisioned
from England and from the provincesof Portugal. The provisions
from England were generally forwarded in regular army vi.ctuallers to
the troops in Portugal since there were no storehouses in Lisbon.
However, a shortage of regular tonnage at home in September 1798
resulted in some victuallers for the Lisbon service being taken up
on fratgt.4 	 Cattle, bread and barley were procured in the
provinces of Portugal for the King's troops.5
When the British army returned to the Continent for the
expedition to North Holland in 1799, they and their Russian allies
were provisioned from England, Bremen, Hamburg and. St. Petersburg.
The provisions from England were forwarded to the army at
the Helder on board troopships, transports on freight and on regular
1. PRO, P.1/759, 4 Jan. 1796.
2. PRO, ADM/1O8/36, 6 Aug. 1795; see also, p. 232.
3. PRO, P.1/823, 10 April 1799.
4. PRO, ADM/108/55, Sept. 1798.
5. PRO, P.1/828, 14 Sept. 1799.
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army victuallers. Though no victuallers sailed with Aberoromby's
first division on 13 August, the troopships contained victuals for
12,000 men for 5 weeks and after disembarkation on the 27th three
weeks provisions remained on board. The second division wider
General Don arrived at the Texel one day later, after having been
embarked only two or three days. There must have remained on
board their transports provisions for 2,000 men for five weeks.
The third division, a cavalry division, was victualled for 650 men
for six weeks and not embarked more than ten days. The fourth
division which sailed on the 11th and 13th September consisted of
twenty one infantry ships containing 5,500 men victualled as above
and were not embarked for more than a week. Therefore the trans-
ports that carried the troops to.the Helder in 1799 carried a large
supply of provisions in surplus to what was needed for the passage.
Besides the food supplies on board the troopships the
Transport Board sent several transports on freight with provisions
for 40,000 men at soldier's allowance of all species for five weeks.
These several transports, first delivered three and one half weeks'
provisions, then returned to Ramsgate where they took on board
another one and one half weeks and brought them to the Held.er. Since
there was very little storeroom at the Helder ami no materials for
building most of the provisions for the army in Holland were forwarded
by regular army viotuallers not exceeding one hundred tons each.2
1. PRO, P.1/825, 24 Jan. 1800.
2. PRO, P.1/829, 30 Sept. 1799; AD/108/63, 11 Oct. 1799;
W.o.i/181, 29 July 1799.
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By these means a proportion of bread, pork and spirits for 40,000
men (bread 10 weeks, spirits 5 weeks, pork 2 weeks) were sent in
six separate sailings between 25 August and 22 October. The sail-
ings were 25 August (sailed with the second army division wider
General Don); 15 September; 19 September, 26 September, 15 October,
22 October.1
The preceding calculation is exclusive of the provisions
brought in the transports from Russia, of supplies which were obtained
from the King's ships and armed transports; and of such quantities
as the commissary procured on the Continent.2
There was no actual want of supplies at any one time during
the expedition but on several ocias ions there was a fear of shortage
since the victuallers sent to the Helder were slow in arriving
(there was a lapse of three weeks between the let and 2nd sailings)
and the resources of Holland did not offer much to the army.
On 31 August, three days after the first fleet of victuallers
arrived with the second army division under General Don, Commissary
General Henry Motz sent orders to Hamburg and Bremen for meal and
oats since he thought there would be a shortage of supplies before•
the next fleet of victuallers arrived. He was probably aware of
the Transport Board's difficulties in obtaining tonnage in Britain
at this time; 3 and his experiences as a commissary general during
1. PRO, P.1/825, 24 Jan. 1800.
2. Ibid..
3. PRO, P.1/829, 10 Oct. 1799.
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the campaigns of 1793-94 must have added to his apprehension. His
anxiety was renewed on 9 September when still no victuallers had
appeared; there were only eight days supplies left. 1 On that day
he informed, the Treasury of an immediate want of bread. The Duke
of York's anxiety over the supply of provisions was expressed through
Colonel Brownrigg in a letter to the Treasury of 13 September.2
Just at this time large quantities of bread and spirits were about
to leave England. The second fleet of victua].lers with enough
supplies to furnish the army for twenty days left from England on
the 15th.3
In the meantime Commissary Motz sent two empty victuallers
to Messrs. Thornton and Power at Hamburg to bring back meal as
quickly as possible. He also sent eleven transports (probably
empty ordnance or troopships) into the Weser to bring back meal
and oats from Bremen.4
 This was necessitated by the fact that the
contractors on the Continent found shipping extremely scarce and
neutral vessels refused to sail under British convoy. Commissary
Motz hoped. that convoys from Hamburg and Bremen could be dispensed
with so that the vessels could arrive at the Helder more quickly.5
While Motz was contracting for provisions on the Continent,
Home Popham at St. Petersburg, was attempting to hire vessels to
1. PRO, W.O.1/182, 7 Feb. 1800.
2. PRO, P.1/834, 18 Oct. 1799.
3. io, w.o.1/182, 7 Feb. 1800.
4. PRO, T.1/829, 30 Sept. 1799.
5. Ibid.
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transport rye meal and biscuit for the use of the Russian troops.
The four victuallers on freight which he hired with much difficulty
did not arrive until 31 October, when the plans for evacuating North
Holland were in operation. 1 These victuallers were sent along with
the Russian troops to Guernsey and. Jersey. 2 Since the Russians
landed no provisions with them they were victualled during their
stay at the Held.er from the magazines of the British army; they
required one and. a half pounds of biscuit and. three pounds of bread
per day, 3 a half pound more of biscuit per day than a British soldier.
Shipping from the Elbe and Weser, after being held up for
five weeks because of the weather, arrived on 20 October, two d.ays
after the British capitulated. to the French. 4 They brought to the
armies in Holland about forty days wheatmeal for 30,000 British
and twenty two days rye meal for 10,000 Russians plus oats for
5,000 horses. 5 These provisions were used by the armies until their
complete withdrawal from the Continent at the end of November.
In the meantime all victuallers and vessels entering the Texel were
told of the evacuation and then were sent back to England.6
1. PRO, T.1/825, 8 Feb. 1800; P.1/830, 31 Oct. 1799.
2. PRO, T.1/830, 29; 31 Oct. 1799.
3. PRO, T.1/828, 14 Sept. 1799.
4. PRO, P.1/829, 10 Oct. 1799; W.O.1/182, f. 68.
5. PRO, P.1/830, 24 Oct. 1799.
6. Ibid., 29 Oct. 1799.
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It is most probable that the experiences of the commissary
department on the Continent during the campaigns of 1793 and 1794
made them over—cautious about the problems of provisioning the army
at the Helder. But they need not have been so apprehensive for
the transports that arrived in England with the wounded men from
the expedition had three, four, five and. even seven, and eight
weeks provisions on board. them for the number of troops they were
intended to receive.1
Keith and Aberoromby had reason to be apprehensive about
provisioning the British expeditionary force in Erpt because the
government's comprehension of the supply problem for that expedition
was very vague indeed. Keith's exertions in Erpt in conjuring up
a supply system out of the provisions available at Minorca, Sicily,
Tunis and Algiers plus the assistance given to the invading forces
by a former British consul general in Erpt in obtaining supplies
from the Arabs saved the anny from starvation.
When the plans to expel the French from Erpt were first
formulated the King had his doubts about the capability of the
British government to adequately provision an E&yptian campaign
and he expressed them in a letter to Henry Dundas in October 1800.
It is with reluctance I consent to the proposal of
sending 15000 troops wider the command of Abercromby
to Erpt; as that service must probably prove a burial
ground for them to as great an extent as St. Domingo;
1. PRO, W.O.1/181, 23 Oct. 1799.
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for unless the army be supplied from home as amply
and. as regularly as -that in America was by the Treasury
in the time of Lord North nothing but famine can attack
it. As to any part of it being afterwards fit for
service that cannot be expected. I am therefore not
surprised that Lord Grenvil.e and. Mr. Wyndiiam have
dissented from the measure.
Dund.as assured the King that the government could undertake such a
campaign by stating that he relied. "with just confidence on the con-
tinuance of the same exertions which had. so successfully contributed
to the supply of His Majesty's troops in all the various and compli-
cated. services of the present war." Relative to the dissent of
Grenville and. Wndhain Dundas asserted that "the extent of the Force
sent on the expedition, and the want of provisions for the army
were none of the grounds of their dissent."2
The government planned. to provision the Egyptian expedition
from the resources available at Gibraltar, Minorca and Malta, from
friendly ports in the Mediterranean, and. from regular army victuallers
sent out every two months.
Gibraltar, Minorca and Malta were generally provisioned from
England but those provisions were usually supplemented by articles
purchased in the Mediterranean. Transports and cruisers, under
convoy, brou,ght fresh provisions and. corn to the garrisons from the
coasts of Italy and. Barbary and. from Leghorn; live bullocks were also
1. Add.. MSS., 40,100, 5 Oct. 1800, f. 293, printed Aspinall, George III,
vol. III, 424. (no. 2256).
2. Ibid., 6 Oct. 1800, f. 295.
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purchased. at Leghorp for the army and transported. in warships.1
Minorca and Malta, unlike Gibraltar, had mills capable of turning
wheat into flour; therefore wheat was purchased in Barbary and
Sicily and Bent directly to those islands. 2 The government also
had. an agent at Lisbon for the purpose of supplying the forces in
the Mediterranean with Portuguese wines.3
Though the garrisons in the Mediterranean could generally
rely on receiving provisions from England and from Mediterranean
ports there was no depot in the Mediterranean to serve them in case
of an emergency. Therefore, in May 1800 Abercromby as commander
in chief of the Mediterranean forces recommended the establishment
of a depot in Minorca to serve the whole Mediterranean army (then
10,000 men). He suggested that six months salt and dry provisions
(biscuit, flour, salt, pork and spirits) be sent to Minorca, one
third every two months until countermanded.. He also recommended
that the vessels hired for their conveyance be hired for six months
certain in order that they could be detained or sent to other
destinations, as the service might require. Abercromby wanted at
least half of the six months supply to be set apart in case of an
emergency.4 An emergency occurred when the troops were in E&ypt
1. NMM, Kei/i.4/26, 13 Aug. 1800; PRO, T.1/841, 18 May 1800.
2. PRo, P.1/848, 1 Nov. 1800.
3. See above, p. 283.
4. PRO, P.1/841, 10 May 1800.
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and. these provisions were sent for.
The government followed Abercromby's suggestion and. by the
third week of September they had established depots at both Minorca
and Malta. There were six months provisions for 6,000 men in
Minorca and three months provisions for 6,000 men in Malta. Since
the articles of flour, biscuit, and. salt meat were perishable in
their nature, the commissary general was directed constantly to issue
part of them nearly in the following proportion always taking the
oldest or least likely to keep - salt meat three days in the week
or half and half with fresh meat according as this could be procured.
Biscuit was issued two days in seven or eight. 1 Deputy Commissary
Burgman on 19 September had. been ordered to keep up his stock by
requisitions from the Treasury at home.
At this point the ministry made their decision to send
Aberoromby to Egypt. From then on all the regular viotuallers
which the Victualling Office said were to be sent out every two months
were assigned to Abercromby's army. 2 These victuallers proceeded
to Gibraltar first and there awaited orders. 3 By the first week
of November seventeen victuallers had arrived at Gibraltar for the
use of the anny; very little of the stock was consumed previous to
1 October. Therefore the force under command of Abercromby appeared
1. PRO, T.1/848, 24 Sept. 1800.
2. Ibid.
3. PRO, 
.ADW108/68, 11 Sept. 1800.
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to be supplied to 11 February 1801 except for the biscuit which was
to last only one third of that time and. requests were to be made
for some to be sent out from England.	 The consumption of Abercromby's
army at Gibraltar was 25,000 rations per day and a proportion of the
provisions had. been carried off by the force under Lieutenant General
Sir James Pulteney. Therefore, as limited a supply of every article
as possible was to be left at Gibraltar so that the army would. be
supplied at least to 11 February 18o1. 2 The army hoped. to receive a
succession of supplies from England until August of the following
year. The army was to rely also on the depots at Minorca and Malta;
the commissary general by Aberoromby's order had applied to the
Treasury that the permanent stock at Malta be six months instead of
three.3
Thus during the preparations of October and November there
was a sufficient supply of provisions in stock in the Mediterranean
for the army; but this was not so for the navy which had to rely on
the army's magazines for salt provisions bread and flour.4
Before the expedition sailed Keith purchased biscuit, flour,
fresh meat, vegetables and wine in the Mediterranean. A kind of
market was held on shore in Morocco for cattle 5 and vegetables;
1. PRO, T.1/849, 29 Oct. 1800.
2. PRO, T.1/849, 19 Oct. 1800; T.1/854, 7 Nov. 1800.
3. PRO, P.1/854, 7 Nov. 1800.
4. PRO, 14.0.1/344, 21 Nov. 1800, Aberoromby to Dundas.
5. Butchers sailed. with the fleet to cut up the cattle. A private
on board the Dictator. A Faithful Journal of the Late Expedition
to Egypt (London, 1802), 22.
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every article bought was dipped. in salt water before being taken on
board the ships. 1	(The army could. no longer rely on Sicily as a
source of corn since an embargo was placed on the export of that
article by the Sicilian government; the Sicilians themselves were
under the necessity of importing corn.) 2
 Nevertheless the army
victuallers sailed with a deficiency of rice, pease and. sugar since
neither Gibraltar nor Minorca could furnish an adequate supply of
these articles. Keith purchased besides provisions in the Mediterranean,
cordage and shoes in Sicily; ropes, canvas, spars, fuel, candles,
medicines and. other necessaries in Lisbon and Naples; he hired small
vessels and paid. pilots to transport these supplies.3
After many weeks of repairing and provisioning troopships
and. victuallers and. after a delay of contrary wind the expedition
finally set sail on 20 December. Fresh provisions, fruit and.
vegetables were acquired at the different ports where the fleet
stopped,4
 especially during the long stay of fifty three days in
Marmaras Bay. 5 However the provision supply was not replenished
anywhere near the rate that it was consumed. As a result, the army
which had been subsisting since 1 October on provisions set aside
for the expedition, landed in Erpt on 10 March with three days
1. A private on board the Dictator, op. cit., 22; see also,
Moore, op. cit., vol. I, 384.
2. PRO, P.1/850, 11 Nov. 1800.
3. NMM, Kei/W22, 19 Sept. 1801.
4. Ibid.
5. PRO, P.1/ö57, 11 Jan. löOl; see also: A private on board the
Dictator, op. cit., 27.
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provisions. This dangerous situation was partly relieved when the
supplies from the warships and. transports were landed bringing the
total amount of provisions for the invading forces (both army and
navy) up to seventeen days.1
The supply of provisions was soon added to through the
efforts of a former British consul general in Egypt who accompanied.
the expedition. George Baldwin obtained sheep, poultry and other
refreshments from the Arabs at a cheap rate; and there was never
any want of water. 2 The supplies provided by the Arabs looked like
an abundance at first and did prevent the soldiers from starving;
but the victuals were quickly diminished and there was little more
to come.
The situation also changed as the army advanced. The
perennial problem of an insufficiency of land transport made it
difficult to bring food. supplies to the army in Egypt as it had to
_____	 L
the army on the Continent. On 2 June HtwkiBon wrote -to Dundas,
"Our chief difficulty is provisions of all kinds, which tho they
abound in the country, we do not find it easy to get at; indeed
the present state of the bar at Rosetta (which is almost impassable)
and the low state of the river, render the carriage of bread and
spirits, which we are obliged to get from the fleet, tedious to a
1. PRO, P.1/859, Motz to Treasury, 15 March 1801.
2. G. Baldwin. Political Recollections relative to Egrpt (London,
1802). Letter to John Baldwin. Baldwin was consul-general in
Egypt 1786-1793; lived. in Egypt as a merchant 1775-1779, 1786-
1798.
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degree, and renders it impossible to advance with that degree of
rapidity" that the army wished. 1 Even if land. transport were
available the provisions on the fleet were being reduced rapidly
and victuallers arrived from England only at rare intervals. In
April the expedition was joined by viotuallere from England; and
by the armed transports with troops from Lisbon. But these provisions
were being conswned at a rapid pace by both the army and navy. The
optimistic reports received from the invading forces soon after they
landed in Egypt obviously led the ministry to believe that there was
an abundant supply of provisions in the country. It is over this
business of supply that Keith's difficulty with his captains arose
and a quarrel ensued which in Keith's eyes amowitedto a conspiracy
to challenge his authority. 2 In May, when the sick were suffering
extremely for the want of fresh provisions, many lives would have
been lost but for the humanity of Keith's captains in supplying them
out of their private stock.3
Another difficulty that impeded the provisioning of the
army was the fact that the expeditionary forces were in the greatest
distress for money. There was plenty of wheat in Erpt but little
could be purchased because of the shortage of currency.4 Keith sent
the wheat that was purchased to Malta and Mahon to be manufactured
.
1. PRO, W.O.1/345, Hutchinson to ' 1'3—TKyri1 1801.
2. NRS, Keith, vol. II, 234-5.
3. Ibid., Captains of the Fleet to Keith, 11 May 1801, 296-7.
4. PRO, P.1/859, 17 May 1801.
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into biscuit; he also sent supplies of rice for the whole station
as it could. be procured in Egypt at a low rate. 1
 Keith alBo sent
warships to Punis, Algiers and Sicily to bring back food supplies;2
without the warships it would have been impossible for Commissary
Motz to feed the army.
Throughout the summer and autumn of 1801 victuallers, troop
reinforcements and money were sent to Egypt. The troopships carry-
ing reinforcements also brought supplies with them. It was Keith's
exertions, however, during spring and. early summer 1801, in creating
a supply system from the Mediterranean to Egypt to supplement the
infrequent arrival of victuallers from England, that kept the British
expeditionary force alive in Egypt in 1801.
As has been discussed in chapter seven the expedition to
Egypt was a success in spite of the failings of the provisioning
department. The failure did. not lay with the transport service,
as there was plenty of tonnage available; but lay with the govern-
ment which did not comprehend the problems that were involved in
provisioning an army of 15,000 men in Egypt. DuMas in October
1800 was very confident that this could be done, as is recorded in
his reply to the King on this subject. 3
 In all fairness one must
point out, however, when plans for an expedition to Egypt were
formulated in September 1801 the ministry thought that the army
1. NMM, Kei/L/22, 15 June 1801.
2. NRS, Keith, vol. II, 229.
3. see above, p. 301.
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would. be in egypt by November and. under normal circumstances it
would. have. What the government failed to foresee were the long
delays at Minorca and Malta resulting from the poor condition of
the troopships; what the government could not foresee was the pro-
longed stay on the coast of Asia Minor occasioned by the uncooperative
spirit of the Turkish government.
310
CHAPTER IX
CONCLUSION
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By the time the Treaty of Amiens caine to pass in March 1802
a number of important developments had taken place concerning the
transport system. It had changed considerably since the American
war of independence having benefited. greatly from the experiencand
weaknesses of the transport service as conducted during that war.
The most important and radical change was the establishment of a
separate board to handle the freight and. victualling services of the
transport system. The lack of centralization in the administration
of the shipping employed. in support of the British army overseas was
a serious problem during the American revolution which was discerned
and discussed by Charles Middleton at the time. During the American
war the Ordnance and Victualling Boards chartered shipping in direct
competition with the Navy Board. Since there was a shipping short-
age throughout the war this had very damaging results particularly
after 1780 when the Navy Board was constantly outbid for ships by
other boards. Only the coming of peace in 1783 saved the transport
service from a tonnage disaster. With the creation of the Transport
Board in July 1794 the competition in the engagement of shipping, which
had before existed among the Navy, Victualling and Ordnance depart- -
ments, was eliminated. By the elimination of competition in the
engagement of shipping the transport service also was saved from
additional enormous expense during the French war because tonnage on
account of the immense extension of trade had been scarce and dear
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beyond example. Except for the transference from the Treasury to
the Navy Board in 1779 of the task of conveying army provisions
overseas, there had been very little cooperation between the depart-
menta concerned with the transport service during the American war
resulting in almost no coordination of their activities and in end.-
less confusion. This same problem existed for the first eighteen
months of the war against revolutionary France before the establish-
ment of the Transport Board. It was not as acute, however, because
the need for cooperation had been revealed by the American war and as
a result the Navy Board on several occasions hired ships for the
Victualling and Ordnance Boards before July 1794. During this
eighteen-month period the Navy Board was successful in hiring and
fitting out the tonnage needed for the conveyance of the King's
forces and their equipment overseas but the Victualling and. Ordnance
Boards met with difficulty in hiring the ships they needed. The
whole process also was slowed down, less organized and less efficient
because the Navy Board was a subordinate administrative office and
had to work through the medium of the Admiralty. With the establish-.
ment of the Transport Board the secretary of state as well as the
heads of other departments concerned with the transportation of' the
British army corresponded directly with the Transport Office. Inter-
departmental comiminication was cut in half and. the whole process was
speeded up.
Other benefits to the public and. war effort arose simply from
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the establishment of the Transport Board itself. Since the Transport
Board was set up to deal specifically with transport affairs it gave
undivided attention to them, whereas, the Navy Board with its duties
and obligations to naval affairs had not. This is best evidenced
by the minutes of the Transport Board which averaged ten pages per
day. When the transport service was under the auspices of the Navy
Board the minutes devoted to that service averaged a half a page
daily. Many of the dockyard abuses revealed by the naval enquiries
of the 1780's especially those respecting the commissioners of the
Victualling Board who superintend.ed. the department of the Hoytaker
were eliminated when the duty of hiring the victualling and. ordnance
vessels was given to the Transport Board. Also eliminated were the
chances of having excess tonnage hired by three boards instead of
one.
Besides the special benefits inherent in the establishment
of the Transport Board there were improvements made in the transport
system by the Board after its creation. The service and the public
derived immense advantage from the fact that the Board used. many
brokers thus eliminating a price fixed by one or a few. When the
Navy Board was in charge of the transport service it employed vessels
tendered by not more than a dozen persons and two thirds of the
vessels tendered were in the hands of one broker. By the close of
the war the Transport Board held contracts with between 300 and 400
different people many of whom were the actual owners of the vessels.
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A major change was made in the transport system when the Transport
Board. adopted. the plan reoommended. by Captain Bowen of taking up
ships by their registered instead of measured tonnage. By this
means great expense and inconvenience was avoided since the owners
would not see the surveyors of the customs to make their vessels
larger than their real tonnage and. the delar of placing the ships
on the ground or going into dock was eliminated. The whole saving
to the public since Captain Bowen's plan was adopted up to 1815,
amounted to the enormous sum of £1,221,816.
	 The Board did. not
employ inferior officers over and. above the superintendence of the
shipwright officer; and. an
 agent of the Transport Board, besides
being a commissioned officer in the navy, had to pass under the
particular examination of one of the naval commissioners of the
Transport Board, and. had. to be approved. by him. The changes made
by the Board in the charter parties particularly the regulations
governing the behaviour of masters, and the initiation of a register
showing the deficiency in men and stores were notable advantages to
the transport system which developed from the experiences of the
Transport Board after its establishment. These things could. not
have been accomplished, with equal advantage and. efficiency if left
to other departments with other and various duties.
The Transport Board was able to meet tonnage requirements
during the war against revolutionary France faster than the Navy
1. NLS, Melville, NSS. 1044, f. 111.
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Board. in the American war. Because of the centralization of the
administration of the shipping employed in the transport service
the Transport Board was able to hire all the shipping needed for a
particular expedition and then let its survey team designate the
vessels that could best be used. as troopships, victuallers, and
ordnance ships. The efficiency established by this coordination
of activities between the Transport, Victualling and Ordnance
Boards enabled. the transport service to produce ships more quickly.
It was also possible for the Transport Board to deal more adequately
with a shipping shortage because the competition among the various
boards in the engagement of shipping had been eliminated. The
existence of a regular trade between Britain and many of the areas
where the army was being sent during the Prenoh war enabled the
Transport Board to hire many ships on a short—term basis to convey
troops, provisions and. stores and thus, satisfy its shipping obliga-
tions within a relatively short period. Hiring space on merchant
ships that traded between Britain and the destination of the King's
forces was an advantage the transport service had during the war
against revolutionary Prance which the Navy Board did. not have during
the American war because a merchant fleet did not sail regularly
between Britain and North America, Ships could be hired on freight
only at a great expense during the American war because of the danger
of capture. Therefore the Navy Board had. no choice but to hire
regular transports which were not easy to obtain. This impediment
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delayed the dispatch of forces and supplies overseas throughout that
war. The transport service during the French war met its shipping
obligations also, by using warships whenever possible to accommodate
troops. For these reasons the Transport Board was able to collect
and. prepare vessels to convey the King's forces overseas faster than
the Navy Board during the American war. For example, the biggest
overseas enterprise of the American war was the dispatch of 27,000
troops in the winter and. spring of 1776. The ships that conveyed.
the men, their provisions and ordnance stores from Europe to North
America were hired, fitted. out and. sent to their destination in at
least four separate sailings over a period of nine months. The
Navy Board, Treasury, and Ordnance Boards with little cooperation
and no coordination of their activities each had to provide its own
ships. The Treasury found. it difficult to hire victuallers and.
had. to raise the freight rate in order to do so. Delay in sending
provisions delayed the entire operation. The November sailing of
the Abercrornby-Christian expedition of 1795 consisted of 27,000
troops and therefore compares favourably in size to the dispatch
of troops in 1776. Arrangements for this military operation were
begun the previous August and. by the middle of November the 27,000
troops had sailed from Portsmouth and. Cork. All the tonnage
requirements for troopships, victuallers and. ordnance ships had been
met by the Transport Board by the middle of October or in less than
three months. In preparing the 1776 campaign the Navy Board in
317
three months had hired 33,806 tons of shipping in Britain to be
used as troopships. This was only one third of the amount of
troopship tonnage needed. for the operation.
Arrangements for the expedition to the Helder is another
example of' how the Transport Board was able to collect, fit out and
prepare vessels in a relatively short time for a large—scale
military enterprise. Preliminaries for the expedition to the
Helder which involved the transportation of 46,000 men from England
and the Baltic to the shores of North Holland were begun at the end
of June 1799. Four weeks later the Board had over 44,000 tons of
transports at its disposal; about one fourth of these ships were
already in the transport service. By the end of September the
Board had collected, fitted out and. sent off to their destination
over 90,000 tons of transports. This was accomplished in a period
of little more than three months and at a time of great commercial
prosperity when it was more advantageous for the merchant to put his
ship to a trade than to lend it to the government. This could. only
have been accomplished by a board set up to deal specifically with
transport affairs; one that could give undivided attention to them.
During the American war tonnage was needed continually to
maintain and. provision an army conducting a campaign 3,000 miles
away over sri eight—year period; there was a shortage of vessels
throughout the war and it was only the coming of peace that saved.
the transport service from a shipping catastrophe. On the other
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hand there was no such sustained activity during the French war
because that war was conducted through a series of short campaigns
and expeditions. However, the scale of shipping needed at peak
periods was greater during the war against revolutionary France than
it was during the American revolution. The dispatch of 27,000
troops to North America in 1776 had been the one large-scale expedi-
tion of the American war and the Abercromby-Christian expedition of
1795 was equal to it in size. Other infantry regiments and recruits
destined for North America were sent throughout the American
revolution in much smaller divisions. On the other hand. there were
several military operations executed on a great scale during the
French war, and at a time when shipping was difficult to procure
because of the vast increase in every branch of trade. Therefore
the Transport Board handled bigger problems for short periods during
the war against revolutionary France than the Navy Board handled
d.uring the American war.
Several measures were taken by the Transport Board in order
to meet its great shipping obligations at these peak periods. At
different times during the war the Transport Board with the approval
of the Treasury raised the freight rate in order to entice the owner
of a merchant ship to lend his ship to the government instead of
putting it to a trade. The freight rate had been raised from 12/-
for all vessels in 1793 up to 19/6 for copper sheathed vessels in
1800. The first rise in the freight rate came in 1795 as a result
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of the aoute tonnage difficulties the Navy Board experienced in
1793 and. 1794 in sending over 16,000 men and their equipment each
to the Continent and. to the West Indies. Because of the precedence
given by the ministry to the West Indian operation the arrival of
the King's forces and their equipment on the Continent was delayed..
Even with the new rise in the freight rate the Transport
Board experienced tonnage difficulties during preparations for
the Abercromby-Christian expedition to the West Indies because of
the size of the enterprise. It met the shipping requirements for
this military operation by taking advantage of the regular trade
that existed. between Britain and. the West Indies and sending to
the Caribbean 14,000 of the 27,000 troops on East and. West India
ships hired. on freight.
There was a lax period. of about three years from 1796 to
1799 when there were no large-scale expeditions and. therefore little
tonnage was needed.. This period gave the Board an opportunity to
discharge many ships and. agents from the transport service and thus
lower expenses during a time of increasing costs and wages. Shipping
problems arose again in 1799 during the preparations for the expedi-
tion to the Helder because of the vast increase in every branch of
trade. The Helder enterprise involved more men than the Aberoromby-
Christian expedition or the '76 campaign but the tonnage requirements
were less because of the short passage and the fact that some of the
troopships conveying the British army made three successive trips to
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North Holland. The Transport Board successfully met the shipping
requirements for this military enterprise by not allowing vessels
already in the service to leave, by utilizing warships as troopships,
and. by hiring many ships on a short-term basis.
The Transport Board did not experience tonnage difficulties
when sending Abercromby's army to Erpt to expel the French in 1801
because the 15,000 men employed, in that operation were already on
board troopships sent into the Mediterranean throughout 1800. The
Board's efforts to meet its shipping requirements in 1800 had been
facilitated by the fact that there were no large-scale expeditions
planned and by -the fact that early that year the freight rate had
been raised 2/- for sheathed vessels and. 2/6 for those sheathed
with copper.
The Transport Board hired more ships on freight during the
war against revolutionary France than had been hired. in any previous
war. They were used often to supplement regular tonnage in the
conveyance of troops especially to the West Indies; but more signi-
ficant was the fact that ships hired on freight carried the bulk
of -the provisions to the King's forces abroad. Only ships on
freight were used to convey troops, provisions and stores to the
Cape of Good Hope and the East Indies, and they carried the major
part of the provisions to the West Indies, Gibraltar and the Continent.
The Transport Board found it more economical to hire ships on freight
to convey food supplies to the British army overseas than to send out
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victuallera on freight with lad.inga only to return home empty.
This practice of the Transport Board resulted from the fact that a
regular trade existed between Britain and many of the areas where
the British army was being sent during the French war, and to the
experiences of the Treasury and. Navy Board during the American war.
There was a large armed force overseas during the American revolution
which at the end of 1779 numbered 63,000 effectives 1 that had to be
equipped. and. victualled over an eight—year period. There was no
escape from the necessity of provisioning the British forces in
America from Europe because of the lack of a regular trade between
Britain and. America during the war and. because of the danger of
capture. The King's troops could. not get provisions locally since
they rarely had control of more territory than the ground upon which
the forces stood. Also, there was the problem of the victuallers
being detained overseas throughout the American war and the efforts
of the Admiralty, Treasury and. Navy Board could not bring about a
prompt return of ships. It was the coming of peace in 1783 that
saved the army in North America from a fatal provision crisis.2
At no time during the war against revolutionary France was there a
body of men overseas as great in number as that which had to be
provisioned during the American war. The greatest number of men
the Treasury had to maintain overseas during the French war was the
46,000 British and Russian troops in North Holland in 1799. The
1. Syrett, op. cit., 191.
2. Ibid.., 269.
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provisions the Transport Board. sent over on troopships, regtdar
victuallers and. ships hired on freight were more than adequate
for the three—month stay at the Helder. There was never a shortage
of provisions in the West Indies during the war against revolutionary
Prance because the transport service took advantage of the regalar
trade existing between Britain and. the Caribbean and. sent most of
the victuals by freight; also food. provisions could be obtained
locally or from America. Provisions were successfully brought to
the King's forces at the Cape of Good Hope on East India ships
hired. on freight and. there was never a want of victuals among the
British army in the East Indies because food. supplies were procured
for them there. In 1793 and. 1794 the British army on the Continent
suffered some discomfort from a lack of provisions because of a
shipping shortage occasioned. by the West Indian campaigns and. because
of the failure of the Ordnance Board. to provide enough waggons and
land transport to convey the victuals to the troops. Abercromby's
expedition to Erpt would. have experienced a provision disaster but
for the exertions of Keith in conjuring up a supply system from the
Mediterranean. But this want of victuals in 1801 resulted from a
lack of cooperation from the Purks and the subsequent long stay of
fifty three days in Marmaras Bay and not from transport failure.
Because of the Transport Board's wise and practical provisioning
policy the British forces never suffered from a provision crisis
during the French war as the King's troops had. during the American war.
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During the war against revolutionary France the transport
service under both the Navy and Transport Boards suffered from the
government's failure to equate its military policy with the realities
of the military and. maritime resources of Britain; it also suffered
from the inefficiency of the Ordnance Board on innumerable occasions.
Because of Dundas' ambitious military policy there was a shortage of
men and equipment which held up the expeditions to the West Indies
and. contributed to the failures on the Continent. Nevertheless
during the first four years of the French war the transport service
was successful in bringing to the Caribbean over 58,000 men with
their necessary camp equipage and baggage and in supplying them with
stores, medicines and provisions; and. as a result Britain succeeded
in conquering many of the colonial possessions of France, Holland and.
Spain. Since most of the tonnage available had been used for the
West Indian operation it was with considerable effort that the Navy
Board. transported about 16,500 men to the Continent during 1793 and
1794 and were successful for the most part in conveying their victuals
and stores. But there were not enough men -to conduct a successful
Continental campaign especially with the disheartened support of
Prussia and Austria in 1794. Therefore, the lack of success in
Flanders in 1793 and 1794 which enabled a new order to -take a firm
hold in France and. in Europe cannot be ascribed to transport failure
but must be attributed to the conflicting war aims of Britain's
allies and to the failure of the ministry to estimate the military
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strength of Britain or to concentrate on a single object instead
of many.
The disorganization and inefficiency of the Ordnance depart-
ment from the very beginning of the French war was an obstacle to
success in every theatre of that war. The Master General of the
Ordnance was Blow to replenish the ordnance magazines and. stock
from the inferior state to which it had sunk after the American war.
He did not even attend cabinet meetings until 1795. The campaigns
of 1793 and 1794 on the Continent suffered considerably because of
the disorderly state of the Ordnance department and because of the
department's negligence in collecting and distributing supplies.
There was a shortage of artillery, artillery men and artillery
drivers throughout the campaigns as well as a shortage of waggons
which greatly hindered the provisioning of the troops. In 1796
the Transport Board came under fire from the ministry for the first
time because of the slowness in getting the Abercromby-Christian
expedition out to sea. It was the Ordnance Board's failure to act
promptly so that the ships could be ready to sail when the wind was
fair. The Transport Board had appropriated the ordnance vessels
rather quickly but time was lost in preparing them for service, a
responsibility of the Ordnance Board. By 4 November, two weeks
before the expedition's departure only half the ordnance vessels
were completely laden and. ready to sail. Since Abercromby refused
to sail till everything was complete the inconvenience and delay in
shipping the stores for the West Indies held up the entire expedition.
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And. by this detention the fair wind, for sailing was lost. As a
result, the Portsmouth and. Cork fleets which finally sailed with a
deficiency of ordnance stores twice tried unsuccessfully to reach
the Caribbean during the stormy winter months of 1795-6. it was
not until the following spring that the expedition greatly decreased
in strength finally reached its destination.
As a board the Transport Board did its work efficiently and
effectively but there Was no outstanding personality like Middleton
during the American war. Two of the original commissioners, Hugh
Christian and Philip Patton left the Transport Board within two
years after its establishment to take their flag in the Royal Navy.
However, the transport agents and. dockyard officers most experienced
in naval and transport affairs and. many of whom worked for the Navy
Board when the transport service was under its jurisdiction, remained
with the Transport Office throughout the war. A separate Transport
department was an innovation in the transport system that was greatly
needed and. which considerably benefited the public and. the war effort.
The fact that the Transport Board was able to meet the shipping
requirements of Dundas' ambitious policy in the Caribbean, the
Mediterranean, the Continent, the Cape of Good Hope arid the East
Indies during a period. of increasing commercial prosperity when
tonnage was scarce and. dear beyond example was a tremendous transport
achievement.
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26 George III, o.60
An Act for the further Increase and. Encouragement of
Shipping and Navigation.
III.	 And. whereas it is highly expedient that the provisions made
for the Registry of Ships and Vessels by an Act, made and passed
in the seventh and eighth Years of the Reign of his late Majesty
King William the Third, intituled, an Act for Preventing Frauds,
and regulating Abuses in the Plantation Trade, should be altered
and amended, and that the same should be extended and applied to
Ships and. Vessels other than those which are therein particularly
described; be it therefore enacted, that all and every Ship or
Vessel, having a Deck, or being of the Bu.rthen of fifteen tons,
or upwards, belonging to any of His Majesty's Subjects in Great
Britain, or Guernsey, Jersey, and the Isle of Man, or of any of
the aforesaid Colonies, Plantations, Islands, or Territories,
shall, from and. after the respective times herein after expressed
be registered in Manner herein after mentioned; and that the
Person or Persons claiming Property therein shall cause the same
to be registered, and shall obtain a certificate of such Registry
from the Collector and Comptroller of His Majesty's Customs in
Great Britain or the Isle of Man, or from the Governor, Lt.
Governor, or Commander In Chief, and Principal Officer or Officers
of His Majesty's Revenue of Customs, residing in the Islands of
Guernsey or Jersey, or in any of the said Colonies, Plantations,
Island or Territories, respectively, in Manner herein after
directed; and. that the Form of such. Certificate shall be as
follows; videlicet:
In pursuance of an Act, passed in the twenty-sixth year
of the Reign of King George the Third, intituled, An Act (here
insert the Pitle of the Act, the Names, Occupation, and ReBidence
of the Subscribing Owners), having taken and. subscribed the Oath
required by this Act, and having sworn that he (or they), together
with (Names, Occupation, and Residence of Non-Subscribing Owners),
is (or are) sole Owner (or Owners) of the Ship or Vessel called
The (Ship's Name), of ( place to which the Vessel belongs), whereof
(Master's Name) is at present Master, and that the said Ship or
Vessel was (when and. where built, or captured, and Date of
Condemnation); and. (Name and nployment of the Surveying Officer)
having certified to us that -the said Ship or Vessel is (whether
British, Foreign, or British Plantation built), has (Number of
Decks) Decks, and (Number of Masts) Masts; that her Length,
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from the Forepart of the Main Stem to the Afterpart of the Stern
Post aloft is (Number of Feet and. Inches), her Breadth at the
broadest Part, whether above or below the Main Wales (Number of
Feet and Inches), her Height between Decks (Number of Feet and
Inches), if more than one Deck, and if not, then the Depth of
the Hold. (Number of Feet arid Inches), and. admeasures (Burthen)
tons, that she is a (Kind of Vessel, and. how built), has (whether
any or no Gallery) Gallery, and. (Kind of Head, if any) Head.; and.
the said. subscribing Owners having consented. and agreed to the
above Description and Admeasurement, and having caused sufficient
Security to be given, as is required by the said. Act, the said.
(Kind and. Name of the Vessel) has been duly registered at the Port
of (Name of Port).
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Charter Party of the 27 Ships from the Elbe -to England or Ireland.
The present Charter Party is convenanted, concluded and.
agreed upon, thia nineteenth day of August, in the Year of our
Lord, One Thousand. Seven Hundred. and Ninety Five, between Messrs.
Parish and. Co. of this City Merchants, and Captain Home Popham,
on the part of the Commissioners for conducting His Britanic
Majesty's Transport Service-
Messrs. Parish and. Co. engage to freight and. let to Captain
Home Pophain, Ten Thousand Lasts, or, Twenty Thousand Tons of
Shipping, to proceed on a voyage from the River Elbe off Stade to
a Port in England or Ireland. or the Limits of Ireland. on the follow-
ing Terms.-
1. The Ships to be all examined by Capt. Popham or his Officers,
as none will be accepted of, that are not teight and staunce, well
tackeled, apparelled, and provided. with everything else necessary
for the performing the said. Voyage. After they are examined and.
approved of, they are to be considered as chartered.
2. Captain Pophaxn promises to get shipped in the said vessels
off Stade, as many Horses, as he may think proper, with Provisions,
Stores etc., and One Man for each Horse, who are however to carry
no Arms, nor Ammunition.— Each Captain is obliged to take one Cabin
Passenger.
3. The Expence of fitting up the Stalls for the Horses and
what other charges may attend this Cargeo to be for Account of
Captain Popham.-
4. Captain Popham is obliged. to pay for each Last of shipping
thus engaged, Six Pounds Sterling, and fifteen percent Primage and.
Average. The Size of the Vessel is to be ascertained by our Sworn
Harbour Master. Each Ship is -to be provided with Combuses, Potts,
Pans and firing sufficient for the Men to be put on Board., for which
Messrs. Parish and Co. are to receive Thirty Shillings Sterling per
Man. Messrs. Parish and Co. are to pay all Port Charges at the
port of delivery, except the fire and Light money, which is to be
paid. by Capt. Pophain, as also all Port Charges, Pilotagee, and other
Expenoes incurred by the Different Vessels, if obliged to put into
any other Port than the Port of discharge by the Commodore of the
Convoy, on Certificates produced, by Bills as specified on the
Commissioners of the Transports.-
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5. For the fittment and loading of' the Vessels twenty days,
and for the discharging the Cargo Ten days, are in all, agreed upon,
beginning the day marked opposite each Ship underneath, which is
the day the Ship was approved of By Capt. Popham. If detained
longer then shall be paid unto Messrs. Parish and Co. Two Shillings
Sterling per day Demurrage for each Last of shipping. The number
of' days the Ships may be detained at Stade or any Port they mey be
ordered into are all to be considered as laydays, and to be deducted
from the above Number, or paid for at the rate Specified.
6. Messrs. Parish and Co. are to forfeit the hire of as many
tons as are not ready by the Twenty Fifth of August, Capt. Pophain
has leave to stop their Progress by giving Twenty Pour hours notice,
provided the Ships are not approved as Messrs. Parish and Co.
immediately hire them on the Approval of Capt. Pophazn.-
7. One half of the Freight Money to be paid to Messrs. PariBh
and Co. on the day the last Ship is chartered and the Charter party
concluded, by Bills on the Commissioners of Transports at Thirty
Days Sight, the other half, One Month after Transports leave Stade,
by bills of the same date.-
8. Messrs. Parish and Co. are to pay all the Bills of outfit
and. on producing their Bills certified by the British Consul and. a
respectable Merchant, to have a Commission of Two per cent, and the
whole to be paid. by Bills at thirty days Sight as above said.-
9. The Transports are to proceed under Convoy of such of His
Britanic Majesty's Ships as may be appointed for such Service—
Should they however happen to be burnt, Sunk, or taken by the Enemy,
in and during the performance of the aforesaid Service, and it shall
appear to a Court of Enquiry that the same did not proceed from any
fault and neglect or otherwise in the Master and Ships Company, the
Value of her shall be paid for by Capt. Pophazn according to an
appraisement to be made before they leave this Port by Alderman,
Captains and Carpenters.-
10. Should any Deviation that may be made from the above Agreement
cause any Dispute, both parties agree to have it settled hereby
arbitration.
This Charter Party is made from the preliminaries signed at
Bremer Lehe the Second day of August, and is concluded the Nineteenth
day of August, when Capt. Popham declared before our Notary that he
would not have any more Tonnage on these Conditions.
Johann Andreas Liiders
	 Home Popham
Johan Herman Langhans
	 Parish and Co.
1795.
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